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Preface. 
This thesis will view the Napoleonic War from three distinct angles. Firstly, as a world war that was 
fought beyond the narrow confines of Europe where events on other continents were as important as 
those taldng place in Europe. Secondly, the thesis will view the war from an Anglo-Swedish angle 
with an emphasis upon the northern and Baltic regions of Europe. This region of Europe is often 
forgotten when the Napoleonic War is written about despite the fact it was of vital economic and 
strategic importance to Britain. Thirdly, this military contest between the Great Powers will be 
viewed from 'beloW or in other words from the perspective of a minor power unable to influence 
events as much as these powers. 
One good reason for Anglo-Swedish friendship was the strong trade links between the two countries, 
which led to their successful but neglected economic sabotage of Napoleon's Continental system. Yet 
economic factors , though vital, did not primarily account for the creation and continued life of the 
'common cause,. Instead geopolitical and ideological factors gave rise to the 'common cause'. Firstly, 
although seeing themselves as nations apart from the continent Sweden and Britain's independence 
and strategic secunty depended upon no one power being able to upset or usurp the European balance 
of power. Secondly, in the eyes of Swedish and British conservatives (they ruled both countries for 
most of the alliance's life) Napoleonic France was not only a direct threat to their external security but 
Napoleon also came to symbolise everything they disliked about the new European order. To the 
architect of the alliance, Gustavus IV, and his fellow conservatives, Napoleon had to be defeated at all 
costs if Sweden, Britain and A of Europe was to survive. 
But the conservatives had a monopoly on neither political power nor the truth, for powerful groups in 
both countries opposed the war with Napoleon. These groups, in opposition during most of the war in 
both countries, believed an accommodation with Napoleon was possible. In 1806 the British Whigs 
tned and failed to find a peaceful accommodation with Napoleon. Following defeat at Russian hands 
and the diversion of British interest to the Iberian peninsula, the Anglo-Swedish alliance was almost 
dead when in early 1809 the Swedish opposition took power through a coup. They managed, unlike 
their British colleagues, to get peace with Napoleon, but at a high price. Defeat, despair and domestic 
9 
turmoil the following year led to the election of marshal Bernadotte as ruler of Sweden. Within two 
years Bernadotte had begun rebuilding the 'common cause' with Britain, and in 1814 Sweden finally 
saw its great protagonist Napoleon defeated, The pro-war line had showed itself to be the onlY 
realistic and viable long-term option for either country. 
10 
Chapter One. 
The Legacy. 
Auaglo-Swedish Relations during the Eighteenth Century and the Beginning of the 'Common 
Cause'. 
L Sweden's Eighteenth Century Legacy. 
By the early eighteenth century when Britain was poised to become the paramount world power 
Sweden's great power era had already ended due to her catastrophic defeat in the Great Northern War 
(1700-172 1). Having blamed Sweden's defeat upon autocracy Sweden's nobility opted to establish a 
parliamentary regime dominated by two parties, the Caps and Hats, but ruled for most of the time by 
the latter party. The Russian threat was a constant Swedish foreign policy theme as was the issue 
whether Sweden should remain isolated from continental politics by observing strict neutrality or 
reassert Sweden! s pretensions of power by meddling in European politics. In 1757 the Hats believed 
(as did Gustavus IV in 1805) that the time was ripe to intervene on the continent against Prussia on 
the side of a powerfid allied coalition that they hoped would be victorious. Both interventions led to 
revolution and the fall of the regimes that had risked an intervention in the dangerous waters of 
continental politics. 
Sweden's king, Gustavus III (Gustavus Ws father), exploited the failures of the discredited 
parliamentary regime to overthrow it on 19 August 1772. The Russians and Danes, united by their 
emnity of Sweden, feared that Gustavus Ul would preside over a resurgent and therefore threatening 
Sweden. Their planned pre-emptive invasion of Sweden a year later however came to nothing 
'because France intervened to prevent it. The price Sweden paid for France's timely intervention was 
to give her ally limited support in the American war against Britain. But Gustavus 111, the 
I Weigley. 3-6,8,13-37,41,44,73-74,78,107-116,120,176-177,305,389,536-537,539-540, 
543.; Michael Roberts, The Swedish Imperial Experience 1560-1718. (London, 1979).; Jeremy Black. 
European Warfare 1660-1815. (London, 1994). 3,8-10,69,77,93,101-102,114-117; DSH. VIII. 20- 
43,303-305.; DSH. IX 174-175; Hatton. NCMH. VII. 339-347,357; SUPH. 11.51-52,58-59,62,66, 
140-160,163-164,201. 
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revolutionary royalist, gave his support only reluctantly, because he believed that the American 
republican 'contagion' would spread to Europe. 2 
While Gustavus HI was no friend of republicans or revolutionanes he proved willing to exploit 
international turmoil to fish in troubled waters. In 1783 Gustavus III saw a chance to realise his old 
ambition of acquiring Norway by invading Zealand- Norway would not only prove a valuable 
economic addition but also eliminate the need for dividing Sweden's military forces between the 
defence of Finland and manning a western front against the hostile Dano-Norwegian army. (As we 
will see this ambition was inherited by his son who continued Swedish attempts in 1801 and 1808 to 
annex Norway by force or guile). Catherine 11 of Russia, Gustavus III's crafty cousin and match in the 
art of Machiavellian statecraft, had no interest however, in seeing the entire Scandinavian peninsula 
dominated by Sweden and intervened to put a stop to Gustavus III's plans. In 1788 Gustavus III had 
his revenge by attacking Russia, but the failure of the Swedish fleet to defeat the Russians in June 
1788 put an end to his hopes for a rapid descent upon St. Petersburg and a short summer war. By the 
autumn Gustavus Ell seemed about to share the Hats' fate as he had to contend vnth deteriorating 
finances, domestic discontent, the 'Anjala' mutiny in the Finnish army and a Danish declaration of 
war. But Gustavus IR, unlike his son in 1808-1809, was at his best when he stared disaster in the 
face, and by early 1789 he had staged a remarkable recovery by overcoming his previous problems. 
That recovery was crowned with complete success when the Swedish navy won a stunning victory at 
3 Svensksund in July 1790 which paved the way for peace based on the status quo. 
During the course of the Russian war Gustavus III had to throw worried side glances at the disturbing 
situation in France. The chaos in France not only undermined her ability to aid Sweden, but could 
spread as far as Sweden itself. 4 Gustavus III advocated harsh methods to crush the French 'trouble' 
claiming that 'The only remedy for all this is steel and cannon. It may be that at this moment the Idng 
2 SRE. 80-85,107,114,117-118,12 1. 
3 Lydia Wahlstr6m, Gustaf III och Norrmannen. Nordisk tidsskrift, XX, (1907). 56-59; Stewart 
Oakley, "Gustavus III's Plans for War against Denmark in 1783-8411, in Ragnhild Hatton and M. S. 
Anderson's (editors), Studies in Diplomatic History. (London, 1970). 268-286.; SRE. 155,157,165- 
170; SUPH. 11.307-308,311,314,317-319,335-336; Sandstr6m. 129-167; Madariaga. 401; GRK 13. 
4 SRE. 177. 
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and queen are in danger, but this danger is not as great as that to all the crowned heads that are 
menaced by the revolutioW. 5 Gustavus III, therefore, saw the warning signals from Paris earlier than 
most Europeans. His former enemy and fellow conservative Catherine II shared his fears and formed 
an alliance with Sweden in 179 1. His successes in gaining Russian support was not matched by his 
endeavours to foster a French counter revolution. 6 In fact, Gustavus III had more to fear from the 
Swedish opposition (radicalised by the French revolution) which managed to murder him in March 
1792 during a masquerade ball in Stockholm. 7 The conspirators failed to take power but duke 
Charles did and he ruled with the help of his friend and favourite, Count Gustav von Reuterholm. 
Aptly named the 'Grand Vizier', Reuterholm was the real power in Sweden and managed to make 
himself as hated a figure as Gustavus III had ever been by the time he was forced to resign with 
8 Gustavus IVs coming of age in November 1796. 
IL The Tranquility of the North 
Britain's Baltic Interests and Northern Policy, 1701-1796 
During the seventeenth century Britain and Sweden remained apart and hardly touched upon each 
other's zones of influence. Britain did not interfere with Swedish hegemony in the Baltic, while 
except for some shortlived colonial experiments in America and Africa9, Sweden chose not to 
challenge Britain! s growing overseas dominance. Anglo-Swedish relations, therefore, remained 
peaceful except for occasional disagreements about trade or maritime rights. That changed drastically 
in 1700 when WilhamIM(preparing for a showdown with Louis MV over Spain) did not want a 
northern war to distract his allies. He gave Sweden some naval support. George I of Hanover chosen 
as Icing of Britain in 1713 had no Spanish distractions and wanted Bremen for his Electorate to get 
access to the sea and used Britain's growing resentment over Swedish control over the Baltic to fight a 
short and victorious war against Sweden. Once he had achieved what he wanted George I maintained 
5 SRE. 194 
6 Barton. 146. 
7 Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg, Tyrannm6rdaren C. F. EhrensvArd. (Stockholm, 1947). 108,110-1,113-5, 
117-8; SRE. 196-7,201-2. 
8 Nylund. 1-52.; SRE. 216-217,227; DSH. IX. 222-229. 
9 Stellan Dahlgren, The Rise and Fall of New Sweden. (Uppsala, 1988). 3-118.; DSH. VI. 58-59. 
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the Baltic balance of power to secure the vital supplies of naval stores by intervening against Russia 
during the latter stages of the Great Northern war. 10 
With the return of peace and the uninterrupted flow of Baltic naval stores, British interest in Sweden 
declined. The few British travellers who went there complained about Sweden's Francophile 
sympathies and culture which did not serve to endear the country to the British. II The Swedes in turn 
dismissed the British as a nation of shopkeepers, while they gave grudging respect to British naval 
power, commercial clout, industrial superiority, and scientific advances. 12 Britain was also Sweden's 
most important export market (iron, tar, pitch, wood, herrings being her main exports). On the 
British side there was always the uncomfortable fact that without Baltic naval stores her vast 
merchant fleet and navy would be paralysed. An even more uncomfortable fact was that these 
supplies were a virtual monopoly of Russia, the primary power in the Baltic. This was both an 
economic and political weakness which put Britain at a disadvantage in relation to Russia. However, 
Russia's dependence upon Britain for trade and investment was even greater than Sweden's, which 
reduced the potential risks to Britain of being economically or politically blackmailed by Russia. 13 
Mutually beneficial trading relations should have provided Sweden and Britain with a sufficiently 
strong base for a political alliance. Indeed those relations provided Gustavus IVs apologists among 
the historians with an argument for his British alliance. But strong trading links, as the Anglo- 
Russian cases showed, did not provide a strong enough base for an alliance without shared political 
interests and objectives. (Gustavus Ws later alliance with Britain rested mainly upon shared 
ideological, political, and strategic interests as well as common trading interests) Indeed the opposite 
could be argued since Sweden's ambition to expand her textile industry could only be made at the 
expense of British imports. Sweden also wanted her share of the rich oriental trade, which could only 
10 Chance. 2549,58-73,82-97,116-130,147-156,185-276,294-397. 
I Birger Steckzdn, Svenskt och Brittiskt. (Uppsala, 1959). 213-215,217-218,224-227. 
12 Sven Rydberg, Svenska studieresor till England under frihetstiden. (Uppsala, 1951). 100-137,139- 
343. 
13 Staffan H6gberg, Utrikeshandel och sj6fart pa 1700-talet. (Lund, 1969). 66-68,72,74,78,101- 
102,108,110-112,123,125-126,140-143,145-146. 
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mean competition with the British. The Swedish East India Company (1731-1806) became a minor, 
but successful, competitor to its British counterpart. 14 
Instead, Sweden remained a French ally right up to the revolution because of their shared political 
objectives and interests. Economic interests were of secondary importance,. In fact the Franco- 
Swedish alliance eNisted for reasons of mutual convenience, the shared desire to keep Russia in check, 
and tradition rather than realpofilik. The French alliance made Anglo-Swedish relations frostier than 
they need have been and placed them on opposite sides in the Seven Years War. In fact normal 
diplomatic relations remained broken between 1748 and 1764.15 But there were no actual hostilities 
between Sweden and Britain during the war. 16 Britain's need for Swedish exports outweighed the 
benefits from attacking her since Sweden's contribution to the allied war effort was minor. Britain! s 
introduction of draconian wartime regulations against neutral trade, seen as an attempt to damage 
competition (the suspected long term aim) rather than strangling French trade, backfired when the 
Scandinavian powers laid aside their mutual enmity to defend their common economic interests 
against the British. Only moderation on both sides prevented the maritime conflict escalating into 
serious crisis. 17 But moderation would not stand in the way of Britain making use of the economic 
blockade, her strongest weapon, in the war against France. The French in turn tried to circumvent the 
blockade by enticing the neutrals into smuggling for them. Using the neutrals in this fashion had the 
added benefit for France of embroiling them in political conflict with Britain which diverted their 
enemy's attention. But Britain obliged her enemy by treating the neutrals in an arrogant manner 
based on her navel supremacy. It was only during periods of relative weakness, such as during the 
American War, that the British used a softer tone towards the neutrals. There was therefore an 
established pattern of antagonism between Sweden, which upheld the view that a neutral flag 
protected the cargo from British seizures, and Britain, the only power to maintain the opposite view, 
that an enemy cargo onboard a neutral vessel was contraband (which was given the widest possible 
definition). Neither side could afford to yield much ground, since the British contraband list 
14 DSH. IX 44-53. 
15 Metcalf. 40-62. 
16 Safe. 5,11,110,323,358,360,442,536-7,559-560,570. 
17 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery. (London, 1991). 105,118,13 1; D. Ogg. 
Europe of the Ancien Regime. (London, 1965). 92-3. 
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contained almost all of Sweden's main exports, while for the British to give in to Swedish demands 
would damage the effectiveness of her main economic weapon against France. 
In 1765, when peace returned to the North, the British were presented with an opportunity not only to 
restore full diplomatic relations but even make an alliance with Sweden. The Francophile Hats had 
been replaced by the Caps who believed Sweden could become a British ally. But for Britain the great 
northern prize was Russia, not Sweden, for obvious economic and political reasons. Opposed to 
paying peacetime subsidies the British government failed to exploit Cap goodwill to cement closer 
Anglo-Swedish relations. The Gustavian revolution came as an unpleasant shock to Britain and she 
persisted in viewing Gustavus IR as a French puppet and a threat to the Tranquility of the North. 
But that perception changed when Gustavus 1H showed greater political independence vis-A-vis 
France than Britain had expected, especially when he kept Sweden out of the American war. Before 
the outbreak of the Russo-Swedish war Gustavus HI offered the surprised British an alliance. Pitt 
declined the alliance but he was becoming increasingly aware of the Russian threat to both the Balkan 
and Scandinavian peninsulas. Pitt was prepared therefore in September 1788, with Prussian backing, 
to force Denmark out of the war with Sweden. Pitt had no interest in seeing Sweden weakened so 
much that it could not act as a counterweight to Russia and fulfil its role in maintaining the delicate 
balance of power in the North, But he limited his intervention to ensuring Sweden's survival and 
nothing more. A calculated minimum effort which his political protdgd, George Canning, was to 
practise twenty years later under similar circumstances with Gustavus IV. The British viewed the 
outbreak of the French revolution with the similar indifference which was in marked contrast to 
Gustavus HI's immediate recognition of its dangerous potential. Pitt only belatedly realised that 
revolutionary France represented an even greater danger than Bourbon France had ever done and that 
Gustavus III's remedy, of brute military force, was the only one that would either contain or destroy 
this threat. 18 
18 Roberts. Liberty. 56; Franco Venturiý The End of the Old Regime in Europe, 1768-1176. vol. 
1. (Princeton, 1979). 287-288; SRE. 54,63,250-2. Michael Roberts, Essays in Swedish History. 
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VIL Contraband and Convoys: The Anglo-Swedish Conflict, 1797 - 1801. 
When Britain declared war on France in February 1793 it was inevitable that the old arguments 
concerning neutral maritime rights would flare up again. Neither side was likely to give way since 
Britain had regained her political confidence following her American debacle, while the success of the 
Armed League of Neutrality (1780-1783) had given Sweden a false sense of strength. The new 
Anglo-Swedish conflict was triggered by the British seizure of two Swedish convoys in the English 
Channel that they suspected were sailing for French ports. Gustavus Ws demand that the British 
release the convoys was refused and the two countries would be locked in an acrimonious dispute over 
the two convoys for the next five years. 
In 1799 the Anglo-Swedish crisis escalated when the British prize courts condemned the Swedish 
convoys19 and emperor Paul I of Russia ended his alliance with Britain over the failure of the Second 
Coalition. " During the summer of 1800 Paul I began to build an Armed League of Neutrality built 
around Russia with Denmark, Sweden and eventually Prussia as members. The aim of this league 
was to curb Britain's 'qTanny of the seas'. 21 Gustavus IV gave his wholehearted support to the aim of 
curbing Britain's 'arrogant' maritime pretensions but opposed Paul I's greater political aim of crippling 
Britain by co-operating with France in invading India. Gustavus IV had no wish to weaken Britain so 
much that she could not keep France, a far greater threat to Europe, in check. He made, therefore, 
last minute efforts to avoid war in December 1800.22 But the British, suspecting him of collaborating 
with Russia, broke off the negotiations. Gustavus IV, to avoid being left isolated, joined Paul I's 
armed League. 23 By then the British were already making military preparations against the League. 
Pitt brushed aside opposition claims that his government was malcing war on friendly powers, 
pointing out that Britain's vital grain imports from the Baltic and her blockade against France were 
19 Svensson. 347-349 
20 McGrew. 287-313; Jupp. 152,253,257,260 
21 Ole Feldbaek, The Anglo-Danish Convoy Conflict of 1800. 
172-182; McGrew. 314-316. 
22 Larsson. 48,58. 
23 Anglica. 473. EhrensvArd to Ehrenheim, 16 Dec. 1800. 
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equally threatened by the League's claims. In January 1801 an embargo was imposed on the League 
members' shipping. 24 
he a change of government to the more 'moderate' Addington administration in February 180 1, 
British preparations for war continued. 25 The new administration, like the previous one, failed to be 
impressed by the naval strength of their adversaries which no doubt encouraged the British to press on 
with their naval mobilisation. 26 But the first British blow fell on the defenceless Swedish and Danish 
colonies in the West and East Indies, which were easily occupied in March and May reSpeCtiVely. 27 
The British believed that only a British battle fleet in the Baltic could force the northern powers to 
capitulate, but they could not however decide if the fleet should attack Denmark or Russia first. 28 
Unaware that the fleet was not aimed against Sweden! s long, vulnerable coast, Gustavus IV mobilised 
his navy and coasW flotfllas in Much 1801.29 He displayed the SaMe fe, Vent SUpport of the aflied 
cause as he was to do during his war against France four years later. He tried therefore to get a 
common Scandinavian defence of the Sound to be organised but it foundered on the Danish suspicion 
that he might use such military preparations to invade Zealand at a later date" The Sound was 
flierefore left open to a British attack that Gustavus IV expected would lead to a rapid Danish 
capitulation. As in 1806-1807, the Scandinavian powers faded, to their mutual detriment, to unite 
against a common threat. 31 
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Events moved with unexpected and devastating speed against the League. On 23 March emperor Paul 
I was murdered and a week later, on 2 April, Nelson defeated the Danes outside Copenhagen. Both 
events forced Denmark to sign an armistice with Nelson and prematurely abandon the alliance, which 
aroused Gustavus IVs angry suspicions. Even if Demnark and Russia abandoned the allies''common 
cause' against Britain, Gustavus IV had no intention to change his political views. (He displayed the 
same uncompromising attitude a few years later in the allied war against Napoleon). This time his 
determination to continue the struggle against Britain forced him to overcome his revulsion for the 
French Republic and he appealed to Napoleon for an alliance. Nothing came of these overtures since 
Napoleon was keen to open peace negotiations with Britain. Russia shared that desire and Alexander 
1, for the first but not last time, reversed Russia's foreign policy at a stroke leaving his allies stranded 
to pick up the pieces. On 13 June 1801 Russia agreed to British maritime demands, such as pre- 
emption rights and the humiliating process of British naval searches of convoyed merchant ships, 
which had been opposed all along by the League and thus secured a total victory for Britain. 32 
IV. Between Enemies and Friends. 
Sweden's Troubled Relations with the Great Powers, 1801-1803 
Sweden was therefore diplomatically isolated and it was crucial for Gustavus IV to break that isolation 
by rebuilding his relations with the British. In November 1801 Gustavus IV therefore appointed Wan 
Silverhjelm as envoy to London, with the task of getting Sweden's West Indian colony 
(St. Bartholomew) back, a separate Anglo-Swedish commercial convention signed that would secure 
Sweden's exports from British seizure, and finally, compensation for the seized convoys. No mean 
diplomatic task in other words. Silverhjelm's negotiating partner, Lord Hawkesbury, the British 
foreign secretary was torn between a wish to normalise relations with Sweden and to force Gustavus 
IV to accede to the St. Petersburg convention. Hawkesbury's reception for Silverhjelm was polite 
but 
he demanded that Sweden accede to the above treaty without preconditions. When Silverhjelm met 
32 Tegndr. 11.1-3,350-355, Tegndr. 111.410-416; Ehrman. 111.470-471; Svensson. 362.; Odelberg. 
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he demanded that Sweden accede to the above treaty without preconditions. When Silverhjelm met 
Hawkesbury again on 12 January 1802, the foreign secretary made it clear that if Swedish demands 
for a separate and more favourable commercial treaty were to be accepted, then it would have to be 
matched by Swedish tariff concessions. (Such British demands were to be made during the next 
couple of years without success. ) Hawkesbury remained adamant and Silverhjelm agreed to accede to 
the St. Petersburg treaty on 26 February 1802.33 
Gustavus IV had hoped that his concession would be reciprocated, but Hawkesbury remained 
ominously silent about the convoys, commercial concessions or the return of St. Bartholomew. There 
was of course a more indirect channel of communication that had opened up with the arrival of king 
George III's son, the Duke of Gloucester, in Russia. The Swedes believed, quite rightly, that 
Gloucester was on a personal goodwill and fact finding tour to rebuild Britain's shattered relations 
with the northern powers on behalf of his government. Gloucester was, therefore, invited on 16 July 
to Finland where he was given a warm welcome from the king. Yet, despite the two princes striking 
up a warm friendship, nothing concrete was achieved. Gloucestees strong overtures for common 
action against Napoleon were ignored by the king (with strong approval from his private secretary, 
Baron Gustav Lagerbjelke) while his own equally strong demands for the restoration of 'his' convoys 
and colony could not be met by Gloucester, who had no authority to do So. 34 
This failure to reach an agreement with Britain would have mattered less to Gustavus IV had his 
relations with the other great powers been more satisfactory. Relations with Russia were of the 
greatest concern since they had remained tense since Russia's unceremonious 'desertion' of the armed 
LeagUe had left a strong residue of Swedish resentment. What made matters worse was Gustavus Ws 
orders to repaint a border bridge at Abborfors in the Swedish colours during an inspection tour of the 
border areas in the summer of 1802. A farcical competition to repaint the bridge broke out but it was 
only in February 1803 that count Alexander Vorontsov, the Russian foreign minister, gave the Swedes 
33 Lundh. 93; Clason. 27-28; Anglica. 484. Ehrenheim to Silverhjelm, 10,13 Nov. 180 1; ESKB. IV. 
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Swedes an ultimatum to repaint the bridge in the Russian colours, one final time or face war. On 28 
March, the Russian government decided to invade Finland if Gustavus IV refused their ultimatum. 
On 9 April, the Russian ambassador in Stockholm, David Alopeus, warned Gustavus IV about the 
consequences of a refusal. As the crisis with Britain had shown, Gustavus IV loathed to be seen to 
give in to a superior force. it was only on 13 April that he reluctantly gave in to the Russian 
demands. But he had displayed a petulant brinkmanship that was to cause him and Sweden much 
trouble in the fUtUre. 35 
In the past, when Sweden had faced the Russian threat she had been able to rely on French support. 
By 1803 that support could no longer be counted upon. Napoleon refused to treat weaker states as 
equal negotiating partners and, unlike the Bourbons, Napoleon was keen to accommodate Russian a- 
expansionism against Sweden and the Ottomans in order to create a Franco-Russian alliance (as he 
had sought in 180 1) than contain it. Napoleonic France, unlike Bourbon France, could therefore not 
be relied upon to keep Russia in check. As Gustavus IV could not overcome his ideological aversion 
to France, and Napoleon showed scant interest in the alliance, the talks proved a complete failure. In 
January 1802 the Franco-Swedish trade talks collapsed and in October the French placed a stiff tariff 
on Swedish iron exports. Obviously the two states' different objectives, priorities and economic 
36 interests prevented them from becoming allies, both in 1802 and later. 
V. The Road to the Treaty of 1, ondon, September 1802 - June 1803. 
Sweden's unsatisfactory relations with Russia and France made it imperative to rebuild normal 
relations with Britain as quickly as possibly. A good opportunity to do so arose in September 1802 
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when Charles Arbuthnot, the new British envoy, arrived in Stockholm. Unfortunately, Hawkesbury, 
who was as pre-occupied with Russia as Napoleon was, only furnished Arbuthnot with limited 
instructions that left the initiative in any talks to the Swedish side. The Swedish foreign minister, 
Fredrik Wilhelm von Ehrenheim, met Arbuthnot for the first time on 7 October. Ehrenheim. posed 
exactly the question Arbuthnot had no instructions concerning: when the convoy compensation would 
be Paid. Arbuthnot could only stall, but he expected the worst when, some time afterwards, he was 
invited to a private dinner with Ehrenheim. Instead of being interrogated about the compensation 
question, he was astonished to find Ehrenheim proposing, on the king's behalf, an unofficial Anglo- 
Swedish alliance to stem Napoleon's encroachments in Germany which, indirectly threatened Swedish 
Pomerania, in north Germany. Gustavus IV had seen with growing amdety how Napoleon had 
undermined the Holy Roman empire. He believed both Sweden and Britain had a common interest to 
prop up the Empire and preserve, as far as possible, the status quo in Germany. This proposal made it 
clear that Gustavus IV was a committed opponent of Napoleon well before his German trip. 
Arbuthnot's mission had therefore taken a sharp turn towards an Anglo-Swedish reconciliation, which 
seemed to improve further when Gloucester, leaving Russia for home, arrived in Stockholm on 10 
November. Both the envoy and the duke were shown every sign of consideration, which aroused 
Napoleon! s anger. His envoy's protests were angrily refuted by Gustavus IV, who in his turn ftniously 
denounced Napoleon's expansionistic plans in GeMany. 37 
Thus not only was Gustavus IV showing growing signs of enmity against Napoleon, but he seemed 
keen on an alliance with Britain to put a check to French expansionism. Arbuthnot and Gloucester's 
optimism would not last, since Gustavus IV was no dupe and he insisted as a precondition for any 
such rapprochement that Britain pay unconditional compensation for the convoys. Gustavus IV 
always insisted upon securing the best financial deal from the British however tempting the political 
objectives of an Anglo-Swedish alliance. The British were to find out to their cost, how determined 
the king was on that score and how hard a bargain Gustavus IV drove. His envoy Silverhjelm, feeling 
that his earlier accession to the Anglo-Russian treaty was a mistake since Hawkesbury had not 
37 FO 73/3 1. Hawkesbury to Arbuthnot, 8 Sept. 1802; ibid. Arbuthnot to Hawkesbury, 1,8,19 Oct., 2, 
5,12,16,19,26 Nov., 3,10,16,30 Dec. 1802,14,18,21,25 Jan. 1803. See Lundh, 112-113.; 
Lundh. 106-110,130-134,184-185. 
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reciprocated, refused to yield to the British demand that in return for paying the convoy compensation 
Sweden should lower her tariffs on British goods. The negotiations remained stalemated during the 
whole of the winter 1802-1803 as neither side budged an inch on their relative demands. The 
impatient Gustavus IV became frustrated with British procrastination and decided to take out that 
frustration upon the nearest available British person. (He was to repeat this 'method twice later on. ) 
In March 1803 Gloucester was forced to leave Stockholm under a cloud of mutual recriminations that 
seemed to herald a fresh Anglo-Swedish crisis. The renewal of the Anglo-French War in May 1803 
prevented such a crisis from escalating. Hawkesbury realised Britain's bargaining position had 
weakened and that British exporters needed access to Europe through Swedish Pomerania, to 
circumvent the French controlled coastline. Nor was it wise that a diplomatically isolated Britain 
make an enemy of Sweden. Hawkesbury therefore gave in to Swedish demands and on 25 July 1803 
signed the Anglo-Swedish commercial convention, which exempted Sweden's exports from the British 
list of contraband, secured Swedish shipping from seizures, and gave generous compensation for the 
confiscated convoys. Swedish shipping and overseas trade had gained the security it had sought for 
well over a century and the convention was viewed, quite rightly, as a diplomatic triumph. It also 
removed any financial or commercial impediments to an Anglo-Swedish alliance. Thus, by granting 
important economic concessions to the Swedes, the British government could reap considerable 
political benefits from such generosity. 38 
VL The Fatal Journey. 
Gustavus IV's German Journey and the Renewal of the Anglo-French War, 1803-1804 
By July 1803, as the Russian crisis was over and relations with Britain were about to be normalised in 
Sweden's favour, Gustavus IV set out to visit his in-laws in Baden. The trip was made for personal 
and political reasons. Queen Frederika wanted to see her family after a long separation and Gustavus 
38 Angfica. 479. Silverhjelm to Gustavus IV, 24,31 May, 7,16,18,19, June, 5,12; 19 July 1803; ibicL 
Silverhjelm. to Ehrenheim, 26 July 1803; Anglica. 484. Lagerbjelke to Silverhjehn, 14,18,25 
Aug. 1803; Anglica. 484. Ehrenheim to Silverhjelm, 8,11,22 Aug. 1803; FO 73/3 1. Arbuthnot to 
Hawkesbury, 8 July 1803; ESKB. IV. Brinkman to Engestr6m, 27 Aug. 1803; ibid Ehrenheim to 
Engestr6m, 18 July 1803; SSKB. XVI. f 189. Edelcrantz to Silverhjelm, 26 Oct. 1803; SSKB. XVI. 
f 304. Lagerbjelke to Silverhielm, 13 Aug. 1803; SSKB. XVI. f 349. Rosenblad to Silverhjelm, II 
Oct. 1804; Johnson. 13 9-141,143 -146. 
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IV wanted to gain first hand experience of Napoleon! s inroads upon Germany. The aim, given his 
earlier proposals to Arbuthnot, was no doubt to see what role he could play in putting a Stop to 
Napoleon. His Francophile private secretary, Baron Gustav LagerbJelke, opposed the trip, therefore, 
on both counts. He feared that the queen would postpone a return journey to Sweden indefinitely and 
that Gustavus IV would indulge her wishes and the journey would become an agonisingly long stay. 
But above all Ehrenheim. and LagerbJelke feared that a prolonged stay in the troubled South-westem 
comer of Germany, so close to Napoleonic France, could embroil Sweden in all sorts of unwanted 
political turmoil due to Gustavus IVs anti-French principles and passionate temper. Their worst fears 
were to be amply realised. 39 
Both the portents and the timing for the journey could not have been worse for preserving Sweden's 
neutrality. The Idng's stormy crossing to Pomerania was an ominous sip of the storms that lay ahead 
for him and Sweden. Gustavus IV had in fact sailed straight into a new war that now lapped at the 
edges of Sweden. After almost 20 months of peace, the Anglo-French war had broken out again in CP 
May 1803. Some 14,000 British merchants and travellers were interned across French occupied 
Europe, and on 5 July the French army occupied George III's defenceless Electorate of Hanover. 
Neither the Prussians nor the Austrians lifted a finger to prevent this violation of the Empire but the 
Prussians had no wish to defend Hanover on behalf of a state they both distrusted and disliked-40 
Prussian apathy stood in sharp contrast to Gustavus Ws strong reaction to the French occupation of 
Hanover which occurred almost simultaneously with Gustavus Ws arrival in Pomerania. Gustavus 
IV mobilised the Pomeraman anny and ordered reinforcements from Sweden to strengthen it. This 
timely precaution was thought of as an over-reaction by the Swedish governor of Pomerania, general 
39 Carlsson. 122-124; HEM VII. 131 (Aug. 1801), 135 ( Sept. 1801), 139. (Oct. 1801), 148,152-154 
(Dec. 1801), 156 ( Jan. 1802); Barton. 314; TSLUB. C. Lagerbjelke to Toll, 5,15 July 1803; ESKB. IV. 
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Henrik von Essen, and an 'unnecessary provocation'. In hindsight Gustavus IVs precaution was not 
only prudent but as the latter conflict would show appeasement only encouraged Napoleon to further 
aggression. That aggression, as yet was still not aimed against Sweden but Gustavus IV was worried 
that the smaller German states would be swallowed up by the client states of France and Prussia. He 
approved of the British blockade of the Hanoverian coast and took the initiative, despite the just 
recently ended Abborfors crisis, to enquire whether Alexander I would collaborate with Gqstavus IV 
to protect Germany against the Franco-Prussian threat. After all, the emperor had dynastic links with 
Baden (he was married to Elizabeth, the elder sister of the Swedish queen) and Russia was a 
, guarantor of 
Germany like Sweden. Unfortunately Alexander I failed to support his brother in laws ; P-- 
plans to shore up the Holy Roman empire since that seemed to him and most other European 
41 statesmen as trying to keep a sinldng ship afloat. 
General Gustav Mauritz Armfelt, an old confidant of the Idng's father and the Swedish envoy in 
Vienna, resided in Carlsruhe with the royal couple and found the extended stay there as trying as 
Lagerbjelke. He blamed the queen and her mother for this unsatisfactory state of affairs and 
denounced the former as the 'obstacle' and the other as the 'oracle'. He believed that the interminable 
smy would damage the Icing's popularity in Sweden. Armfelt's criticism was well founded, as the 
public was showing open discontent with Gustavus Ws prolonged absence. One citizen hung up a 
I rooms to rent' sign on the Palace gatc. The humour masked deeper resentment against the 
government and Gustavus IVs 'tyrannical' rule. Lagerbjelke, and other Francophile critics of the 
Icing, believed Gustavus IV anti-Napoleonic policies were due to the 'dangerous' influence French 
royalist emigres in Carlsruhe. Other observers believed that Gustavus IV's later problems originated 
with the stay in CarIsruhe. In fact, he had already in September 1802, over half a year earlier, made 
his antipathy against Napoleon quite clear, including an alliance against him. Nor were Lagerbjelke's 
hopes for a Franco-Swedish alliance realistic, since it took Talleyrand months to send a French 
41 TSLUB. C. Gustavus IV to Toll, 15 July 1803. See Carlsson. 85; ibid. Essen to Toll, 7 July 1803 ; 
ibid. Lagerbjelke to Toll, 15 July 1803 ; Anglica. 484. Ehrenheim to Silverhjelm, 3 June, 8,14,18, July 
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negotiator to Carlsruhe. By the time he arrived there, in late 1803, Sweden and France were already 
on collision course. 42 
LagerbJelke persisted to believe that such a Franco-Swedish alliance was possible, even desirable, and 
that it was only Gustavus IVs ideological prejudices that prevented it from becoming a reality. There 
is some truth in Lagerbjelke's analysis but there vdsted 'real' reasons for Franco-Swedish alienation. 
How far were in fact the king's policies guided by his background, personality and ideological 
perceptions? The simple answer was that these had a very strong influence upon his foreign policy, 
yet so many lies and legends surround this little liked and little understood Icing that it is very difficult 
to disentangle fact from fiction. Gustavus IV kept no diary and he never wrote down his ideas on 
paper. All of which proves a great hindrance in assessing his plans. Nor is it any easier to assess the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of his character. His aunt, Duchess Charlotte, believed his many 
good personal qualities were ruined by his lack of patience or sound judgement. Count Hans Axel von 
Fersen, another old confidant of his father, believed the king's honesty and self-discipline were 
outweighed by his 'frivolousness in regard to matters of state and a lack of familiarity and ability of 
such'. [andl.. 'for allowing the state secretaries [to] lead him because of his lack of foresight, 
industriousness and interests in state affairs'. 43 Gustav von Brinkman, one of his more capable 
diplomats, claimed that 'We possess without doubt no greater and more conscientious patriot than 
him. Enlightened, thoroughly honest and dependable', rare qualities in any man, even more so in a 
monarch, according to Brinkman 44, who remained a staunch admirer and supporter of Gustavus IV 
without sharing his ideology. 
Because of his temper and personal peculiarities he was accused (like Idng George HI) of being mad 
and of being illegitimte as well. Both of these unsubstantiated accusations were to haunt him during 
his reign and did much to undennine his authority and standing in Sweden. Nevertheless, his 
childhood was tragic and lonely enough to cause major psychological problems. When he was only 
42 AIVSjd. X111. Ehrenheim to Lagerbjelke, 16 Aug., 20,27 Sept., 25 Oct., 18 Nov., 23 Dec., 6,7,13 
Jan., 3,7,14,24 Feb., 20 Mar 1804; HEM VII. 271 ( Jan. 1804 ); Carlsson. 127; Schinkel. 149- 
152. 
43 Barton. 304. 
44 SSKB. XVI. f 178.12 Dec. 1799 Brinkman to Silverhjelm. 
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fourteen years old his father was murdered, and this instilled in him, for the rest of his life, a fervent 
hatred for revolutionaries and radicals. No doubt his father's fate haunted him and contributed to his 
intense, almost paranoid, suspiciousness of his surroundings. Gustavus IV came to cherish his 
fathces memory, which included his political objectives and his father's intense hatred of the French 
revolution and everything it stood for. That was established at an early age, as was his honest and 
blunt outspokenness, since he told the French republican envoy in October 1793 that the execution of 
Marie-Antoinette was a barbarous act. Through these troubled political times and his own personal 
turmoff, his rehgious behefs gave him comfort, support and sustenance. But his behefs were 
unusually intense, fatalistic and old-fashioned almost more Catholic than Lutheran. He had in his 
religiosity, violent temper, passion, fatalism and stubborn pride, something of the proud, haughty 
Castilian about him (as one British observer noted) rather than the sombre, cool tempered Swede. In 
fact, besides Charles XII, the other great hero whom he resembled, was Don Quixote, and Quixotism 
was a phrase that was often to be used to describe him. Another was that of the restless crusader and 
he had, like Emperor Paul 1, an inordinate respect for the Order of Malta, which he offered a 
pemianent base on the Swedish island of Gotland, A love of heraldic chivalry was not the only 
characteristic that Gustavus IV shared with his distant relative Paul 1. They were both conservative 
autocrats in an age of violent revolutionary change, and their undoing at the hands of their nobility 
came about because, as Paul I so aptly put it, they preferred to be hated for fighting evil rather than for 
condoning It. 
45 
That evil, in Gustavus Ws eyes, was symbolised by revolutionary France and later personified by 
Napoleon. That ideological prism, coloured by his personal and political prejudices, guided his 
foreign policy, but the revolutionary contagion had to be fought, as in his father's day, on the home 
front too. The two were closely linked, and for Gustavus IV part of the same struggle against the 
political plague from Paris. He used a fairly well organised secret police, bequeathed to him by 
Reuterholm., and a very efficient censorship system; not only to quarantine Sweden from that 'plague', 
but also to silence the Swedish opposition. The two main centres of opposition, Stockholm and 
Uppsala, both dominated by the disaffected nobilitY, were strictly controlled by troops and police. He 
45 HECD. VII. 128 (July 1801). 
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stayed away from the capital as much as possible since he hated being there. The rest of the country 
remained loyal, but that could change if Sweden went to war. His protracted and unpopular German 
trip was not only the beginning of Sweden's road to war, but also the road to revolution. 46 
46 Holmberg. 10-19; Jackson. 129-130. (4 Mar. 1803); Carlsson. 47-49. 
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Chapter Two. 
The Road to War. 
The Creation of the Anglo-Swedish Common Cause, the Third Coalition and the Preparations 
for War against Napoleon, March 1804-October 1805. 
L Murder Most Foul. 
The Death of Duc d'Enghien and the Beginning of the European Coalition against Napoleonq 
March- July 1804. 
The Napoleonic War, like the First World War, was triggered by the assassination of a single, royal 
figure. Unlike his twentieth century counterpart the Duc dEnghien was politically unimportant. But 
his tragic death came to symbolise what was wrong with Napoleonic France and united her enemies 
against her ruler. DEnghien's death was the result of the failure of the French royalists, led by 
Georges Cadoudal, and military conspirators to overthrow Napoleon. Their arrest in March 1804 
Lagerbjelke predicted with uncanny accuracy would engulf Europe in flames. 1 
Napoleon saw a perfect opportunity in the failed cou dWat to strike terror in his French dmigrc P 
enemies and discredit the British. On the night of 14-15 March 1804 French cavahy crossed the 
border to Baden and seized dEnghien in his home in Ettenheim. The duke was taken to Vincennes 
where he shot for his alleged role in the planned Coup. 2 Napoleon justified himself by claiming that 
d'Enghien's death was a 'great and necessary blow'. When Fouchd, his chief of police, dared to 
question the wisdom of this decision, Napoleon retorted that the duke's guilt was obvious, since 'is he 
I Palmer. 106,112-113,117-118; Blanning. 111-112,115-118,126,149,155,176-177,241,25 1, 
253,256,258; Malmesbury. 320-321.28 May 1804.; Feodorak 224-225; Palmer. ENE. 62; Bingham 
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not a Bourbon and the most dangerous of all of them?.. 1 am surrounded by plots; I must imprint terror 
or perish'. 3 Indeed, to survive against domestic and foreign enemies Napoleon had to act with 
ruthlessness but executing dTnghien and violating Baden's territory was going too far. No doubt 
Napoleon found his justification from the appalled British reaction to such a 'horrid act' 4 and shocked 
reaction of Paris society. 5 
Napoleon's blatant disregard for international law created shock waves throughout Europe and new 
enemies in its wake. None were more affected than Gustavus IV, who not only knew dEnghien, but 
was staying only a few miles from dT-nghien's residence in Ettenheim. His warnings to the duke and 
attempts from 17 to 29 March to have dEnghien released proved equally ft-uitiess. It was only by 28 
March that Gustavus IV knew the duke was dead. The Idng was both infuriated and stunned by 
dT-nghien's fate, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that he was dissuaded from breaking off 
diplomatic relations with France. His protests won him not only surprising support from his r-- 
ministers, but also, since it contrasted to Europe's general passivity, from the British. DEnghien! s 
death began the transformation of Gustavus IV: firom. hostile spectator to active opponent of Napoleon. 
If Napoleon could murder royalty by criminal abduction with impunity then no state or individual was 
safe from his power. Gustavus IV took up Napoleon's challenge with an enthusiastic fervour which 
lasted with undiminished power for the nexi five years. 
The king's strong protests on the duke's behalf earned him Napoleon's enmity and he demanded that 
Gustavus IV be thrown out of Baden. Gustavus IV retaliated by recalling his ambassador from Paris. 
In May, when Napoleon assumed his imperial title, Gustavus IV thought the act typical of a criminal 
regime that challenged every legitimate monarchy in Europe. 7 Napoleon was infuriated at Gustavus 
Ws loud and open denunciations of his assumption of the imperial purple. He claimed he could 
3 Fouchd. Memoirs. 18 1. 
4 Minto. 3 14-5.10 Apr. 1804. 
5 ESKB. V. Brinkman to Engestr6m, 10 Apr. 1804 
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remove Gustavus IV by 'ordering' Sweden's neighbours to divide Sweden between theM. 8 It took 
Napoleon four years to realise his boast. 
Given that Gustavus IV was in Carlsruhe on the French border could not he be kidnapped the same 
way as dEnghien had? Napoleon, who preferred brutal action to diplomacy, was tempted to give 
Gustavus IV the martyrdom he seemed so keen to attain. But saner counsels in Paris made Napoleon 
realise that the abduction of a monarch, unlike that of a refugee, would have brought the wrath of 
Europe upon their heads. 9 Napoleon, however, did not share his advisers caution telling one of his 
cronies that 'I regret that I followed your advice concerning the King of Sweden; you will see what the 
consequences of that will be; ... in politics one should never hesitate to eliminate our enemies'. 10 
Gustavus Ws ministers shared their French counterpart's task of trying to keep their hot-headed ruler 
under control and prevent an open conflict with France. If Napoleon had to be challenged then this 
was the 'task' of the Great powers and not poor and 'distant' Sweden. II However, they realised that 
this would not be an easy task since the Idng, Ehrenheim argued, Tocated on the border of France 
the king has moved Sweden there with him, and thus lost the neutrality that his [usual] residence 
gives him, where events are seen from a distance, are felt with a delay and only judged after others 
have judged them first; where every condemnation and utterance of ill-will can be as quickly known 
in Paris as in Carlsruhe'. 12 He feared the presence of the equally hot-headed and Francophobic 
Armfelt would encourage Gustavus IV to pick a quarrel with Napoleon. What Ehrenheim feared was 
that Britain and Russia would seduce Gustavus IV into a damaging alliance against France by fair 
words of generous subsidies that would embroil Sweden in a war that would then be fought for 
reasons totally alien to Sweden's 'true interestSo. 13 This was the first time but not the last time this 
dubious expression were used by Gustavus Ws ministers to work against the king's foreign policy. 
None proved more critical of the king's posturing than Lagerbjelke who blamed Gustavus IV for the 
8 Schinkel. 172. Brinkman to Engestr6m, 15 Sept. 1804. 
9 HECD. VII. 287,302. May, June 1804; Hauterive. 5,13,15. Reports 16,21,23 July 1804; J. H. Rose, 
Gustavus IV and the Formation of the Third Coalition, Revue Napoleonnie, 11, (Turin, 1909), 88. 
10 Schinkel. 173. 
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state of tension in Franco-Swedish relations. Lagerbjelke exaggerated the influence upon Gustavus IV 
which he claimed French royalist dmigrds supposedly had upon the king in Carlsruhe and opposed 
Gustavus IV`s justified precaution of reinforcing Stralsund in the face of Napoleon's growing 
hostility. 14 
11 The Shadow of St. Petersburg and the British Quest for Allies. 
Alexander I's Reaction to the d'Engbien Murder, Russia's European Role and Proposals for a 
European Coalition against Napoleon, 1801-1805. 
Lagerbielke remained an uncritical admirer of Napoleon until the end of the war and never recognised 
that Napoleonic France posed a severe threat to the established order and peace of Europe. He also 
failed to recognise that the Franco-Swedish conflict stemmed more from Napoleon's violation of 
Baden and killin of dEnghien than Gustavus IV actions after these actions had taken place. These 
violations provided common ground of grievance against France by both Alexander I and Gustavus IV 
since the Russian Emperor shared his brother-in-law's revulsion at the violation of Baden territory and 
the death of the duke. In April and May 1804 Gustavus IV urged Alexander I to declare openly his 
intention to protect their common interest in the preservation of the Holy Roman Empire against 
Napoleon's aggression. The Emperor did not go as far as the Icing wished but he did offer military aid 
to defend Swedish Pomerania against the French- Gustavus IV praised Alexander I's strong protests 
against Napoleon's actions, which contrasted with the cringing response from the German states, 
including Austria and Pmssia, which had more to lose from Napoleon's aggression than either Russia 
or Sweden. 15 Under Prince Czartoryski's influence, Alexander I transformed his previous admiration 
for Napoleon to an ever deepening hostility, even to the extent of proposing a Russo-Prussian alliance 
against France in 1803. In April 1804 Czartoryski urged the Russian government to break all 
14 TSLUB. C. Lagerbjelke to Toll, 14 Mar., 21 Apr., 16 May, 5,13 June, 26 July 1804; ESKB. V. 
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diplomatic relations with France, whose government he denounced as a 'den of brigands'. His 
ministerial colleagues agreed. Only Count Rumyantsev argued that the fate of Baden and of 
d! Enghien did not effect Russia's direct interests. 16 Gustavus Ws ministers would have supported 
RunvyantseVs reasoning but they did not share their Idng's new found enthusiasm for Russia. Unlike 
Gustavus IV they had apparently not forgotten the earlier Russian threat against Finland. (They did 
not seem to have noticed that another outlying possession, Pomerania, was similarly threatened by 
Napoleon! s invasion of Hanover). They viewed the possible landings of Russian troops in Pomerania 
as a national 'humiliation' that could trigger war with France and increase domestic discontent. 17 
Britain, Gustavus lVs would be ally, pinned its hopes upon Russia as well. While the British cabinet 
appreciated Gustavus Ws gestures of defiance against Napoleon, they questioned his basic goodwill 
because of the long drawn out convoy crisis. They also realised that Sweden could not, on its own, 
make up for Britain's own basic military weakness on land- Without Russian military might to back it 
up, an Anglo-Swedish alliance would lack credibility, and ability to make an impact on the continent. 
An Anglo-Russian alliance (despite their shared interests with Sweden) in maintaining and 
strengthening the European balance of power by containing Napoleon's expansionism, remained an 
elusive goal. Despite Hawkesbury's exhaustive efforts to achieve an offensive alliance with Russia 
from 1802 to 1803 to contain Napoleon, the Russians left his overtures unanswered. Despite 
Napoleon! s aggression and numerous provocations, Russia maintained her neutrality. In May 1804, 
however, a limited defensive pact was signed with Britain. 18 
That same month Pitt returned to office and set about building an Anglo-Russian pact. Like Gustavus 
IV Pitt preferred to act as his own foreign minister. The Russian alliance became Pitt's most 
important diplomatic goal and one that he set out to achieve with his customary single-mindedness. 
He used Britain! s large reserves of ready cash to lure allies to her side. On 31 July Pitt offered his 
16 Zawadzld.. 36-60,63-7,70-71,73-77,100-6; Zawadzki. 245-6; Hartley. 58-64; 70-7 1; Palmer. 
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potential European allies L5,000,000 to be shared between them. Austria, which would shoulder the 
main military burden and the brunt of a possible French counter-offensive, was to have the lion share 
or half of the subsidies, some L2-2,500,000. Russia's share was L1,000,900, Prussia's L1,000,000, 
leaving L400-500,000 for Naples and Sweden to share. Czartoryski, Russia's new foreign minister, 
was not impressed with the British offer. But Russia's bargaining position had worsened considerably 
during the summer when Napoleon took offence at Russian demands that he evacuate Italy and 
Germany. In September 1804 Russia broke off diplomatic relations with Napoleon, who remained 
unimpressed as long as Austria remained uncommitted to the allies. 19 Napoleon concluded therefore 
with his custommy affogant self-confidence that his enemies were isolated and that 'that madman, the 
King of Sweden, is the only one who is really in understanding with England against Met 20 
Napoleon's claim was almost accurate for once since the alliance, even with Russia's support, would 
remain impotent as long as the Germanic great powers remained outside the allied camp. To reach 
the French, the Russian army needed access to France through either Prussia or Austria and neither 
seemed keen to grapple with Napoleon. Of the two powers Austria seemed the more likely to join the 
allied cause. The Austrians, like the Pmssians, were sharply divided about the correct foreign policy 
to pursue. The so-called neutralist party wanted a postponement of the inevitable showdown with 
Napoleon until such a time the Austrian army had recovered from the trauma of the last coalition and 
the allied powers were more united and stronger. The war party shared the ultimate aim of the 
neutralists but its supporters believed that Austrian neutrality could be exploited by Napoleon to 
extend his power and undermine Austria's security yet further2l 
If procrastination and political confusion characterised Austrian policies then it was even more 
characteristic of the muddle that reigned in Berlin. Prussia had suffered less at the hands of France 
than Austria, and in Berlin a French alliance was a realistic option in return for territorial expansion. 
Yet with Russia and Austria bordering her while the French had made an unwelcome appearance in 
19 Fremont. 58,63,65-70. 
20 Fouchd. Memoirs. 198. 
21 Fremont. 95-97,101; Malmesbury. 311-314.20 May 1803.; Schroeder. 234-235,251-252,259.; 
Alan Parker. Metternich. (London, 1972). 34-37; Arthur Bryant, Years of Victory 1802-1812. 
(London, 1944). 105-107,130-131,141,151-152,154,176; Rothenberg. 39-104. 
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Hanover, Prussia's foreign policy choices were far from clear. Both Napoleon and the allies could 
punish Prussia severely if she made the wrong choice. So her timid ministers, reminiscent of their 
Swedish colleagues both in lack of spirit and clear policies, opted for neutrality, inactivity and a 'wait 
and see' approach. This supposedly safe option carried the risk of alienating both sides and in fact 
-for both the British and Napoleon had little but conteml4Prussia. On their part the Prussians were 
sceptical about the British, fearftd of Russia and hostile to Austria. The Prusso-Austrian conflict was 
the key to much of Napoleon's runaway success up to 1813 when the two German powers joined, at 
last, the Anglo-Russian-Swedish coalition simultancously. 22 
III The Dresden Dialogue. 
The First Anglo-Swedish Negotiations, March-October 1804. 
Once the Anglo-Russian defence alliance had been signed, Bntain could turn its eyes to Gustavus IV 
who had earned their admiration for his courageous stand against Napoleon over dEnghien! s brutal 
death. In July 1804 Harrowby appointed the twenty-four year old Henry Pierrepoint, as British envoy 
to Sweden with instructions to seek out and to propose to Gustavus IV a far-reaching Anglo-Swedish 
alUiance. 23 Pieffepoint caught up with the perambulating king (who was returning from Baden) in 
Dresden, the Saxon capital. Pierrepoint conveyed his government and people's fulsome admiration 
for Gustavus Ws courageous stand against Napoleon. Gustavus IV, in return, proposed an Anglo- 
Swedish alliance (as he had two years earlier) as the foundation for a European wide coalition against 
Napoleon. Pierrepoint pointed out that Gustavus Ws plans coincided with Britain's intentions. 
Hence these tentative and preliminary talks had established a vital platform on which to build the 
Anglo-Swedish alliance. The only problems, which were to haunt the entire life span of the alliance, 
were differences of opinion between the king and British, over his high demands for subsidies and his 
22 Fremont. 123-124,126; Jackson. 137.30 Apr. 1803.; Simms. 101-114; Schroeder. 234-236,256. 
23 PAP. Harrowby to Jackson, 24 July 1804; FO 334/9. ff. 395-397. Haffowby to Pierrepoint, 29 June 
1804; FO 73/32. Pierrepoint to Haffowby, 3 Aug. 1804. 
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tke 
insistence that the restoration ofýourbons was to be an aflied war aim. The British feared that the 
latter demand would undermine the appeal of the alliance. 24 
The king's growing enthusiasm for a confrontation with Napoleon and understanding with the British 
did not have the support of his ministers, least of all Lagerbjelke, who claimed that 'I fear the worst 
consequences. It is not given to all the supreme confidence to see war against a tenfold enemy with 
prospects of victory and glory. A victory in itself would be a misfortune for a country in Sweden's 
position since it will cost both in blood and silver'. 25 Lagerbjelke called Britain and Russia 
untrustworthy and selfish. 26 In Stockholm (Ehrenheim, whose only interest in the talks with 
Pierrepoint was to find out what subsidies Britain was willing to offer) supported his colleagues 
strenuous efforts to prevent the creation of an Anglo-Swedish alliance. Lagerbjelke collaborated with 
the Swedish chargd daffaires in Berlin, Brinkman, to delay communications between Gustavus IV 
and Pierrepoint, to prevent them causing 'mischief . 
27 
Such sabotage had to be undertaken so discreetly that it would not arouse the suspicions of the volatile 
king. There is no doubting that Brinkman opposed an alliance with Britain, as he wrote to Engestr6m 1-1 
in mid-August, that 'In strictest confidence: We arc in the deepest of negotiations with England. 
They offer everything we could wish for - or possibly should not. 28 In Berlin, George Jackson, 
younger diplomat brother of the British envoy Francis Jackson, distrusted Brinkman as 'an 
unrepentant Jacobin'. Jackson extended that distrust and dislike with good reason, to most of the 
Swedish diplomatic corp. 'It is one of the ... e)draordinary circumstances of 
the King of SwedeWs 
24 FO 73/33. Pierrepoint to Harrowby 13,23 Jan 1805; ibid. Pierrepoint to Mulgrave, 21 Feb., 11,20 
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situation', noted Jackson, 'that most of His ministers in foreign courts are advocates for that cause 
which their Sovereign appears to have in abhoffence'. 29 
No one supported Lagerbjelke's diplomatic sabotage campaign as diligently as Silverhjelm? O He 
realised, however, it had to be done so subtly that it did not arouse Gustavus Ws suspicions. In fact 
Silverhjelm. put Gustavus Ws own proposals and demands to good use'. He hoped, no doubt, to 
wreck the negotiations by presenting them to Harrowby in such a strident tone that the British would 
break off the talks. When he met Harrowby on 20 August Silverhjelm therefore claimed that 
Gustavus IV insisted upon retaining command of the Swedish troops if they became part of an allied 
contingent and the restoration of the Bourbons. Silverhjelm knew these demands were unacceptable 
and that Harrowby would take offence at Silverhjelms arrogant tone. He also presented his personal 
view, that Sweden had nothing to gain by maldng war on France, as the established view of Gustavus 
IV and his goverrument. It was not, of course, and Flarrowby knew that from PieffepoinVs talks with 
Gustavus IV at Dresden. Gustavus IV had both a personal and political conflict with France and 
Sweden could gain security for itself and its exposed province of Pomerania by contributing to the 
defeat of Napoleon. Silverhjelms claims were therefore exposed as the Francophile lies that they 
were. Silverhjelm tried also to poison Gustavus Ws mind against the British by claiming equally 
falsely that they were unreliable allies that only wanted control over Swedish troops and would make 
peace with France when it suited them without reference to Sweden's interests. 31 
This last falsehood was to be repeated by Swedish ministers regularly hereafter. It is also remarkable 
that Silverhjelm. who had been in London for three years could believe this claim himself as he must 
have observed the resolution of the new Pittite administration to fight on and not negotiate with 
Napoleon. Haffowby lost all confidence m Sflverhjelm and denounced his sabotage to Pieffepoint. 
Ua wanted Silverhjelm. replaced as quickly as possible with a trustworthy diplomat, who not only 
agreed with king's policies, but was also in the king's confidence. To the horror of Haffowby and 
29 Jackson. 236-237.25 Sept. 1804. 
30 Fremont. 158-159. 
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Pierrepoint, Gustavus IV chose to retain Silverhjelm, the very man who (besides Lagerbjelke) was 
doing his utmost to undermine his policies. Not for the first or last time Gustavus W was badly 
advised by his unreliable ministers who rallied around to defend one of their own. 32 
IV. Building and Burning Diplomatic BridgeL 
The Franco Swedish Cold War, the Dispute with Prussia and the Deepening European Crisis. ) 
October 1804-April 1805. 
While Anglo-Swedish relations improved dramatically during the summer of 1804 those with France 
w Aim eriorated sharply. Napoleon, infuriated by Gustavus Ws defiance, retaliated the only way he could 
when his enemy was out of reach: by insults and threats, In late August his newspaper mouthpiece 
the Moniteur published an article that insulted Gustavus IV and sought to divide him from his 
people's loyalty. The king responded in Idnd, first by breaking off all diplomatic relations with 
France, and then, on 25 September, by mobilising Pomerania's defences. 33 
A month later followed yet another incident that led to further deterioration in Franco-Swedish 
relations. The most important one was part of Napoleon's shadowy secret war against British 
intelligence. Suspecting Sir George Rumbold, the British chargd daffaires in Hamburg, of being head 
of British intelligence in north Germany, 240 French dragoons crossed the border from occupied 
Hanover to Hamburg and seized the diplomat. Marshal Bernadotte, the commander of the French 
. Un occupation army in I bnover (whom we shall meet again) assured the terrified diplomat that he would 
not be harmed. In fact he was imprisoned in Paris until Prussia intervened to secure his release. I-lis 
dT-nghien style abduction was not only a major blow to Prussia's declining prestige since it made a 
mockery of her self-proclaimed role as 'protector' of north Germany's neutrality but it also made clear 
to Sweden and Denmark that their German provinces were not safe from the French. Napoleon's 
violation of yet another harmless German state not only undermined the security of the German states 
32 MUSCOVita. 50 1. Ehrenheim to Stedin&, 24 Oct., 8 Nov. 1804. 
33 Stafgundsarkivet. M. Gustavus IV to Fersen, 25 Sept. 1804.; Jackson 239-240,23 Oct. 1804.; 
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(including Pomerania) but also threatened Sweden's international finances which were transacted 
through Hamburg. Thus the Rumbold affair escalated the Franco-Swedish cold war further. 34 
But Napoleon's actions was not the only one to escalate the Franco-Swedish conflict since Gustavus 
IV chose to invite the e)dled French Bourbon King, Louis XVHI, to Calmar in southern Sweden, in 
October. Louis XVHI who had been a friend of Gustavus HI was given a warm welcome by Fersen, 
standing in for the absent Icing, and the Calmar populace. Gustavus IV was determined to further the 
Bourbon cause by extending his full support to Louis XVIII. The Swedish ministers believed that 
Louis XVM's visit was part of a Anglo-Russian plot to embroil Sweden in a war with France. 35 
These suspicions were unfounded since it was Gustavus IV who invited Louis XVIII to Calmar and 
there was no need for any elaborate schemes to escalate the Franco-Swedish conflict. Nor was it fair 
to blame that conflict on Gustavus Ws 'war mongering' since it was Napoleon that was the main 
culprit behind it. Ehrenheim. and his fellow ministers were equally mistaken in blaming general 
Armfelt for the king's bellicosity against Bonaparte. They were blinded by Armfelts violent temper, 
Francophobia, loud denunciations of Napoleon's and other similarities with Gustavus IV, to Armfelt's 
general ambiguity. He proved a willing collaborator at Carlsruhe with Lagerbjelke to prevent a 
conflict with France, he shared the other ministers suspicions of Britain and he believed Gustavus IV, 
the 'Swedish Leonidas' (as Armfelt called him) cut a ridiculous figure on the European political stage 
with his posturing. Pierrepoint, often a shrewd judge of character, found that Armfelt's true character, 
36 behind the facade of bluff bonhomie, was one of egotistic vanity, conceit and ambition. 
Outside Sweden and France the king's loudest critics and denouncers of his 'Quixotism', as they put it, 
were to be found, to no one's surprise, in Berlin. The Prussian ministers feared that Gustavus Ws 
open defiance of Napoleon would not only jeopardise their north German neutrality zone but could 
34 Palmer 122; PAP Vol. MSS 48,399. ff. 72-74. Jackson to Paget 27,28 Oct., 15 Nov. 1804.; ibid. 
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also lead to a continental war which would only serve Britaies selfish interests. 37 Prussia's short- 
sightedness paralleled that of Swedish ministers. Unlike Sweden, where the king's strident will 
overrode his ministers' caution, the Prussian king, Frederick Wilhelm HI, did not have the willpowcr 
do the same with his ministers. Prussia's ministers took a high tone with smaller powers, including 
Sweden, which earned them the enmity of most Swedes. Gustavus IV tried, in September, to placate 
Prussia but he instructed Armfelt (his less than diplomatic envoy) to ignore the Prussian government 
and deal directly with the Prussian king which only made matters worse. The Prussian government, 
terrified at the prospect of war on the continent in general and in north Germany in particular, 
protested strongly against Gustavus Ws mobilisation of Pomerania's defences. They claimed that 
Pomerania would be given sufficient protection by Prussia's north German neutrality zone. The 
blatant invalidity of that exaggerated claim was burst like a balloon by the Rumbold incident, proving 
once and for all that Pomerania! s defences really needed to be strengthened. Jackson mused what 
Europe would be like with Gustavus IV as Idng of Prussia since he believed Gustavus IV would put 
the powerful Prussian army to good use against Napoleon. In fact with his bellicose Francophobia 
Gustavus IV was more in tune with Prussian popular sentiments than Frederick Wilhelm III, who 
would have been a more suitable ruler of the cautious Swedes. 38 
Sweden's conflict with Prussia was to rumble on for years and served to undermine the allied 
coalition. It was, however, the conflict with France (not Prussia) which was the major cause of 
concern to Gustavus IV. He was especially worried about the security of Pomerama which was the 
only part of Sweden that was exposed to a direct French attack from Hanover. The Swedes realised 
that Pomerania could not be defended properly without Russian support. In October Alexander I 
offered Gustavus IV 12,000 troops to defend the exposed but strategically vital bridgehead against 
either a French or Prussian threat. Stedingk, like Gustavus w, hoped that this would end Russia! s 
neutrality and herald the beginning of a new Russo-Swedish alliance. Ehrenheim failed to support 
such an alliance. Overestimating, as usual, the potential enemy's striking power he was convinced 
37 Bailleu. 291-2. 
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Pomerania would be overrun well before the Russians set foot in Pomerania. He questioned Russia's 
reliability and intentions, dismissed her offensive plans as a 'web of absurdities' and Stedingk as a 
'warmonger' for SUpporting theM. 39 
Stedingk was in fact a sensible statesman with a realistic appreciation of Sweden's strategic choices. 
Sweden could not afford to antagonise Russia when the possibility of war with France was rising and 
if Swcden jcopardised Russian plans by dcnying them acccss to Stralsund then Russia might want to 
remove a threat on her exposed north-western frontier before facing Napoleon by invading Finland. 
Stedingk believed that Swedish membership of the allied coalition would not only remove any reason 
for Russian discontent with Sweden and thus remove the threat against Finland but could also 
contribute to the defeat of Napoleon which was to Sweden's ultimate benefit. But Prussia threatened 
to deter Gustavus IV firom giving Russia access to Pomerania since this would threaten their neutrality 
zone. Alexander I's protests in Berlin silenced Prussian threats but Gustavus IV thought the emperor 
was too indulgent with Prussia. 40 Unlike his allies who counted on Prussia's eventual membership of 
the coalition Gustavus TV had no such illusion. To him Prussia was Napoleon's proxy in northern 
Europe and therefore a hostile state. Differences between Gustavus IV and Alexander I over Prussia 
compficated the Russo-Swedish military talks and delayed the signing of a treaty until I March 1805. 
In that treaty Sweden pledged to send 25,000 troops to Pomerania while the Russians were supposed 
to furnish twice that number in a combined offensive against the French forces in northern 
Germany. 41 
But the pact only became operational when Russia got access to Pomerania and that depended upon 
Sweden receiving 'adequate' British subsidies. What was meant by adequate differed widely between 
the Swedish and British definitions. Pierrepoint agreed to sign a temporary subsidy treaty (in 
December 1804) for the upkeep of 
Stralsunds fortifications. But even this was subject to long and 
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heated discussions. Pierrepoint was at loath to hand over money to Sweden without some Swedish 
reciprocation. This reflected his government's aversion to pay out peacetime subsidies. In return for 
the paying L60,000 for Stralsund! s defences the British were allowed to establish a trade depot (vital 
for her exports to Europe) and a recruiting depot (useful to keep her foreign regiments up to strength) 
in Stralsund- The depots, however, could only be established after Sweden was at war with France. 
But that seemed a long way off since Pierrepoint had only reached his limited agreement with some 
difficulty. What problems would not be encountered when it came to settling the main subsidy 
question. There was a huge gap to bridge between the level Britain was willing to offer, f 12 per man 
and year, and Sweden's maximum subsidy demand: a staggering L75. Ehrenheim believed Britain 
would accept the Swedish demands since it was still cheaper for her to subsidise others to do her 
fighting for her than pay for her own defences. 42 
Ehrenheim did not remain unenlightened by Britain! s real views about Sweden's high subsidy 
demands. When Pierrepoint arrived in Stockholm in January 1805 he made it clear to Ehrenheim 
that Gustavus IV had to be persuaded to reduce his enormous subsidy demands. Unless they were at 
least halved (ca. L30-35) there would be no point in continuing further talks. As yet Pierrepoint had 
not realised that such an impasse and eventual breakdown in the talks suited Ehrenheirn and his 
fellow ministers. They wanted, of course, the talks to fail and to prevent Gustavus IV dragging 
Sweden into war. Knowing full well their demands were unacceptable, Ehrenheim claimed that the 
subsidy level had to remain so (inordinately) high to prevent the war expeditions from crippling 
Sweden's precarious finances. Pierrepoint hoped that direct talks with Gustavus IV could reduce 
Sweden's unrealistic subsidy demands. Gustavus IV returned to Stockholm in early February 1805 to 
a surprisingly warm reception from the capital's population which had grown tired of his long 
absence. On 15 February Pierrepoint saw Gustavus IV (who was ignorant about financial matters and 
trustingly relied on his ministers) who simply repeated Ehrenheim's unsubstantiated claims. 
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Pierrepoint had come to despair, by March, of ever reaching an acceptable subsidy agreement with the 
Swe&s. 43 
V. The Edge of War. 
The Creation of the Common Cause, the Third Coalition and Allied Preparations for War, 
April-October 1805. 
Two months later Pierrepoint had good reason to hope that things could improve the prospects of his 
mission, since the hostile and obstructionist Lagerbjelke was at last removed from his sensitive post. 
Gustavus IV, unaware of Lagerbjelke's role in trying to sabotage the talks with the British, had 
nevertheless grown tired of Lagerbjelke's constant criticisms of his policies. Lagerbjelke's place was 
taken by a young Finnish nobleman, Baron Gustaf of Wetterstedt, who was to play an important role 
in this story. Wetterstedt was immediately thrust into the political maelstrom because of yet 
another one of the king's symbolic acts of outdated chivalry bom of his strict principles. When 
Frederick Wilhelm III accepted the Legion of Honour from Napoleon Gustavus IV promptly sent back 
his Prussian Order of the Black Eagle. Gustavus IV claimed that it was meant as a private gesture but 
given the tense state of Prusso-Swedish relations the Prussians took the medal's return as a deliberate 
and gratuitous insult that provoked them into recalling their minister from Stockholm.. 44 
Many found the king's action honourable, but futile since he had no real power to impose his will on 
pmLqSia. 45 Brinkman who had to deal with Prussian protests found nothing but trouble in the king's 
action. Since Brinkman believed in Swedish neutrality and good relations with Prussia, he 
deliberately toned down Prussia's strong protests in his reports to Gustavus IV. 46 Gustavus iV too 
wanted no conflict with Prussia when he was preoccupied with his negotiations with Russia and 
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Britain. 47 He hoped Prussia would restore diplomatic relations with Sweden. 48 Gustavus W had a 
disconcerting habit of taking unexpected and unwelcome actions that upset all diplomatic calculations 
and plunged Sweden into sudden crises. While the Prusso-Swedish crisis continued it had 
overshadowed the more important question of British subsidies for Sweden. In mid May, having tired 
of waiting for an answer from London to his inquiries, Gustavus IV informed Pierrepoint that he 
would be withdrawing troops from Pomerania to Scania to reduce costs. Pierrepoint told Gustavus IV 
that this was no time to think of financial prudence. Such a troop withdrawal was doubly damaging 
since it not only exposed Pomerania to a French invasion but implied allied disunity when they were 
trying to form a coalition- Gustavus IV ignored Pierrepoint's warnings, departed for the Swedish 
army manoeuvres in Scania on 30 May and on 7 June gave orders for the troops to be withdrawn from 
Pomerania. 49 
Gustavus IV explained a week later to Pierrepoint and the Russian envoy, Alopeus, that the troops he 
had withdrawn from Pomerania would be returned to the province once the manoeuvres were over. 
Gustavus IV asked why it took Mulgrave, the new British foreign secretary, so long to reply to his 
subsidy enquiries. In the meanwhile Gustavus IV in order to put more pressure on the British told 
Pierrepoint on 20 June that unless the British wdended and increased their subsidies he would reduce 
his army in Pomerania yet ftuther. To remove any impression in Mulgrave's mind that Gustavus IV 
was any less keen on the alliance Pierrepoint made it clear that Sweden! s unchanged demands was due 
to ministerial pressure. The real culprit and the strongest opponent of a war and an alliance with 
Britain was the finance minister, Carl Erik Lagerheim, whose incompetence, according to Pierrepoint, 
had reduced Sweden to the very financial chaos that reputedly forced her to make such exorbitant 
financial demands upon her ally-50 There seemed little hope that the subsidy question would be 
resolved since neither side yielded an inch. The British were not about to be cajoled into paying out 
huge subsidies. What was it that made the Swedish soldier so good or horribly expensive that he had 
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to cost the British taxpayer L75 when a Russian or an Austrian made do with L12.5? Mulgrave 
refused to be blackmailed by Sweden and made it quite clear to Pierrepoint that he had only authority 
to negotiate with the Swedes at the standard rate. 51 
The hard bargaining could therefore begin on 3 July when Pierrepoint informed Gustavus IV of 
Mulgrave's veto. Pierrepoint was only authorised to negotiate subsidies at the standard rate (f 12. k) e&xj 
told Gustavus IV and that was some way off from the king's absolute minimum of amd eveu 
more so the maNimum level of 05). That Swedish minimum was one that was acceptable to 
Gustavus IV because he was so keen to join the allies. It was not one that Lagerheim or his other 
ministers endorsed Otherwise, the only way to reduce total costs was simply to reduce the Swedish 
contingent in the allied forces from 25,000 to 15,000. On 9 July Pierrepoint, having considered the 
king's suggestion, told Gustavus IV that neither was acceptable. Two days later Gustavus IV returned 4;;, 
with slightly trimmed figures which failed to meet Pierrepoint's demands and the latter threatened to 
break off the talks because of what he termed Swedish intransigence. The negotiations had reached 
what seemed an impasse that could lead to total breakdown. Ironically, it was neither Sweden or 
Britain that would suffer the most from such a diplomatic stalemate but their ally Russia, whose entire 
plans for a northern flanking attack against NaPoleon's northern army in Hanover, hinged upon using 
Pomerania as a bridgeheacL Alopeus, under increasing pressure from St. Petersburg to resolve the 
subsidy issue and access to Pomerania, supported Pierrepoint's arguments but to no avail. Gustavus 
IV, suspicious of an uninvited third party's interference in his negotiations, ignored Alopeus and grew 
angry about British 'intransigence'. But slowly he began to give way on details that made his 
ministers, indifferent to his aims and hostile to his alliance plans, fear that Gustavus IV would give 
Russia permission to land before the subsidy question Md been Settled52 
Pierrepoint was as keen as Alopeus to find an escape route out of the diplomatic quagmire he was 
s=k in and tried to find a Swedish mediator to convince Gustavus IV to sign a subsidy agreement at 
something like the British level and allow the Russians to land while sending a sizeable Swedish army 
51 FO 73/33. Mulgrave to Pierrepoint, 25 June 1805. 
52 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenhenn, 3,10,14 July 1805.; FO 73/33. Mulgrave to Pieffepoint, 3,9, 
11 July 1805; Ehrman. 11.786. 
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to the continent. There was no point in appealing to Toll, since it was his dubious calculations that 
lay behind the huge Swedish demands. By using Gustavus IV ignorance of finance and pride in 
Sweden's new won solvency Toll hoped by presenting unrealistically high subsidy demands to 
sabotage the negotiations with Pierrepoint and Sweden's chances to join the allies. Nor was there 
much point in appealing to Wcttcrstedt who was a willing collaborator in Toll's plots and thus proved 
to be no major improvement upon LagerbJelke. Only general Armfelt and colonel Baltazar von Platen 
were wi ing to support Pierrepoint but more out of individual opportunism than support for the allied 
cause. 53 
The Swedish ministers persisted in viewing Sweden, even as late as 1805, as a pristine neutral power 
that had unfortunately got entangled in dangerous negotiations with foreign powers that manipulated 
their monarch's ideological prejudices to achieve their own selfish aims. Throughout the Anglo- 
Swedish alliance the ministers maintained that misconceived notion and persisted in their political 
guerrilla campaign against the alliance to frustrate king's pro-allied policies in the mistaken belief 
that Sweden could return to the dubious sanctuary of strict neutrality. They failed to grasp that 
monarchical Sweden and Napoleonic France were poles apart and would come to blows sooner or 
later due to their conflicting interests in Europe. Gustavus Ws conflict with Napoleon had only 
brought those differences to the boiling point and it was clear that Sweden had more to gain, than 
by supporting an aRied'victOrY over Napoleon. In the meantime the ministers debilitating 
interventions almost managed to wreck the incipient alliance in 1805, contributed to Sweden's defeat 
three years later and was exposed, as we shall see, as a dangerous delusion after the king had been 
removed from power. Had they succeeded the consequences for Sweden could have been quite serious 
as she tried to return to neutrality when she was viewed as enemy in Paris and Berlin, and an ally in 
London and St. Petersburg. The British would not have taken kindly to being swindled out of their 
subsidies, nor to Sweden making a hasty but belated return to neutrality. The disappointed British 
might have taken out that frustration by retaliating against Sweden's vulnerable overseas trade and 
53 FO 73/33. Pierrepoint to Mulgrave, 20 July 1805.; Anglica. 492. Ehrenheim to Rehausen, 8 July 
1805.; ibid Wetterstedt to Rehausen, 22 July 1805.; FRA, Annfeltska samlingen. 1.26/PR- 10, 
Wetterstedt to Armfelt, 23 July 1805. 
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shipping. No doubt the Russian response would have been even more hostile than Britain's had their 
German plans been sabotaged by the Swedish ministers. 
The main stumbling block to an agreement remained Sweden's subsidy demand. But were these 
demands too high? Sweden was being asked after all to abandon her neutrality and provide 
Pomerania as an allied military base. That may have been true but Sweden's excessive demands 
verged on the absurd. For the use of 25,000 troops the Swedes were asking for fl, 880,000 to pay 
their campaign costs and 022,000 in equipment costs. Or in other words the same amount as for 
putting 200,000 Austrians in the field. 54 Nothing could have illustrated the minister's efforts to exact 
as high a price as possible for Sweden's services but that price was unacceptable to the British. 
Gustavus IV persisted in supporting these demands in the mistaken belief that his minister's cost 
estimates were correct. The other was his fear that if he had to dip into Sweden's own pockets he 
would have to call a Diet (Riksdag) to get approval for the necessary tax increases. Given the 
urIPOPUlaritY of war among the Noble and Burgher Estates of the Swedish parliament that support was 
unlikely to be forthcoming. He never put that message properly across to the British in order to 
explain that constitutional shortcomings forced him to make such high subsidy demands. From this 
point of view the deadlock in the negotiations could only be broken if Britain compronused on the 
subsidy levels. His ministers hoped Britain would not be willing to compromise. With rumours, in 
early August, of a Franco-Danish alliance that could threaten the Sound (a common Anglo-Swedish 
area of interest), Gustavus IV made new proposals to Pierrepoint. By 19 August when no answer had 
arrived from London (not surprising given Mulgrave's earlier uncompromising line to Pierrepoint), 
Gustavus IVs attitude towards Britain hardened 55 
Again it was the Russians, with most at stake, who tried to break the deadlock by intervening in the 4; pl 
talks, this time by taking the Swedish side. On 23 August Alopeus informed Gustavus IV that he was 
authorised by the emperor to sign a Russo-Swedish subsidy treaty that guaranteed Gustavus IV the 
subsidies he sought. Nothing could have illustrated better how desperate the Russians were growing. 
54 Ehrman. 744; Ham. 26,27. 
55 KUDHA- Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 21,25,26 July 1805.; FO 73/3 3. Pieffepoint to mulgrave, 8 
Aug 1805. 
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To his disappointment, the Swedes remained unimpressed with Alopeus's proposal since they reatised 
that the British (and not the cash-poor Russians) would have to foot the final biH and were unlikely to 
do so. This Swedish prediction failed to materialise because Pierrepoint realised that time was 
runnIng Out fast if Russian and allied operations were not to be jeopardised. On 24 August 
Pierrepoint signed a temporary extension of the 'secret' December treaty (signed in December 1804 to 
provide fumds for the defence of Stralsund) which enabled Gustavus IV to increase his Pomeranian 
army to 8,000 men. The following day, Pierrepoint agreed to negotiate with the Swedes without 
authorisation from London. He would give in to Swedish subsidy demands (i. e. Sweden's minimum 
demand of L18 per man) if this concession on his part was matched by equally generous Swedish 
commercial concessions. Pierrepoint hoped this would placate his superiors expected disapproval of 
his unauthorised concessions. Gustavus IV failed to reciprocate PieffepoinVs bold move by re- 
appointing Toll as negotiator. Toll's appointment came as a rude shock to Pimepoint and did not 
bode well for the success of the talks. Nevertheless on 27 August Pierrepoint handed Toll his fonnal 
proposals to pay Sweden L18 per man/year for the 4,000 strong Stralsund garrison and L500 for 
transport subsidy per 100 men. The day after Toll handed him the Swedish commercial counter- 
proposals that granted Britain no real concessions. Pierrepoint, who was risking his career by making 
any concessions at all, was not pleased by Toll's intransigence and told him that the British 
Parliament would not accept such a large subsidy without real commercial concessions. 56 
Pierrepoint's appeal could not expect to get much sympathy from a hostile partner such as Toll who 
opposed the Anglo-Swedish alliance. Beside his immediate political concerns to steer Sweden clear of 
a 'dangerous' and 'unnatural' connection with the allies, Toll was also determined to keep Britain's 
cheaper and higher quality goods out of the Swedish market. He and other mercantilist minded 
ministers feared such imports would destroy Sweden's own fledgling industries. (On this point, 
therefore, Sweden and Britain lacked a common commercial interest to unite them politically). On 29 
Augustý as expected, Toll rejected any commercial concessions to Britain. Pierrepoint's position was 
unenviable. As a junior diplomat he could expect a severe reprimand for exceeding his instructions. 
56 FO 73/33. Pieffepoint to Mulgrave, 25 Aug. 1805, KUDHA- Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 24,25ý 29 
Aug. 1805. 
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On the other hand Alopeus's ever more urgent calls for a resolution of the impasse were a growing 
distraction. Pierrepoint dared not, however, go much further beyond the extension of the previous 
Stralsund subsidies which he had granted with the justification of preserving Anglo-Swedish relations 
and possibly getting permission for the Russians to land without granting substantial subsidies. 57 
Nevertheless Pierrepoint's last minute injection of subsidies had enabled Gustavus IV, despite the 
opposition of his ministers and his generals, to put Pomerania's defences in a state of much needed 
readiness. I-lis generals were as pessimistic as the Pomeramans were terrified at the prospect of war. 
Arrafelt, in command of one of the Pomeranian divisions, believed neither the army nor the Swedish 
nation were ready for war. 58 Maybe Armfelt's view was correct. Most Swedes had expected their 
country to stay out of the new continental war and as in 1788 it was the noble-dominated Swedish 
officer corp5that opposed such a war most strongly. That their'esprit de corps' was poor can be judged 
by their superiors lack of leadership and openly defeatist sentiments. Unfortunately no one 
personified these weaknesses more than the commander in chief of the Pomeranian army, general von 
Essen, himself. Essen, showing a daring streak that he did not display on the battlefield, questioned 
the kines policies by writing to him that 'No mortal could defend Stralsund with a few thousand men, 
and if that man existed, then I would ask Your Majesty to be so good as to send him to us and I would 
gladly serve such an obviously talented man'. 59 Gustavus IV, who did not appreciate having his 
orders or policies questioned, was infuriated by Essen's sarcastic letter. His intention to have Essen 
sacked was deflected by Toff and Wetterstedt's intervention on EsseWs behalf. 60 His decision not to 
sack Essen was an unfortunate mistake since Essen was a lacklustre military commander, a defeatist 
whose views spread demoralisation and showed too much enthusiasm to negotiate rather than fight 
with the enemy. By not making an example of Essen, Gustavus IV encouraged his domestic noble 
enemies to continue their subversive campaign, safe in the knowledge that their careers would not 
suffer. 
57 KUDHA_ Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 29 Aug. 1805.; Sherwig. 168.; FO 73/33. Pierrepoint to 
Mulgrave, 1,5 Sept- 1805; KUDHA- Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim 30,31 Aug. 1805; Anglica. 492. 
Wetterstedt to Rehausen, 2 Sept. 1805. 
58 FO 73/33. Pierrepoint to Mulgrave, 8 September 1805.; RA- Skrivelser till Konungen. Serie 11. Vol 
A_G. Armfelt to Gustavus IV, 2 Sept. 1805; KLJDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 6,8 Sept. 1805. 
59 KUDHA- Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim 19,21 Sept. 1805. 
6o KUDHA- Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 22 Sept. 1807. 
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Meanwhile the all important subsidy question had still not been resolved and with PierrePoint 
cautious about going beyond paying for Stralsund! s garrison and defences, the initiative to resolve the 
long-standing impasse would have to come from the Swedish side. On 14 September Gustavus IV, as 
keen as Pierrepoint to bridge the gap that eýdsted between the two sides, proposed to cut Swedish costs 
to the bone. Pierrepoint offered payment for 15,000 Swedish troops at the standard rate and three 
months additional subsidies. Toll, however, was on hand to undermine the prospects for a resolution 
of the subsidy question and he claimed that the British level of subsidies would lead to a 'massive 
deficit' even if the Swedish contingent was reduced to 10,000 troops. Two days later Pierrepoint had 
to reject Toll's unchanged subsidy demands. Toll had managed to sabotage the talks yet again. But 
Wetterstedt began to fear that Gustavus Ws determination to join the allies would prevail over 'his 
country's interests and finances ,. 61 
Wetterstedt's definition of 'interest' was very limited. When the other allies, except Britain, had poor 
finances why should Sweden not make some financial sacrifices in support of her own salvation 
instead of relying on Britain to cover all her costs? Pierrepoint, however, refused to give up his quest 
for a subsidy treaty when the gap was narrowing and an Anglo-Swedish subsidy treaty could be of 
such value to the allied cause. On 24 September Pierrepoint proposed a compromise between Swedish 
and British claims. Wetterstedt now hoped that the late season would prevent active military 
operation before the subsidy issue was resolved He feared that Gustavus IV would give way on 'the 
great question of the Deficit, and if so then the [allied] cause is won'. 62 Toll proved as persistent a 
protagonist as Pierrepoint and stubbornly maintained that Pierrepoint's latest proposals would still 
lead to a deficit of 150,000 riksdaler, even if the Pomeranian army was reduced further and the costs 
of the reserves were not included. At last Pierrepoint realised that he had to cut the ministerial screen 
that separated him and Gustavus IV by bypassing Toll. He travelled to Beckaskog in Scania where 
Gustavus IV was residing and managed to persuade the king to conduct the talks himself. Once that 
was done the talks proceeded with a speed that alarmed Gustavus IV's ministers. The king drove as 
hard a bargain as Toll but moderated his pecuniarY demands. He demanded that the British pay him 
61 KUDHA Wetterstedt to Ehrenheini, 19 Sept. 1805. 
62 KUDHA Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 24 Sept. 1805. 
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for 12,000 troops (but that he only mobilised 10,000) and one year's subsidies in advance and another 
at the end of the campaign. Pierrepoint managed to reduce this to six months at each end of the 
63 campaign. 
Thus at the eleventh hour the Anglo-Swedish subsidy treaty had finally, on 29 September, been signed 
after months haggling. Despite Pierrepoint's satisfaction at reducing Gustavus IV he was still paying 
L25 per soldier frav year for 12,000 troops when in fact only 10,000 would be fielded by the Swedes. 
His justification was that Sweden was now an ally instead of a friend of France or a semi-hostile 
neutral hovering on Russia's north-western flank and that the treaty had not only secured Pomerania's 
use as an allied base, a secure bridgehead for a Russian landing, but that Sweden would also provide a 
sizeable contingent to the northern army of the coalition. It was only Pieffepoint's and Gustavus Ws 
combined persistence that overcame the Swedish ministers energetic sabotage and made the 'common 
cause@ possible. The forthcoming campaign would show if their efforts had been wasted. 64 
63 KUDIJA_ Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 26,27 Sept. 1805; Anglica 492 Wetterstedt to Rehausen, 28 
Sept. 1805. 
64 FO 73/33. Pierrepoint to Mulgrave, 27 Sept., 4 Oct. 1805; KUDHA Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim 4,6 
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Chapter Three. 
The Great Offensive. 
The Allied Campaign of the Third Coalition, October 1805-February 1806. 
L The Grand Encirclement. 
British and Allied War Plans to Defeat Napoleon, April-October 1805. 
Sweden was now finally, due to Pierrepoint's efforts, part of the allied coalition that was destined to be 
overshadowed by two titanic battles : Austerlitz which represented the height of Napoleon's 
generalship and confirmed, his European dominance; and Trafalgar where Nelson confirmed the 
supremacy of the Royal Navy. Yet the results of these two victories, beyond confirming the military 
superiority of France on land and Britain's on the seas, were widely different. Austerlitz proved an 
indecisive victory since the defeated allies fought on. Trafalgar on the other hand confirmed Britain! s 
naval hegemony and established her global dominance for almost a cenftuy. This chapter does not 
focus upon these well known events but upon the allies peripheral operations. 
These widely dispersed operations, combining allied landings in southern Italy and northern 
Germany, were part of the allied plans for a huge encirclement and entrapment of Napoleon's 
overeNiended armies. By landing in North Germany, the British hoped to liberate Hanover, defeat the 
French northern armies, threaten Napoleon's northern flank and eventually occupy the Netherlands 
(their most important strategic objective in north-western Europe). The British continued to be 
haunted by the fear that Napoleon would use the Scheldt and Rhine estuaries to invade southern or 
eastern England- The British were, however, supremely confident that they could achieve their 
objectives and bring relief to the allied armies in central Europe. They were supremely confident of 
victory and their allies appreciation of their unprecedented efforts on their behalf. British 
expectations were mistaken on both counts. Napoleon's Grand Army had achieved an unparalleled 
level of discipline and fighting spirit not matched by the allies. (In fact allied planning for the 1805 
campaign was ,a classical example of how the best laid plans, so brilliant on paper, led to 
muddled disaster when put into practice). Nor were the allies as appreciative of their efforts as the 
British could have hoped for. The Austrians believed that the landings in Germany and Italy were too 
far from the main front to be of actual benefit to them as diversionary relief for their armies. They 
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also believed that peripheral operations were an easy and low risk option for the British which left the 
brunt of the fighting to her allies. These claims were quite unfair. Having only a small regular army 
which was unused to large scale operations on the continent, peripheral operations were not a luxury, 
but a necessity for the British. The continental powers never grasped the complexity of Britain's 
combined operations (which caused delays) or the risk entailed by such operations. If a British force 
was attacked at the initial stages of landing the French could defeat it with ease. In fact Pitt stripped 
home and colonial defences to the barest minimum ( which aroused the anger of his own supporters 
and the opposition) in order to send the largest possible British expeditionary army to the continent. ' 
Pitt may have set out the goverment's broad strategic priorities and objectives but it was his 
hardworking minister of War and Colonies, Lord Castlereagh, who dealt with the military details and 
transformed PitVs ideas into practical operations. Castlereagh originally wanted to send the British 
German expedition to the relative safety of Stralsund where it could operate in conjunction with her 
northern allies. Unfortunate delays meant that the long lines of sea communications between Britain 
and Pomerania were exposed to interruption by bad weather as the season grew ever later. 
Castlereagh chose therefore to divert the expedition to Cuxhaven which was not only closer to Britain 
but also to the allied objective of Holland. The British cabinet saw before them the allied northern 
army group sweeping across north Germany and occupying Holland with ease. 2 (Or in other words 
the reverse of their unsuccessful landing at Den Helder in 1799). Castlereaghs plans contained two 
fatal flaws. It relied upon the irresolute Prussians joining the allies when no such resolve eNisted in 
Berlin and by dispersing British troops at either extremity of Europe ensured that neither force was 
strong enough to defeat the French. The British government should have reinforced the landing in 
Germany rather than sent an expedition to Italy. 3 
No one criticised Pitt's war plans and the war in general with more venom than the opposition. 
Forftmtely for Pitt the opposition was badly fractured between the Whigs and disgruntled Tories, led 
by Grenville, Pitt! s former foreign secretary and Addington, the former Prime-minister. Of these, 
I Nfackesy. 69-71; Derry. 131-132; Hall. 78,116. 
2 CC. 6-8; Hall. 119.; WO 6/13. ff. 62-64. Castlereagh to Don, 19 Nov. 1805; Bj6rlin. 74. 
Holland. 535; Fortescue. V. 281. 
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Charles Fox, the leader of the Foxites, was Pitt's foremost and most uncompromising critic. He firmly 
believed that Pitt's efforts on behalf of the coalition would only lead to further allied defeatS. 4 'I think 
the most probable event is the success of the French, and a second treaty of Campo Formio in a few 
months', noted a glumly accurate Fox on 10 October. He had come to the conclusion years ago that 
the war against Napoleon could not possibly be won and that Britain, if she was not to avoid complete 
disaster, had to establish a permanent peace with France. He realised that many of his countrymen 
opposed this but it was the only way to end an unwinnable and stalemated war. 5 So like his Swedish 
oppositionist counterparts Fox knew what his objective was but he had no clear idea, just like them, 
how to achieve peace. Fox persisted, like LagerbJelke, to view the established government's war 
policies as high risk and disastrous without pausing to think that Napoleon might be even more 
dangerous unchallenged. Given the poor state of health of the government and its leader, Fox hoped 
to take power by forming a coalition government made up of Foxites, Grenvillites and Addingtonians. 
In the meanwhile, Fox hoped to find a formula that would satisfy his more, sceptical coalition 
partners and at the same time give Britain long-term peace and security. That task was not easy since 
Grenville, his main partner in a new government, believed, at least at the outset of the allied 
campaign, that a lasting peace could only be built upon the foundation of a decisive allied ViCtory. 6 
IL Victory at Sea. Defeat on Land 
Nelson's Victory at Trafalgar and Napoleon's Triumph at Uhn, October 1805. 
While the politicians plotted and planned back in London, Nelson triumphed over the Franco-Spanish 
fleet at Trafalgar on 21 October. 7 With one blow, Nelson had removed the French invasion threat and 
the only obstacle to Britain exercising supreme and unchallenged naval hegemony, not only along 
Europe's exposed coastline, but across the world. A naval victory even on the scale of Trafalgar could 
not, however, compensate for a serious allied setback that took place simultaneously in southern 
Germany. The Austrians had recognised Napoleon's Achilles heel in his extended fines of 
communications and sought to cut these from their base at Ulm, but it backfired when 
Napoleon 
4 Russell. 103-104. Fox to Lauderdale, 27 Oct. 1805; ibid. 117. Fox to Adair, 6 Oct. 1805. 
5 Russell 118. Fox to Lauderdale, 10 Oct. 1805. 
6 HaM. 10,67. 
7 Wyme. 216-217.7 Nov. 1805; Schom. 307-3 56. 
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swung around his armies and encircled the Austrians at Ulm. On 20 October they were forced to 
capitulate and Napoleon could claim a victory despite his initial miscalculations about the Austrian 
position. Hence the news of Ulm cut short British celebrations. 8 But Ulm might be only a temporary 
setback if the main allied army managed to defeat Napoleon and Pitt was confident that news of 
Trafalgar would 'counterbalance the impression of Ulm'. 9 His cabinet colleagues were equally 
confident since they expected the tide of war would turn in their favour with the expected military 
intervention of Prussia. 10 
M. Italian Imbroglio. 
The Anglo-Russian Campaign in Southern Italy, October 1805-January 1806. 
Allied setbacks in central Europe were not offset by any greater success on the periphery of the 
continent. In fact operations in the Mediterranean only served to deepen Anglo-Russian rivalry. 
Russia resented Britain's occupation of Malta while the British feared that Russia's ambition was to 
undermine the Ottoman empire which might threaten the security of India. 11 Nevertheless a 
substantial Anglo-Russian army (20,000 troops) landed in Calabria by late November and made some 
progress against the enemy. 12 Unfortunately Austerlitz cut short any ffirther advance of the allied 
forces in Italy (like in northern Germany as we shall see) and the allies were forced to evacuate 
Calabria by mid January. 13 
IV. The Elbe Expedition 
Generals Don and Cathcart's Expeditionary Army in Hanover, October 1805-January 1806. 
The Italian expedition remained a sideshow to Britain's main continental effort which took place in 
northern Germany (we shall be looking at the Swedish operation in the next section) and had a 
8 Gash. 64; Wynne. 454.3-6 Nov. 1805; Connelly. 80,83-84; Rothenberg. 82,104,117,119-123, 
135,176. 
9 Holland. 3 13. Pitt to Harrowby, 6 Nov. 1805. 
10 BLMC. PAP. Add. MSS. 48,390. ff. 213-218. Mulgrave to Paget, 5 Nov. 1805. 
1 G. H. Alder, Britain and the Defence of India: The Origins of the Problem, 1798-1815, Journal of 
Asian History, vol. Vl. (1972). 14-44.; Schroeder. 13-16,22-23,163,181-182,275-276,307,317, 
616-622,646-648,653-654,726-745,750-754; Palmer. DFOE. 55,66-67,79-80,89,97-100,107- 
108,110.; Pratt. 82-83,85-90.; Gregory. 58-67,74,80,82,77,91,97- 99,103 -104,106-109,111 - 
114,119,126-128,135,138-157,189-199,256-278. 
12 Fortescue. VI. 266-273; Flayhart. 54,91,94,98,106,108. 
13 Hall. 116-117. 
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twofold aim. The first was to liberate Holland, using Hanover as a bridgehead, and the other was to 
coax the reluctant Prussians into the war with an impressive display of British military power. 
Castlereagh had therefore resolved, as seen before, to send 10,000 troops to the Elbe by landing at 
Cuxhaven and that force would eventually (by January) have increased to 25,000 which was a 
considerable armed effort when compared to Britain's overall army strength. 14 
Castlereagh's first choice for command of the expedition, general Sir George Don, displayed a healthy 
respect for the French and wished that Castlereagh had chosen fortified Stralsund where his army 
would have allied support rather than landing it next door to the French with only defenceless 
Cuxhaven as a base. 15 His deputy, general Decken, a Hanoverian officer in British service, found 
Don's fears about a strong French military presence in Hanover to be groundless. The only French he 
had found was 4,000 troops surrounded by the Prussians at the city of Hameln and their nearest 
potential reinforcements would have to come from Boulogne. The greatest threat, in fact, to the 
success of the allied operations was not the French presence but the Prussian advance into Hanover 
undertaken deliberately to sabotage the allied advance on Holland and keep the war as far away from 
Prussia as possible. Britain's actual allies were not much better than the Prussians since the Russian 
commander threatened to resign if Gustavus IV took over command of his forces. 16 
Decken's report could not have made pleasant reading for the British government since it showed 
them the extent of allied disunity and that Castlereagh's hope for a Prussian intervention on the allied 
side was groundless. Castlereagh was as yet unaware of these developments and 
Prussian permission 
for the Russian army to cross Silesia to link up with the Austrian army increased 
his confidence 
concerning Prussia. 17 Unfortunately Castlereagh's entire planning 
depended upon Prussia and his 
choice of commander to supersede Dom general Lord Cathcart, was made more with 
Cathcart's 
14 WO 6/13. ff. 5-7,10-19,62-64. Castlereagh to Don, 10,14,16 Oct., 19 
Nov. 1805 
15 WO 1/186. ff. 1-6,13-16. Don to Castlereagh, 8,14 Oct. 1805. 
16 WO 1/186. ff. 109-114,116-120. Decken to Castlereagh, 12,16 Nov. 
1805 
17 WO 6/13. ff. 27-30,32-33,37-38. Castlereagh to Don, 16,19 
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diplomatic skills and title in mind than his military skills. 18 To put additional pressure upon the 
Prussians the cabinet appointed Lord Harrowby to head a special mission to Berlin. 19 
As yet unaware of his demotion Don had landed and occupied neutral Cuxhaven in November, to find 
the Swedes in open conflict with the Prussians a state of affairs which could not only jeopardise the 
invasion of Holland but also Prussia's membership in the coalition. Don appealed to Harrowby to 
intervene in the damaging Prusso-Swedish conflict which coincided with news that Brune was 
sending 15,000 troops to Holland thus dashing British hopes of an painless occupation. 20 
In early December this ominous news was still unknown to Castlereagh, who predicted Prussia's early 
inclusion in the coalition, the fall of Holland and NapoleoWs total defeat. 21 Castlereagh's optimism 
should not be judged with hindsight since in early December the signs were, despite Ulm, good for the 
allies. Napoleon's armies suffered from the weather and lack of supplies, they were outnumbered by 
the allies and Napoleon was hard pressed from several flanks. Instead of following the original plan 
to retreat ftu-ther east, Alexander I's premature offensive ensured that the allies failed. A much larger 
Russian army, fighting closer to home and with shorter supply lines, might have defeated Napoleon, 
as happened at Eylau in February 1807. Had the Prussians simultaneously attacked the French flank 
in Bohemia, while the allied Northern army took Holland, then Napoleon would have faced almost 
certain disaster on all fronts as he did in 1813-14. But allied plans hinged too much upon the 
irresolute Prussians. 22 
Cathcart, who arrived at Cuxhaven on 15 December, initially shared Castlereagh oPtimism, and 
hoped that he could accomplish close co-operation with his allies. 
23 Despite the fact that Austerlitz 
made Prussia even less enthusiastic about a British alliance, the cabinet persisted 
in their hopes for 
18 WO 6/13. ff. 62-64,73-76,83-84. Castlereagh to Don, 19,27 Nov., 7 Dec. 1805. 
19 WO 6/13. ff. 4243,4649. Castlereagh to Don, 25,28 Oct. 1805. 
20 WO 1/196 ff- 123-124.127-128,131-132,143-148,153-156. Don to Castlereagh, 17,19,28 
Nov., 
I Dec. 1805.; Bj6rlin. 76. 
21 WO 6/13. ff. 90-117. Castlereagh to Cathcart, 27 Nov., 5 Dec. 1805 
22 Ehrman. 797-798.; Ham. 45-46.; Hall. 120-121; Fortescue. 282. 
23 WO 1/ 186. ff. 227-229. Cathcart to Castlereagh, 15 Dec. 1805; FO 3 34/12. 
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such an alliance. 24 Hence Castlereagh's orders on 23 December for Cathcart to remain in Hanover 
until the Prussians declared war on Napoleon. 25 Harrowby, having spent weeks trying to pin down 
the elusive Prussians to make some kind of commitment to the allied cause, had come to the 
conclusion a fortnight after Austerlitz that they would never join Britain. He recommended that the 
Elbe force evacuate Hanover at the first opportunity. 26 Cathcart faced, therefore, the unpleasant 
prospect of facing the French on his own, as the Swedes refused to advance into Hanover, while the 
Russians had placed themselves under Prussian command. 27 
On I January Cathcart's small army was isolated and alone, mainly, as he saw it, due to the Prusso- 
Swedish conflict that had flared up concerning the security of Stralsund. This petty, but damaging, 
conflict had prevented the allied advance, Cathcart claimed, on Holland and at least officially he 
blamed the Prussians for it. 28 His private view was quite different, as he blamed the quarrelsome 
Gustavus IV for the dispute with Berlin and thus the failure, also, of the allied offensive. But Cathcart 
could not be seen to criticise Gustavus IV too harshly, as he wanted to avoid an ignominious 
evacuation back to England, and to remain on the continent by retreating and ensconcing his army in 
Stralsund. 29 He could either remain in Hanover in the (forlorn) hope that the Prussians would come 
out to fight Napoleon, which carried the risk of his force being trapped in Hanover, or return home, at 
the risk of losing the last hope of a Prussian alliance. In early January Cathcart compromised by 
occupying Stade, to secure his escape route home; and holding Bremen, to be in a position to co- 
30 
operate with the Prussian army in Hanover. 
Castlereagh had by now lost all faith in Prussia3l because 'from past experience, I do not feel much 
confidence in the Firmness and decision of Prussia'. 32 A curiously late conversion to reality for a 
statesman, who had only a week earlier pinned his inflated hopes upon Prussia's support. 
One could 
24 Hall. 12 1. 
25 WO 6/13. ff. 134-144. Castlereagh to Cathcart, 23 Dec. 1805. 
26 WO 1/186. ff. 227-229. Harrowby to Don, 1,12 Dec. 1805. 
27 WO 1/ 186. ff. 259-273. Cathcart to Castlereagh, 25 Dec. 1805. 
28 WO 1/186. ff. 343-359. Cathcart to Castlereagh, I Jan. 1806. 
29 WO 1/ 186. ff 3 43 -3 5 9. Cathcart to Pierrepoint, 2,3,6,8 
Jan. 1806. 
30 WO 1/186. ff. 445-463,479-483. Cathcart to Castlereagh, 6,8 Jan. 1806. 
31 WO 6/13. ff. 159-164. Castlereagh to Harrowby, 10 Jan. 1806. 
32 WO 6/13. ff. 159-164. Castlereagh to Cathcart, 10 Jan. 1806. 
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already sense that Castlereagh was preparing his excuses to parliament for another disastrous 
continental foray in the face of Fo)dte denunciations of the government's failures by putting the blame 
on the allies. Despite Gustavus Ws inability to co-operate with the Prussians, Cathcart hoped that he 
might be able to patch together some kind of workable alliance between them and his own army on 
the ground. If so, then he would occupy Hamburg to establish a line of communication with the 
Swedes, 33 (ignoring the fact that Hamburg was a sovereign, neutral state). Castlereagh, previously so 
overoptimistic held out no further hopes for continental operations and ordered, in mid January, 
Cathcart to return home. 34 Cathcart had in fact already by 10 January concentrated his forces in 
Stade for a rapid evacuation and return to England. The former was achieved by late January and the 
troops saw home again by mid-February. 35 When they returned home they had a new government 
and the war with France seemed to have ended, in fact, if not in word. The departing Pittites blamed 
Britain's military misfortunes on her allies' bungling. 
V. The Forgotten Ally 
Sweden's Role in the Third Coalition, Gustavus IV's Conflict with Prussia and the Russo- 
Swedish Campaign in North Germany, October 1805-January 1806. 
In the wake of the allied defeat mutual recriminations flourished giving truth to the claim that while a 
victory may have many fathers, defeat is an orphan. The British blamed their continental allies in 
combination for the allied debacle without considering that their delayed expeditions played an 
important part in it. The British had learnt to treat subsidised allies either as mere vassal states, as 
Naples, Sicily or Sardinia were, or with intense suspicions, as they did Austria and Russia, whom they 
suspected in late November of wishing to collude with Napoleon against British interests. Sweden 
was treated as something between the two by the British but still seen as sharing some of the blame 
for the defeat. The British were disappointed to have Sweden at her side rather than Prussia and 
dismayed when Gustavus IV decided to provoke trouble with their vital potential ally. 
The British 
blamed this conflict for contributing to Prussia's absence from the coalition. Sweden was seen, 
33 FO 33 4/12. Cathcart to Pierrepoint, 2,8 Jan. 1806 
34 WO 6/13. ff. 184-185,188-189,191-195. Castlereagh to Cathcart, 10,19,20 Jan. 1806. 
35 WO 1/186. ff. 479-483,515-517,525-540,581-589,625-633. Cathcart to Castlereagh, 11,23,30 
Jan. 1806,18 Feb. 1806. 
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therefore, as no substitute for Prussia, with her weak contingent, unreliable tninisters and questionable 
strategies. 36 
After all, it was only with great reluctance and under Russia's recent pressure that the British ratified 
the Beckaskog treaty that Pierrepoint had signed with Gustavus IV in the hope that the rapid advance 
of the Russo-Swedish army would occupy the Netherlands, thus justifying this huge British expense. 
In other words, in return for unprecedented generosity the British expected Gustavus IV to exert 
himself and his small army to the fullest in support of the allied offensive. 37 Everything began with 
such high hopes and optimism as the Russians landed on Rfigen on 4 October and Sweden officially 
declared war on France. 38 Without pausing for a single moment the Russian advance guard pressed 
on towards the Elbe by 17 October, occupying Mecklcnburg-Schwerin on the way. On 22 October 
general Tolstoy's main Russian army landed on Rfigen, followed two days later by the Swedish 
advance guard led by general Cardell. On I November the energetic and fiery Cardell set out after 
Tolstoy's army which had reached Uneburg, where Cardell linked up with him on 14 November. His 
advance was so rapid that general Morian's division (2,800 troops) could not catch up with him, 
opting to occupy and secure Lauenburg on the north bank of the Elbe instead. The allied northern 
Army group was an impressive force on paper and numbered, at least officially, some 29,000 troops - 
17,000 Russians and 12,000 Swedes. The Russo-Swedish army was not only a professional force of 
regular troops, with an excellent esprit de corps, but if it kept up its impressive rate of advance, it 
would not only occupy Hanover but also Holland, faster than they could have expected and maybe 
Castlereagh's hopes would not have proved so unrealistic after all. 39 
Pierrepoint's optimistic reports could not hide some serious underlying problems. These problems only 
increased his discomfiture and heightened his fears that the government might not accept his excuse 
that allied operations and Russian demands compelled him to yield to Swedish demands and sign the 
36 FO 73/34. Harrowby to Pierrepoint, 28 Nov. 1805; Rose. 329-330. Canning to Pitt, 29 Nov. 1805; 
Hall. 120; Ehrman. 11.798; Ham. 59; Schroeder. 111-230,239-240,255-256,263,290,295,297, 
327,414-415,497-498; See H. Acton, The Bourbons of Naples. (London, 1956). 
37 FO 73/34. Mulgrave to Pierrepoint, 8 Oct. 1805. 
38 KLJDHA- Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 10 Oct. 1805; Carlsson. 144. 
39 FO 73/34. Pierrepoint to Mulgrave, 5,14,22 Oct. 1805; Bj6rlin. 75,77,81,84-85,87; SRE. 268. 
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treaty. The fact that Swedish troop numbers - (officially Sweden was fielding 12,000 troops, in the 
secret clauses of the treaty she only put 10,000 troops in the field) - were considerably lower than 
stipulated, or some 8,600 troops, alone could have posed a major problem. If the British government 
repudiated the treaty then Swedish funding would dry up and its operations cease. 40 Pierrepoint had 
worried in vain. Once allied operations had begun, his government was unlikely to rock, let alone (if 
they had repudiated the Beckaskog treaty) sink the allied boat. Mulgrave endorsed and ratified the 
treaty, but not without some minor changes. He reduced the advance payment due to Sweden from 5 
to 3 months, since his government had already paid the Swedes L60,000 for Stralsund's defences and 
he wanted the city's garrison to join the main field army. He also wanted, to forestall parliamentary 
protests, that Sweden reciprocated British financial generosity with trading concessions. A much 
relieved Pierrepoint sought, without much success, to include such clauses in the treaty. 41 
A graver threat to a successful Swedish contribution to the north German operations was the mutual 
suspicions that eýdsted between Sweden and Russia. A shallow friendship based on comradeship in 
arms could not hide the deep-seated animosity that eýdsted between these two traditional foes that 
found themselves, as during the Seven Years War, fighting a common enemy. Mutual suspicions and 
jealousies flourished especially between general count Tolstoy, the Russian commander, and Gustavus 
IV. The iý rn xrresented being under Swedish conu-nand and the king suspected Tolstoy of 
insubordination and disrespect of his position. An actual crisis of command was only just averted. 42 
Such a crisis would have suited Gustavus lVs Swedish domestic critics, for although 'his' war was 
disliked in general, it was his Russian alliance that was most unpopular in particular. To them the war 
was an unnecessary conflict quite alien to Sweden's true interest and only 
due to their king's personal 
vendetta against Napoleon. 43 Although most Swedes hoped their army would perform we1144 the 
40 FO 73/34. Pieffepoint to Mulgrave, 5 Oct., 14 Nov. 1805; Bj6rlin. 30,74-77. 
41 FO 73/34. Mulgrave to Pieffepoint, 8,18,23 Oct., 27 Nov. 1805; KUDHA. 
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Ehrenheim, 10,13 Oct., 8 Nov. 1805. 
42 FO 73/34. Pieffepoint to Mulgrave, 3,9,14 Nov. 1805; KUDHA. Wetterstedt to 
Ehrenheim, I 
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43 Adlerbeth. 346. 
44 ESKB. V. ff. 207-208. Brinkman to Engestr6m, 7 Nov. 1805. 
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45 officer corp displayed the same sort of disaffection with this war as they had in the Seven Year War. 
Even officers who were not necessarily oppositionist opposed the war and were to complain about the 
chaotic German campaign. 46 More worrying than the disaffected officer corps at this stage (it was to 
become more dangerous as the war progressed) was the lack of support for the king and the war 
among his ministers. What possible hope was there for the Gustavian regime if an arch conservative 
such as count von Fersen was opposed to the war and lukewarm about the king's policies. 47 
As if to confirm his opponents' every prejudice about the dangers and inconsistencies of autocratic 
rule, where whims of the king decided matters of life and death, Gustavus IV had not gone to war 
with Napoleon, but also provoked Prussia. As seen earlier, the Swedes and Prussians were long- 
standing opponents in north Germany and had conducted a war of nerves since 1804. Despite the fact 
that it was Prussia that had threatened to invade Pomerania if the Russians landed there both his allies 
and domestic critics claimed that it was Gustavus IV who had provoked the Prussians into an open 
conflict. In fact Prussia was a dangerous, predatory state whose territorial ambitions at the expense of 
Holstein and Pomerania aroused equal Danish and Swedish hostility. Thus Gustavus IV was not alone 
in disliking Prussia48 In fact Gustavus IV more than most European rulers distrusted Prussia since he 
believed that power was secretly collaborating with Napoleon against the allies and this made him 
doubly resentful of his allies' favouritism of such an 'unworthy' nation. He also believed that Prussia's 
partial occupation of Hanover was only the prelude to an occupation of Pomerania and part of Franco- 
49 Prussian collaboration. 
Thus Gustavus Ws hostile suspicion of Prussia was not merely based on personal whim. His 
assessment of Prussian duplicity was far more realistic, in part, than 
his allies', who persisted in 
viewing Prussia as a friendly, would-be ally. He feared his allies would 
double-cross him in relation to 
Prussia whose great military power, 50 in comparison to 
Sweden, made her a much more attractive 
45 KWAH. 113. 
46 ESKB. V. ff. 376-377. M6mer to Engestr6m, I Jan. 1806. 
47 Barton. 329. 
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ally. He was convinced that the Prussians, in return for flattering Anglo-Russian attention would 
repay the allies by brokering an Austro-Russian armistice with Napoleon at the expense of Sweden 
and Britain. Despite his misgivings and reluctance, Gustavus IV engaged in diplomatic talks with the 
51 Prussians, to resolve their difference both territorial and political. 
When he found the Prussians slow in replying to his query about their intentions Gustavus IV was 
only just prevented by Pierrepoint from sending an angry personal letter to Frederick Wilhelm III 
which replaced by a friendlier one carried to Berlin by count L6wenhjelm. 52 The Prussian 
government procrastinated and refused L6wenhjelm's request to hand over the king's letter. He was 
ordered back by an infuriated Gustavus IV. 53 This show of temper was due to, in Wetterstedt's 
opinion, the fact that 'The King's noble soul is so beyond all considerations of political calculation that 
He will not consider the slightest deviation from what he considers to be a strictly honourable 
conduct'. 54 Swedish diplomats, who favoured good relations with Prussia, deplored the sending of an 
inexperienced officer on such a delicate mission which failure could lead to an open Prusso-Swedish 
crisis. 55 The failure of the L6wenhjelm mission coincided with news of Ulm, which heightened 
Gustavus Ws suspicions of his allies betraying him. Gustavus IV was sure that they would prevent 
his exercise of real commander over the northern army group and chose therefore to resign as 
commander-in-chief, claiming that 'I prefer to be alone with my few Swedes than command a Larger 
Army over which I do not have the freedom to dispose as I see fit'. 56 
On 14 November ( L6wenhjelm had returned to Pomerania meanwhile) Gustavus IV called Alopeus, 
Pierrepoint and Tolstoy to his HQ where he told them that his limited patience with Prussia had ran 
out. Gustavus IV denounced Prussia as an enemy of the coalition and declared unless 
he had a swift 
response with a written guarantee that they would not invade Pomerania or threaten 
his army's 
advance, then Gustavus IV would call a halt to the allied advance. 
57 Gustavus IVs decision remains 
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one of the most controversial he ever made in a long career richly sprinkled with idiosyncratic 
decisions and policies. At the time, and well after, he was heavily criticised for halting the advance on 
his own, personal initiative without consulting his ministers. in fact, his military advisers 
recommended, no doubt out of genuine fear of a Prussian invasion, but also because of their collective 
opposition to the war, such a halt or even a Swedish retreat back to Stralsund. 58 Yet again 
Pierrepoint exercised damage control by preventing Gustavus IV from sending a new angry letter to 
Berlin, which could only have the situation worse. He prevailed on Gustavus IV to allow at least half 
his army to advance. Even the combined efforts of Wetterstedt, Armfelt and Tolstoy failed to 
persuade Gustavus IV to let his entire army advance, 59 the latter replying to their desperate entreaties 
that 'I will do what I have to do whatever the Costi. 60 In one sentence, Gustavus IV summed up his 
entire raison dWre in the face of what he saw as the outside worlds opposition to his designs, 
preordained by destiny, and why his ministers despaired of preventing a Prusso-Swedish conflict. 61 
'He does not understand, noted Fersen in his diary. 'that politics does not include matters of knightly 
honour' and why, therefore, the allies would not rally to his personal crusade against Prussia. 62 
Pierrepoint gave full vent to his fury at Gustavus IV on 20 November in a private letter to Paget the 
British Envoy in Vienna claiming that 
After having given more trouble in negotiating for 10,000 men than all the Powers of the 
Continent for their united force, the King of Sweden has now found out that his honour (mark 
the word) prevents him from marching forward in support of the Russian troops which are 
under his command, till he has obtained some assurances that he shall not be attacked by 
Prussia, who is allied to the common cause & has not a soldier within a week's march of his 
paltry province, and whom he has insulted in the most gross manner. 
63 
Prussia was in fact not a friendly power at all, least of all from the Swedish point of view, and 
Pierrepoint Is implied claim that it Gustavus Ws fault that Prussia did not join the allied powers 
is 
overstated and one sided. 
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Nevertheless Pierrepoint persevered to prevent a Prusso-Swedish conflict and prevailed on Harrowby 
to get the Prussians to make a public assurance that they did not have hostile intentions against 
Sweden. Harrowby suggested that Gustavus IV placed his troops under Russian command to avoid a 
conflict with Prussia. But unless Gustavus IV advanced, Harrowby threatened to end the British 
subsidies. Wetterstedt had feared from the beginning of the conflict with Prussia that the British 
would react angrily to Gustavus IV using British subsidies in a conflict with Prussia. Not only could 
Sweden face financial ruin, but the Idng's order to halt the Swedish advance could be blamed for the 
subsequent failure of the allied operations. Pierrepoint's threat to end the subsidies was deemed to be 
so arrogant that an infuriated Gustavus IV (always conscious of not being treated as a vassal by his 
'paymaster') asked if the subsidy treaty was still in force. Meanwhile in Berlin Harrowby had been 
assured by Hardenberg that Gustavus Ws fears were (naturally) without foundation, Pierrepoint, and 
Harrowby, hoped this 'assurance' would suffice for Gustavus IV to renew the Swedish advance. 
Gustavus IV was singularly unimpressed by a casual remark during talks between Harrowby and a 
Prussian minister. That did not constitute any sort of 'guarantee', especially as Pierrepoint and 
Harrowby did not have the authority to guarantee a verbal assurance. Gustavus IV, unsatisfied with 
the British 'efforts', was determined to demand a written Prussian guarantee. Pierrepoint believed this 
demand was not only counter productive but would only worsen the crisis further. Gustavus IV 
agreed that Brinkman, the Swedish chargd d'affaires in Berlin, was a better medium of 
communication with the Prussian government than L6wenhjelm. On 27 November, growing worried 
about his isolated position, Gustavus IV ordered his army to advance. When news reached 
him that 
Prussian troops were requisitioning supplies from Hanover he countermanded 
his order immediately, 
which paralysed the Swedish army's advance. In Berlin the 
Prussians could not be brought to a firm 
answer by Harrowby, which exhausted the usefulness of a 
British intervention for Gustavus IV and 
left the Russians to prevail upon Gustavus IV to renew his offensive. 
Given Alopeus' unpopularity 
with Gustavus IV, only Alexander 1, despite 
Gustavus IVs anger at the emperor's alliance with 
Prussia which the Russians failed to inform 
him about, could now make the king end his sulky 
isolation from the rest of the coalition. The Emperor promised to 
keep Prussia in check and urged 
65 
Gustavus IV to advance for the sake of the common cause. On I December Gustavus IV finally 
ordered his remaining 4,000 troops to advance on the Elbe and Lftneburg. 64 
His decision came too late. The day after his orders for the Swedish army to advance, the Russians 
and Austrians were defeated at Austerlitz. He left Pomerania on 16 December and his army advanced 
rapidly and crossed the Elbe three days later, but on 20 December the allied Northern army learnt 
about the Franco-Austrian armistice. Thus Hanover was threatened by a French invasion which made 
the allied position untenable. This tragic news seemed to justify, in Swedish eyes, Gustavus Ws 
previous caution about advancing. The Swedish army also faced deepening financial problems by 
December 1805. Despite Pierrepoint's assurances of rapid resumption of the subsidies when the 
Swedes advanced, he only managed to pay the October subsidy by mid-December, which was 
diminished in value by currency fluctuations on the Hamburg exchange following Austerlitz. The 
Swedes imposed double tolls in those areas of Hanover which they had occupied, much to the 
irritation of the Hanoverians and British. But these stop-gap measures could not save the army from 
an acute cash crisis by January, compounded by the failure of the British subsidies to arrive as fast as 
promised by Pierrepoint. 65 
By early January financial problems were added to new political ones. Cathcart's request for 
sanctuary in Stralsund for his troopS66 seemed to indicate that the coalition was falling apart and the 
war was lost, Wetterstedt was convinced that the British intended to evacuate Hanover at the first 
opportunity instead of continuing their presence in north Germany. A fast escape 
by sea was not open 
to Britain's land bound allies, noted Wetterstedt sourly. In mid-January the rapid British retreat to the 
67 168 coast, convinced Wetterstedt 'that Messrs. British are seeking a 
fast return to safe home ports , 
which the Swedes should emulate 
69 as a prelude to leaving the collapsing coalition. Gustavus IV 
64 FO 73/34. Pieffepoint to Mulgrave, 22,24 Nov., 6 Dec. 1805.; ibid. Pierrepoint to Haffowby, 
24 
Nov. 1805; ibid. Harrowby to Pieffepoint, 18,28 Nov. 1805; KUDHA- Wetterstedt to 
Ehrenheim, 17, 
19,20,24,27 Nov., 1,3 Dec. 1805; TSLUB. C. Wetterstedt to Toll, 3 Dec. 1805; 
Bj6rlin. 90-91. 
65 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 1,4,7,11,12,21,23,28 Dec. 1805,6 
Jan. 1806.; TSLUB. C. 
Wetterstedt to Toll, 28 Dec., 6 Jan. 1806. 
66 FO 73/34. Cathcart to Pierrepoint, 10 Jan. 1806. 
67 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 25 Dec., 1,12 Jan. 1806. 
68 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 16 Jan. 1806. 
69 KLTDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 15 Jan. 1806. 
66 
seemed to share, for once, Wetterstedt's cynical views on the alliance and was determined to evacuate 
Hanover' now that this unhappy coalition through a series of the most unbelievable mistakes and 
most selfish actions will probably be dissolved'. 70 He did not dwell on his own share in the allied 
debacle, and his decision was probably more to do with his pique at not being told that the Russians 
had placed their troops (to avoid being captured or encircled by the French) under the detested 
Prussians' command7l instead of under continued Swedish command. 72 This double insult to 
Gustavus IV heightened his discontent. 73 Despite the approaching French menace, Gustavus IV 
refused to place his own army under Prussian command. 74 
Allied favouritism towards Prussia was viewed with growing distaste by Gustavus IV and he wanted 
to avenge his wounded pride by postponing the evacuation from Lauenburg, where his army was 
situated, to avoid being seen to retreat before the Prussians. For the Swedes to remain in Lauenburg 
suited Pierrepoint in early January. A few weeks later, with Cathcart's evacuation of Hanover, this no 
longer suited British designs. While the bulk of the Swedish army retreated back to Pomerania by 17 
January the same L6wenhjelm who had headed the futile mission to Berlin was left behind in 
Lauenburg with 1,800 troops. Pierrepoint, Armfelt and the Russians all exerted the greatest pressure 
on Gustavus IV to evacuate the province. On 26 January he told them that he would not evacuate the 
province without hearing from London what the British government wished him to do. Knowing that 
Gustavus IV took no one into his confidence, Pierrepoint realised how difficult it would be to get him 
to change his mind. Pierrepoint told Armfelt that only God knew what the 
king was up to, since one 
could not get him to advance earlier when there was an enemy in the 
field but now that there was 
none, one could not get him to retreat. Pierrepoint had yet to grasp that 
in Gustavus Ws view the 
political situation since while the war against Napoleon was 
dormant, the struggle against his ally, 
Prussia, had to continue and he urged his neighbours, Russia and 
Denmark, to join an Anglo-Swedish 
alliance against a suspected Franco-Prussian pact 
in defence of north Germany. Pierrepoint was not 
convinced by Gustavus IVs reasoning and 
he believed the king only wanted personal revenge against 
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Prussia humiliating her with Russian aid. He predicted dire consequences for Europe from a prusso- 
Swedish conflict. A view shared by Wetterstedt, who believed that the Swedish occupation of 
Lauenburg would lead to war with Prussia. He was convinced that the British would not support 
Sweden trying to retain a province the British had already given up as lost. British support was even 
less likely from the incoming Grenville-Fox administration, which would seek peace with France. If 
Prussia remained calm, then Sweden should not only withdraw from Hanover, Wetterstedt argued, but 
also emulate Fox's example and withdraw from the war. But Sweden's policy decision in favour of 
war or peace, in early February, would depend upon Russia's foreign policy. Should Russia join the 
Franco-Prussian block, Wetterstedt argued, then Sweden would lose Finland and Pomerania at the 
same time. 75 Wetterstedt had predicted with uncanny accuracy Sweden's fate a year later, and how 
the failure of the Third Coalition would undermine the independence and security of the European 
powers vis-A-vis the expanding Napoleonic empire. 
VL Austerlitz, Austria and the Demise of the Alliance 
The Bohemian Campaign and the Allied Debacle at Austerlitz, October-December 1805. 
The Third Coalition had not failed because the British did not exert themselves sufficiently or because 
the Swedes did not advance early enough to the Elbe, nor even because Prussia, the missing piece in 
Pitt's alliance puzzle, declined to join the allied cause. The real fate of the coalition rested with the 
performance of the Austrian and Russian armies. The allied campaign in central Europe proved a 
dismal failure, as the French, bolstered and emboldened by their success at Ulm, invaded Austria and 
occupied Vienna. The fall of Vienna led to demoralising Austrian arguments with the Russians, who 
were more concerned about keeping the allied field armies intact, than defending the Austrian 
capital. 76 
The Austrian retreat aroused British fears about the reliability of their ally, who showed signs of 
defeatiSM. 77 The British hoped that the Russian army could defeat Napoleon and turn the tide of the 
75 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 2,27 Jan., 1,2 Feb. 1806.; FO 73/34. 
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war in the allies favour. 79 But an allied victory would very much hinge upon Prussia's intervention on 
the allied side but that proved a forlorn hope since by November, with the failure of Harrowby's 
special diplomatic mission to Berlin, the British finally accepted that Prussia would not be joining the 
'common cause' against Napoleon. 80 Clearly that the fate of the allied cause would be decided by a 
mighty clash of arms. Unfortunately the allies miscalculated their strength by challenging Napoleon 
on the battlefield of Austerlitz where, on 2 December, they suffered massive defeat which shattered 
the coalition and forced Austria to make peace on Napoleon's terms. 81 Any hope for a Prussian 
intervention was now lost as she rapidly returned to neutrality. 82 
VIEL Death and Demise 
The End of Pitt and his Political System, December 1805-January 1806. 
On 29 December London had received accurate news of Austerlitz. 83 which both shocked and 
dismayed the British public since they had such great expectations from the allied campaign. Now 
another 'Austrian catastrophe'84 had turned initial news of a Russian victory into stunning defeat. 85 
As early as 29 November Pitt's bright protdgd, George Canning, had predicted that Pitt's government 
would be forced to resign if it presided over another continental fiasco. 86 Canning's prediction proved 
devastatingly accurate. But the bad news also took a personal toll on Pitt, whose health, which had 
been undermined already by overwork and a brisk consumption of alcohol, deteriorated further as the 
Prime minister took on a new cadaverous 'Austerlitz look'. 87 He was, quite unfairly, blamed for yet 
another failed coalition. 88 Pitt, ever the optimist, shrugged off the criticism and persisted in his hope 
that the Prussians, his last faltering military card, would intervene on the allied side. When the 
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Prussians, true to form, failed to oblige89 the Prime minister's last hope had gone and his health 
began to deteriorate very fast. By the morning of 23 January Pitt, the great and long serving British 
Prime minister (in war and peace) was dead-90 Pitt's death deprived a weak, often disunited and by 
now discredited administration, of its last hope of political survival. 91 No senior Tory politician could 
be found to head a new administration and the alternative, much against George III's wishes, would be 
one that included the Fwdtes. 92 The king was almost as much out of tune with public opinion in 
Britain as Gustavus IV was in Sweden since both countries had become disillusioned with continuing 
93 to fight 'an unwinnable war'. 
Count Fersen no doubt expressed public opinion in both countries when he stated in his diary that 
'Thus a dismal year has finally come to an end. A year that saw the coalition dissolved at the expense 
of Austria and Italy while north Germany is not united enough to erect a barrier against further 
French expansion and at the mercy of Prussia's base policies. May we not in the new year therefore 
see an even greater extension of France's monstrous power'. 94 Unfortunately the count's fervent hopes 
went unheeded as 1806 and the following years saw ftirther allied set-backs and the expansion of that 
'monstrous power'. 
89 Reilly. 339; ROse. 552-553,555; Hall. 121-122. 
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Chapter Four. 
Phoney War and Phoney Peace. 
The Anglo-Swedish 'War' with Prussia and the Anglo-Russian Peace Negotiations with Napoleon, February-September 1806. 
1. A New Diplomatic Direction. 
Fox's New Foreign Policy System. 
The death of Pitt was not merely the end of a great statesman but the end of an entire system of 
foreign policy. The new government made up of disgruntled Tories led by Lord Grenville and 
Addington together with the Foxite Whigs were only united by their opposition to the Pittite system 
which had been discredited by the complete failure of the third coalition. When they took power in 
February 1806 the Talents, as they were known, desired an end to the war, a return to peace and 
prosperity. Neither Britain's allies nor her political public were much impressed with the calibre or 
unity of the Talents. 
IL The Phoney Peace 
The Anglo-Russian Peace Negotiations in Paris, April-September 1806. 
The first priority for the new foreign secretary Charles James Fox was to open peace talks with France 
and in early 1806 this seemed the ideal time to do so. Despite Grenville's lukewarm support Lord 
Yarmouth was appointed as special envoy for the peace talks in Paris by early June. 2 Yarmouth 
refused to be browbeaten by the French, like his Russian colleague d! Oubril who signed a highly 
disadvantageous treaty with the French, and give up Sicily in exchange for Hanover. 3 In August the 
ineffectual Yarmouth was replaced with Lord Lauderdale. The French had been chastened by 
Alexander I's refusal to ratify the dOubril treaty, lowered their pretensions but still insisted upon 
Sicily being exchanged in return for peace. British attitudes hardened after Fox's death in mid 
I Harvey. 619,621,63 2-63 3.; Mitchell. 222-227.; Smith. 84,87,101,104; Taylor. 50,56-57; GLG. 
177-178; Wordsworth. 246; Anglica. 489. Rehausen to Gustavus IV, 21 Feb. 1806. 
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3 FO 27/73. Fox to Yarmouth, 26 June, 4,26 July 1806; ibid. Yarmouth to Fox, 21 June, 
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September and by this time the French were preparing to invade prussia the talks collapsed due to 
their mutual intransigence over the fate of Sicily. On 6 October Lauderdale returned to London. 4 
M. The Phoney War 
The Lauenburg Crisis and the Anglo-Swedish Conflict with Prussia, February-August 1806. 
Fox was in the paradoxical position during his short tenure as foreign secretary of pursuing peace 
talks with BritaiWs enemy while making half-hearted war on a power considered the most desirable of 
allies only a few months earlier. This ludicrous situation arose from Prussia's mutually insincere 
alliance with France in February 1806 which led to the occupation of Hanover. 5 Gustavus IV too was 
in conflict with Prussia since he refused to evacuate L6wenhjelm's force from Lauenburg. 6 Prussia, 
wishing to remove the allied forces from north Germany as quickly as possible to eliminate any cause 
for a French intervention in an area of great security importance to it and secure its western border by 
occupying Hanover outrighý7 urged the British to remove the Swedes from Lauenburg. 8 Berlin had 
overestimated British influence with Gustavus IV who believed he was fulfilling his obligations as a 
British ally by defending Hanover against the ally of their common enemy, Prussia. 9 These were his 
immediate reasons for confronting Prussia, but they only reflected his long-term opposition to any 
Prussian annexation of Hanover and his conflict with Prussia during the 1805 campaign. 10 Nor had 
he any wish to hand over Lauenburg to Prussia's tender mercies. II However, beneath a surface of 
sentimentalism and political reason lurked more base motives. He threatened to remain in the 
province as long as the British did not pay their outstanding debt of 05,000. Pierrepoint, on 
London's orders and no doubt motivated by the wish to get Gustavus IV out of the province, promptly 
paid the sum on 27 March. 12 This was not the first, nor the last, time that Gustavus IV succeeded in 
4 FO 27/74. Fox to Lauderdale, 2,8,23 Aug., 4 Sept. 1806; ibid. Lauderdale to Fox, 6,9,11,16,17, 
20,28,29,30,31 Aug. 1806; ibid. Spencer to Lauderdale, 26,30 Sept., 4,6 Oct. 1806; ibid. 
Lauderdale to Spencer, 18,19,26 Sept., 4,6 Oct. 1806. 
5 Simms. 231-232. 
6 KUDHA- Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 6 Feb. 1806. 
7 Simms. 235-236. 
8 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 24 Feb. 1806. 
9 TSLUB. C. Gustavus IV to Toll, 6 Apr. 1806; Carlsson. 146. 
10 GLS. HLL. Fersen's proclamation, 27 Apr. 1806.; Carlsson. 147. 
1 Carlsson. 146. 
12 KUDHA- Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 10,13,20,24,26 Mar. 1806.; Anglica. 489. Rehausen to 
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getting the British to pay him subsidies promptly by using crude blackmail. His motivation in using 
such dubious methods was his army's financial plight and Sweden's inability to shoulder the cost of 
the war itself, arising from Gustavus Ws refusal to levy war taxes which would require the Riksdag's 
approval. Fearing this could call his unpopular war policies into question, Gustavus refused to call 
the Swedish parliament into session. His financial weakness undermined his war effort and 
bargaining position vis-a-vis the British. 
Pierrepoint did not believe that Gustavus IV would, or could, make war on Prussia with L6wenhjelm's 
puny force, numbering 1,600 men in February 13 and even less so in March, when only 400 cavalry 
remained there, after the withdrawal of the infantry to strengthen Pomerania's defences. 14 Pierrepoint 
urged Gustavus on II February, during an audience at his Ratzeburg HQ, to evacuate the province, 
but the king's adamant determination to occupy it at all cost convinced Pierrepoint that Gustavus IV 
intended deliberately to provoke war with Prussia. 15 This view was shared by Gustavus IVs 
advisers, 16 who were as keen to remove the troops as was Pierrepoint. In February Wetterstedt 
combined his efforts with Pierrepoint to get the province evacuated. Pierrepoint argued that the 
Swedish occupation, however well intentioned, 17 only prolonged Hanover's agony, 1 8 since the French 
would remain in Hameln as long as the Swedes remained in Lauenburg. 19 
While Gustavus IV`s civilian advisers urged him to evacuate Lauenburg to return to a peaceful, 
neutral state of affairs with the outside world, his military advisers wanted an end to the continental 
war, in order to fight another, more profitable war. The end of active fighting in northern Europe in 
February 1806 seemed to be an ideal time to seize Norway from Denmark. This was an old Swedish 
dream that Gustavus III had worked hard to achieve during his reign but had failed to realise. 
Gustavus IV followed in his father's footsteps. But he would, like his father, be careful about 
choosing the right time to do so. The Norwegian project's most persistent advocate was the French 
13 FO 73/35. Pierrepoint to Mulgrave, 10 Feb. 1806. 
14 FO 73/35. Pierrepoint to Fox, 28 Mar. 1806. 
15 FO 73/35. Pierrepoint to Mulgrave, 14 Feb. 1806. 
16 KPA- Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 15 Apr. 1806; Barton. 340. 
17 KUDHA- Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 6 Feb., I Mar. 1806 
18 FO 73/35. Pierrepoint to Fox, 21 Feb. 1806. 
19 FO 33 4/ 10. Thornton to Pierrepoint, 27 Feb. 1806. 
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royalist dmigrd colonel Charles de Suremain, who had been planning an invasion of Zealand since 
1798, and who urged Gustavus IV between February and April to seize the island before Napoleon did 
and exchange it for Norway. 20 Armfelt added his greater influence to this idea and seemed even less 
bothered than Suremain about the implications of abandoning her allies in favour of attacking a 
peaceful neighbour and robbing it of her most valuable possession. That Russia might take offence or 
emulate the Swedish example in relation to Finland 21 did not seem to either influence or worry these 
cynical expansionists. On 27 February Armfelt expounded his theories to Wetterstedt, and claimed 
that 
If Sweden seeks to increase her dominions then Norway would be a far more important 
possession than Pomerania; under present conditions that task would not present any major 
problems. To become again what we once were, and (what is more important) to- preserve our 
influence and power then we have only to reduce the circumference of our activities. The 
Peace of Westphalia has in fact been suspended since Prussia and Russia entered their 
respective roles in the European balance of power. Let us [therefore] leave the continent to 
wallow in its crimes, baseness, filth and blood; let us avoid even touching its accursed Soil. 22 
If one could trust this to represent the real views of Arnifelt, who was notorious for changing his 
views with alarming frequency and ease of mind, it was an extraordinary transformation from only a 
few months before when he was a strong advocate for a European crusade against Napoleon. The 
change can only be explained by the mood of defeatism that naturally followed the Austerlitz 
thei r 
campaign and spread in early 1806 among the allies. His views carry, in isolationist aspirations, 
abandonment of continental interests and 'safe' expansion beyond the confines of the continent to 
restore the nation's imperial vigour, an uncanny similarity to Grenville's and Windham's views in 
London. 
Ehrenheim was horrified when he heard about Armfelt'g imperialist speculations, since he wanted 
good relations with Denmark, possibly for mutual defence of Northern neutrality, which Ehrenheim 
aspired to restore once the king's passions for war had passed. On II February Ehrenheim expounded 
his sceptical views to Wetterstedt in their private correspondence, claiming that 
20 Klemming. 42. 
21 KPA- Ehrenheim to Wetterstedl, II Feb. 1806. 
22 Tegner. 85. 
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Should we burn our fingers after a few, failed campaigns, so much the better for the Russians. 
Should we gain and hold Norway, then it would soon be viewed as a compensation for Finland 
which we would no doubt have to cede [to Russia] - Our entire peace and happiness depend upon peaceful concern for our commerce and agriculture, and Armfelt would do better to direct 
IHM's passions in that direction. 23 
Ehrenheim's fears were quite justified and prophetically described what happened to Finland and 
Norway between 1809 and 1814. No doubt such projects, if known in St. Petersburg, would have 
aroused Russian opposition. As it was, the Danes believed that Swedish mobilisation in southern 
Sweden, ostensibly for the defence of Scania, were in fact preparations for an invasion of Zgaland. 24 
While Gustavus IV found the Danish allegations ridiculous, 25 it did not stop his suspicious neighbour 
rejecting his overtures for a Nordic alliance against Napoleon for the common defence of the Sound. 26 
There is no direct proof that Gustavus IV heeded either Ehrenheim or de Suremain's contradictory 
advice. Gustavus Ws eyes were firmly upon the fate of Europe as a whole and supporting the allied 
cause. (It is of course possible that Gustavus IV hoped that his loyal support for the allied cause 
would be rewarded by Denmark being forced by his allied to cede Norway to him by peaceful means. 
If that failed then Gustavus IV would probably use force). In early 1806 Gustavus IVs main priority 
was defending northern Germany against the Franco-Prussian threat, 27 where Denmark played a vital 
role. The Danish rebuff to his overtures not only weakened allied defences but also thwarted his 
aspirations for Denmark's inclusion in the 'common cause'. 
28 Again Gustavus IV suspected Prussian 
sabotage, possibly in spreading rumours about Norway to the Danes, to prevent such alliance putting 
obstacles in the way for their own expansion in northern Germany. In early 
1806 Wetterstedt hoped 
that Sweden would leave the war as soon as the British subsidies ran outý9 and not renew 
the alliance 
with her. Wetterstedt believed the British were more 
interested in making peace with France than 
supporting Sweden's unsolicited Lauenburg occupation which might provoke a 
French advance into 
30 
an area of special economic interest to Britain. 
23 KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, II Feb. 1806. 
24 FO 73/35. Pierrepoint to Fox, 28 Apr. 1806. 
25 TSLUB. C. Gustavus IV to Toll, 26 Apr. 1806. 
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Ehrenheim shared Wetterstedt's peaceful aspirations and doubts about their British ally, especially 
Fox and the continued flow of subsidies, which, if they failed to arrive promptly, could be used as a 
convenient excuse to end the British alliance. But Ehrenheim realised that Gustavus lV's support for 
the alliance was unchanged and his trust in his British ally unquestioning. 31 Like their British 
counterparts, Ehrenheim. and Wetterstedt seemed to have blithely underestimated the difficulties in 
achieving a lasting peace with Napoleon and the serious consequences of a rapid Swedish desertion of 
the coalition. But they had support from Armfelt, who again on 18 March voiced his opinion to 
Engestr6m, the arch Francophile: 'My God, if the king would only return home and forget thinking 
about what is going on in Europe, until the circumstances there have changed'. 32 Armfelt seemed to 
have believed that events on the continent would change on their own, and ignored the argument that 
unless Napoleon was checked by the allies, including Sweden, then they would not. Having blamed 
Gustavus IV for the failure to make peace with Napoleon (Pitt was similarly blamed by the Foxites), 
the Swedish oppositionists were only to find out how difficult and long the road to peace was after 
they took power. 
Meanwhile, the initially undecided, but positive, British reactions to Prussian 'protection', instead of a 
33 French occupation of Hanover, was transformed by the Prussian proclamation that their North Sea 
ports had been closed to British shipping. 34 On 4 April Fox informed Rehausen that the Prussians 
had also made their occupation of Hanover permanent (thus realising Gustavus Ws earlier suspicion 
that the Prussians would eventually annex the country). Fox was visibly enraged by the Prussian 
action which he interpreted as a de-facto declaration of war against Britain and, should her loyal ally 
Sweden be threatened by either France or Prussia, then Britain would give all possible assistance. 35 
This message was re-iterated by Fox on 15 April, during another meeting, where he also promised to 
pursue the war against Prussia with all vigour, with the help of Russia. 
36 In fact, beside Alexander I's 
far too close relations with Berlin, rumours of Franco-Russian plans to divide the Ottoman empire 
31 KPA- Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 11,14,18,25,28 Feb., 5 Mar. 1806 
32 Tegndr. 86. 
33 Anglica. 489. Rehausen to Gustavus IV, 7 Mar. 1806. 
34 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 2 Apr. 1806. 
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made Fox doubt Russia's usefulness and reliability in the Prussian CriSiS. 37 When Fox's declarations 
of support prompted Pierrepoint, on 12 April, to renew his recommendations to Gustavus IV to 
evacuate Lauenburg (to concentrate upon the defence of Pomerania) Gustavus IV refused to budge and 
declared that he would take any Prussian violation of the province's territory as an act of war. 38 In 
fact Gustavus IVs Prussophobia was fed by the growing Anglo-Prussian crisis which reduced his 
ministers hopes for a return to peace in Europe. 39 
Gustavus Ws bellicosity was more than matched by Fox who was a lifelong opponent of what he saw 
as Prussian aggression and autocratic tyranny. He convinced his cabinet colleagues to declare 
immediate war on Prussia and put its ports under blockade. But his apparent militancy was tempered 
by political calculation, since to take a strong line against Prussia would always prove popular with 
George 111, yet another Prussophobe. The king refused to cede Hanover to the Prussians and was as 
jealously possessive about the Electorate as Gustavus IV was about Pomerania. Fox could therefore 
gain the king's trust and confidence (especially when he claimed that Hanover was as British as 
Hampshire), which improved his general political image, and at the same time used the Prussian'war' 
as a convenient smoke screen for his Parisian peace negotiations. 40 In public Fox denounced Prussia's 
policy eloquently as combining 'everything that is contemptible in servility with everything that is 
41 odious in rapacity" while in private telling Howick that not enough could be done to harm 
Prussia. 42 This was all part of his political play-acting since he settled for a limited blockade of 
Prussian occupied North Sea ports, 43 hoping it would cripple the Prussian economy sufficiently for 
Frederick Wilhelm III to evacuate Hanover. 44 This blockade failed to impress the Swedes since it left 
Britain's vital Prussian imports from the Baltic untouched so as not to provoke Russia too much. 45 
Wetterstedt's cynical analysis of Foxs response to the Prussians was correct up to a point. Fox had 
37 Anglica. 489. Rehausen to Gustavus IV, 9 May 1806.; FO 334/10. Thomton to Pierrepoint, 24 June 
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indeed no wish for a real war with Prussia, 46 but he sincerely hoped to cripple Prussia's trade47 for 
political reasons. 
The blockade was more effective than Fox could have hoped for, as the complacent Prussian 
authorities had failed to forewarn their ship owners and merchants about the possibility of a British 
embargo in response to their own blockade. Berlin had in fact not expected such a forcefid British 
reaction, and by early April over 300 merchant ships had been captured by the British. The blockade, 
meanwhile, crippled Prussia's exports in general, but especially her grain and timber trade for which 
Britain was the largest export market. Soon the Prussian merchant class and the finance minister 
were Protesting that the blockade was bankrupting both them and the nation. The Prussian 
government remained unmoved since, in a world of narrowing choices and smaller margins for error, 
they chose the lesser of two evils: slow economic strangulation by the British, in preference to military 
annihilation by Napoleon! s army. Better a British blockade than French troops in Berlin, in other 
words. This capitulation to Napoleon had come about after the failure of pro-allied policies to yield 
result and the amorphous balance in the Berlin cabinet shifted to the Trench Party' who adopted the 
above policy. But the Prussians believed that the British would not take such umbrage at their 
occupation and blockade simply because of a mere matter of honour. Blinded by its own cynicism the 
Prussian government convinced itself that other governments' political motivations were guided by the 
same lack of principle as its own. This unimaginative approach translated itself not only into 
economic, but political losseS, 48 and Wetterstedt ridiculed Prussian incredulity at British 'inCiVility. 
49 
If the British sense of moral outrage at their actions remained a mystery to the Prussians, then 
Gustavus JVs crusading zeal against them proved an even greater puzzle. Gustavus Ws fears for 
Pomerania and Lauenburg, both of which he wcLs determined to defend, were immediately aroused 
and he intended to blockade Prussia if she occupied Lauenburg. Ehrenheirn, whose advice was rarely 
46 Mitchell. 230. 
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acted upon by Gustavus IV, urged the king to stay neutral in the Anglo-Prussian war and instead take 
economic advantage of it. This piece of crass and selfish commercialism not only promised to 
embroil Sweden in a trade dispute with her most important ally (since the British had a strong 
aversion to other powers, especially paid allies such as Sweden, taking unfair advantage of her state of 
war to increase their trade at her expense); but his advice was also patently against the spirit of the 
alliance since Britain and Sweden faced a new common foe: Prussia, allied to their arch enemy 
France. Ehrenheimls advice for Gustavus IV to end his self imposed role as Lauenburg's protector 
and await his allies policies towards Berlin, was far more perceptive. However, against all the 
experience of the pasý he still advised Gustavus IV to leave the war. Ehrenheim, sidelined in 
Stockholm, was very much ignored by the king, and his private correspondence probably expressed 
50 his private wishes more than any real intention to influence Gustavus IVs actual policy orientation. 
Wetterstedt needed no prompting to end the alliance with Britain, prevent a conflict with Prussia and 
get Sweden out of the war. But his efforts were undermined by what he perceived as Prussia's 
deliberate efforts to provoke Gustavus IV into hostilities. 51 An officer in Ldwenhjelm's corp, count 
M6mer, believed that Russia would invade Prussian Poland, in support of Sweden, if the Prussians 
invaded Lauenburg. 52 This cataclysmic scenario, which would have seen the allied powers making 
war among themselves without Napoleon, was unlikely to occur since Alexander I had no wish to go 
to war against a friendly power on behalf of either Britain or Sweden. Pierrepoint did not share 
Swedish sentiments, which grossly exaggerated Sweden's influence in St. Petersburg and the perceived 
weakness of Prussia. Pierrepoint believed the Prussians were determined to occupy Lauenburg, and 
that the weak Swedish force there would be unable to prevent it. This state of weakness no doubt 
influenced L6wenhjelm's orders from Gustavus IV not to risk an encirclement, but retreat as quickly 
as possible to pomerania. 53 Gustavus IV, when faced with the hard choice of war or peace, opted, 
like 
Fox, to avoid an unwinnable land war in favour of a blockade of Prussia's ports. 
54 In the Spring of 
5OKUDHA- Wetterstedt to Ehrenhein-ý 7 Apr. 1806; KPA- Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 8,11,15,18,23 
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1806 Britain and Sweden could have embroiled themselves in a disastrous war with Prussia that 
would have had the potential to pull other powers into the maelstrom. 
When the Prussian 'invasion! took place on 19 April, with 1,800 troops crossing the Elbe at 
Neuhausen, L6wenhjelffes force (400 men) made token resistance, losing one dead, before retreating 
to safety in Pomerania. After this farcical operation, would the Prussians follow up their empty 
'victory' with an invasion of Mecklenburg-Schwerin or Pomerania with the 17,000 Prussian troops 
massed along the Peenc river? Both the Swedes and the British were convinced that this army was 
there as a threat and not as an actual invasion force. Two days before Lauenburg was occupied 
Jackson, following Fo)es orders to cut a diplomatic links with Prussia, left Berlin without taking 
leave of the foreign minister, pointing to an escalation in the crisis between Britain and Prussia as 
well. 55 
In early May, with rumours of war with Prussia, Gustavus IV announced to Pierrepoint, during an 
audience, his blockade of Prussia's Baltic ports in retaliation for Prussia's occupation of Lauenburg. 
His suggestion to occupy the neutral ports of Travenifinde, Wismar and Rostock, to forestall the 
Prussians, was flatly turned down by Pierrepoint, who believed his government would never agree to 
such a callous violation of neutral territory. Gustavus IV also asked for increased British subsidies (as 
he was prone to do when there was a crisis to be dealt with), to increase his Pomeranian army from 
10,000 to 15,000 troops. Both Pierrepoint and Ehrenheiin believed the Swedish blockade would hurt 
Swedish commerce more than Prussia's. Fersen, who feared that Prussia might be provoked into 
invading Pomerania by the blockade, wanted Gustavus IV to appease them by only leaving a small 
garrison in Pomerania. Fersen's supine advice would not only have violated the terms of the alliance 
with Britain, but probably encourage further Prussian aggression. Fersen was at a loss to understand 
Gustavus IVs strong objections to his proposals. Wetterstedt supported Fersen! s proposals, shared the 
count, s and the Pomeranians' exaggerated fears of the Prussian army, especially as Wetterstedt 
believed Sweden's unreliable' allies would not come to Sweden's aid. Nor could there be much 
55 FO 73/35. Pieffepoint to Fox, 5,25 Apr. 1806; FO 334/10. Thomton to Pieffepoint, 4,8,11 
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Support to be expected from the Pomeranian aristocracy, which had been alienated by Gustavus lVs 
land reform and abolition of the province's autonoMy. 56 
An even greater threat than an escalation of the conflict with Prussia, was the fear held by the king's 
ministers that it could embroil Sweden in conflict with her allies. Ehrenheim feared, with experience 
of the conflict five years earlier, that the blockade would give the British an excuse to violate Sweden's 
hard won maritime rights elsewhere. 57 Both he and Pierrepoint were relieved when Gustavus IV, in 
late May, cancelled his plans to bombard Prussia's ports, which would no doubt have provoked the 
Prussians beyond endurance . At least Pierrepoint was assured on 22 May that Gustavus IV had no 
offensive plans against Prussia beyond the blockade. 58 The Swedish blockade of Prussia's Baltic 
ports, by trapping 2,000 ships, added to her economic woes. Pierrepoints request that Prussian ships 
in British ports be allowed to return home was politely, but firmly, declined by the Swedes, since it 
would have undermined the entire purpose of the blockade. 59 Pierrepoint's increasing protests made 
Wetterstedt nervous that Britain would join a Russo-Danish protest which could lead to British 
threats, such as those made during earlier maritime conflicts between her and Sweden. 60 
In fact Wetterstedt believed that Fox would make peace with France at Sweden's expense, stating on 
24 May that 'It seems that all England wants to do is to gain time, using us as a convenient target, as 
long as the wrath against Prussia lasts, and then in their own good time leave us to save ourselves as 
best we can'. 61 The Swedes were in fact very disappointed with Britain's failure to support their 
blockade and their endeavours to end it with diplomatic pressure being applied to Sweden with the 
assistance of Russia. 62 The British lack of support for the Swedish blockade comes as no surprise, 
since Fox had limited the British blockade in order to minimise British merchants' losses and 
inconvenience, while securing Britain's vital imports of Prussian grain. The cabinet simply found 
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59 WT TDI-I A Wetterste& to Ehrenheim, 10,14,21 June 1806; Simms. 246. 
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Gustavus IVs blockade 'troublesomel63 and wanted it to end as swiffly as possible. As early as late 
May British merchants supplying the navy had inquired if they could get naval stores out of the 
blockaded ports. 64 It was only two months later that Gustavus IV allowed L80,000 of stores through 
the blockade. 65 Gustavus IV, aware how annoying his blockade was to the British, was therefore 
willing to relent. But the stoppage of Prussian grain imports into Sweden was causing widespread 
distress in his own country, and his ministers (like the British) no less ardently wished it to end. They 
praised his moderation in applying it66 and his decision to send a naval mission to Berlin to defuse 
67 the situation. 
The gravest threat to the blockade did not however, come from Britain, but from Russia, whose 
relations with Sweden had cooled considerably since the failed 1805 campaign. Alexander I had only 
renewed his alliance with Sweden to placate her over the issue of the Finnish border while he was 
embroiled in war against France but had already in March warned Gustavus IV not to provoke either 
Russia or Prussia over territorial disputes. 68 Relations between the two allies, and ancient enemies, 
were therefore far from friendly, even before the blockade promised to worsen them yet further. The 
Swedish suspicion that Prussia would shield behind Russia to protect herself against an Anglo- 
Swedish attack was soon realised69 The Prussians complained to the emperor that the British hoped 
to rekindle the continental war, to their sole benefit, by encouraging Gustavus IV`s incomprehensible 
crusade against Prussia. 70 They argued that Gustavus IV was a British puppet, doing the bidding of 
his sinister paymasters in London. 71 In fact the British shared Prussia's frustration with Gustavus 
IV`s blockade which was his and not their idea. The Prussians' self-justifying accusations of a 
diabolical British plan to rekindle the continental war seem far fetched. It not only overestimated the 
British cabinet's talents for Machiavellian intrigue, but also ignored the Talents' pre-occupation with 
the pursuit of peace and overseas expansion. Under these circumstances a continental war would 
63 Grey. Box 2 1. File 2. Grenville to Howick, 25 July 1806. 
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67 KUDHA_ Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 17,21 May 1806. 
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distract Britain from its main priorities as much as it would Napoleon. Not surprisingly the emperor 
found the Prussian arguments unconvincing and urged them to end the conflict with Gustavus IV. 72 
Like the Swedes, the Prussians found Alexander I uncommitted and difficult to pin down when they 
were in need of Russi; a! s SUpport. 73 
Gustavus IV was angered by Russian ambigUity, 74 which contrasted with Britain's praiseworthy 
support and hard line against Berlin. 75 MS rninisters feared that a Russian intervention to the Prusso- 
Swedish conflict would favour the Prussians. 76 Prussian enthusiasm for such an intervention seemed 
to justify their suspicions . 
77 Alopeus intervened against what he claimed were Swedish hostilities 
towards a 'peaceful' Prussia claims which were refuted by an indignant Gustavus IV. 78 His rebuff 
reinforced the impression of Swedetfs diplomatic isolation79 and Ehrenheim feared that Gustavus IV, 
like his hero Charles XIII, could soon find himself facing the combined enmity of Russia, Prussia and 
Denmark. 80 'God knows what our negotiations will achieve, Ehrenheim claimed on 18 July, 'they 
draa on until we are embroiled with both Russia and Denmark, and the prospects before us are even C7 
more disquieting than ever before, especially as there is threatening and real food shortages in several 
81 
provinces, while trade is in fast decline'. 
By I July Ehrenheim believed that Sweden was balancing finely between war and peace, as Prussia 
prepared for war with Sweden, while feigning a willingness to negotiat02 Much depended upon the 
political survival of the Prussophobic and warlike prince Czartoryski's political future in 
St. Petersburg, where he had been a support for Sweden, among a strong body of anti-Swedish 
opinion. But Austerlitz had undermined his warlike policies, as it had Pitt's, and 
by early July it 
seemed evident that his days as foreign minister were numbered, which could not 
bode well for 
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Swedish influence with the Russian goVeMment. 83 By the end of the month Sweden's worst fears 
were confirmed as Czartoryski gave way to count Andrei Budberg, who bore their country a strong 
84 personal ill will since his days as envoy in Stockholm. Under these circumstances, Wetterstedt 
believed, it was not impossible that Russia would return to her pre- 1805 'neutrality system', which 
could be dangerous for Sweden if Gustavus IV continued his war against Napoleon. 85 Ehrenheim 
failed to be convinced that Budberg's elevation beyond his abilities would change policy, since he 
expected Czartorysid to continue to be the de-facto leader of the Empire's foreign poliCy. 86 
Ehrenheim's scepticism was shared by British diplomats, but the question was which side Russia 
would support in the Prusso-Swedish conflict . 
87 The first signs from SL Petersburg seemed ominouO' 
as Budberg intimated to a shocked Stedingk that the Russo-Swedish alliance was coming to and end, 
while there were rumours in St. Petersburg that a Russian squadron was being readied to break the 
Swedish bloCkade. 89 should the Russians in addition to this ratify the d! Oubril treaty with France, 
this would signal a return to the pre-1805 neutrality-90 
Just as Sweden had lost a vital support in the east, she seemed, through Fox! s growing ill-health, to be 
about to lose another in the west. Fox had, like Pitt, provided much of the cabinet's force, energy and 
direction, proving to be a steadfast opponent of Prussia and admiring friend of Gustavus IV. His 
death would also signal a cabinet reshuffle, crisis, or even collapse; so vital was his role and 
personality for the cabinefs survival. 91 Rehausen fmed that the Franco-Spanish threat against 
Portuga192 would divert British attention away from the Baltic and put their promised military 
assistance, if the Prussians invaded Pomerania, in jeopardy. 93 Should the Talents fall apart following 
Fox's death, this would leave Sweden alone against Prussia. Would Alexander I be convinced by the 
Prussians, argument that the British wanted a continental war so as to leave her free to pursue 
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overseas expansion and world domination without hindrance? 94 The emperor faded to give a clear 
indication about his intentionS. 95 
The Prussians were thus left to their own devices, but their own attempts at negotiations with 
Gustavus IV proved unsuccessful. A blunt Prussian request, in May, for an end to the blockade was 
flatly refused. A similar request a month later, in return for the evacuation of Lauenburg, failed to 
change Gustavus Ws mind, When general Kalkreuth was chosen for a special diplomatic mission to 
Pomerania, and met the king at Anclain on 21 June, both sides asked for too much, which ensured 
that the talks failed Gustavus IV was convinced a Swedish temporary occupation of the Prussian 
islands of Usedom and Wollin (until the Prussians evacuated Lauenburg) could end the long Prusso- 
Swedish dispute. Prussia refused to consider Gustavus IV and continued to play for tiMe. 96 
Tj- 
However, the time for Prussian procrastination was almost over as Alexander 1, to his allies relief, not 
only failed to ratify the dOubril treaty but also refused to give Prussia any support against Sweden. 
Having failed to get Russia's unequivocal support, and facing a growing French menace to her 
western border, the Prussians had to give in to Gustavus IVs demands which were quite simple and 
stark. As a precondition for any normalisation of relations, the Prussians would have to evacuate 
Lauenburg, which was to be re-occupied by the Swedes. There was no hope that Gustavus IV would 
moderate these demands since Gustavus IV, according to Pierrepoint, never gave up his standpoint 
except under the most extreme pressure. Therefore the only way to resolve the dispute was for the 
Prussians to give way, and they only yielded with reluctance due to the threat of war with France, a 
threat that Pierrepoint believed (wrongly) would not lead to war. Facing that real threat in deepest 
isolation and in desperate need of AngIO-Russian succour Prussia decided to give in to Swedish 
demands in order to reduce their number of enemies. They evacuated Lauenburg, which was re- 
occupied by the Swedes, in return for which (as promised) Gustavus IV lifted the blockade. Delighted 
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95 Bailleu. 112-115. Alexander I to Frederick Wilhelm 111,7,16 June 1806. 
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with his 'triumph' Gustavus IV exclaimed in a letter to Toll on 27 August that he had answered his 
conscience and that his victory was due to God. Gustavus IV saw the re-occupation as a victory of 
international law and order over an immoral and aggressive predatory power such as Prussia. 97 
IV. The Buenos Aires Blunder and the 'Miracle' of Maida. 
The British Expeditions to South America and South Italy, July-August 1806. 
While Gustavus IV celebrated his hollow victory over Prussia the British seemed to have been smitten 
with a fever for overseas eVansion due to the adventurist antics of a buccaneering naval officer by the 
name of Sir Riggs Home Popham. Popham had commanded the naval squadron which transported 
the British troops that captured the Cape in January 1806 and in April he persuaded general 
Beresford, with 1,600 troops, to accompany him to the Plate. Beresford's army captured Buenos Aires 
with ease a month later and Popham could return to London, in September, with a rich booty and be 
treated by the public as a national hero. No one knew in London that Buenos Aires had been rc- 
captured shortly after Pophanfs departure. The government saw Popham's conquest of the Plate as an 
opportunity to expand trade in a new colony and compensate for military and political setbacks in 
Europe. Only Howick, the new foreign secretary to be (who was appointed in October), opposed these 
south American ventures as a dangerous distraction from the war in Europe where the struggle 
against Napo' teon would be settled. After all conquering Spain's colonies would make no major 
impression upon Napoleon! s resolve to fight Britain to the bitter end and he could prevent, with armed 
might, should Spain try to make peace with Britain in order to save her colonial empire. 98 
While the occupation of Buenos Aires only lead to further setbacks and humiliations for Britain her 
army had scored a significant victory on another front in a very different part of the world, On 30 
June general Stuart, conunanding 5,000 British troops, had landed on the coast of Calabria and a few 
days later encountered an evenly matched French force at Maida. The French, holding their enemy in 
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low esteem, rushed at the British lines without artillery support and were cut to shreds by British fire 
power. For the first time in the war the British army had truly showed the discipline and valour that 
would eventually, after long and hard years of war, secure its share of the victory over NapoleoWs 
hitherto victorious legions. 99 
V. A Friend in Need or just Old Perfidious Prussia? 
Prussian Preparations for War against the 'Common Foe' and the Allied Response, August- 
October 1806. 
It may seem strange and out of place in a study of bilateral diplomatic relations to devote any time to 
military operations as far removed from Scandinavia as the Plate and Calabria. But in wartime 
military and diplomatic efforts go hand in hand and form two different, but equally important sides to 
the same coin: political leadership. Britain, fighting a global war, placed less importance on Sweden 
than on these far flung operations, which may have been justified, but which crippled her ability to 
intervene decisively at a crucial phase in the war. That new phase was about to begin, as Napoleon 
challenged the last remaining undefeated military power in Europe: Prussia, which at last seemed 
prepared to abandon a decade of devious diplomatic juggling to preserve her neutrality in favour of a 
direct military confrontation with Napoleon. 100 
Prussian discontent with Napoleon had reached a boiling point in the late summer of 1806. Apart 
from his contemptuous treatment of them in general, and their king in particular, Napoleon's 
territorial ambitions in Germany, especially his creation of the Confederation of the Rhine on 25 July, 
set off the alarm bells in Berlin, since it challenged their own territorial plans and North German 
Confederation. Too late the Prussians had realised that two expansionist states could not live side by 
side indefinitely without a confrontation. The last straw came when Napoleon, ignoring Prussian 
possession of the country completely, showed a willingness to hand over Hanover (Prussia's only and 
inadequate reward in its 'alliance' with Napoleon) to the British in return for peace. This was 
probably a deliberate provocation by Napoleon, who distrusted and disliked the Prussians as much as 
Gustavus IV and the British, in order to punish the Prussians for their armed and hostile 'mediation' 
99 Finley. 1-15,3646,49-58,63-78. 
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in 1805, and establish once and for all who was master in Germany. 10 1 By August both sides were a 
state of 'cold war with the each other, and when Franco-Dutch troops occupied East Friesland the 
Prussians responded by secretly mobilising their army along their vulnerable western border. 102 
Prussia's volte-face brought to a head the on-going dilemma of her old enemies, Sweden and Britain: 
should unreliable and changeable Prussia be treated as enemy or potential ally? Neither powers self- 
interest would be served by seeing Prussia defeated, conquered by the French and left unaided in her 
hour of neecL After all, Prussia was the bulwark against a French invasion of the Baltic littoral, 
including the vital Stralsund base, and a vital ally to have in any war against Napoleon. Yet, on the 
other hand, could she be relied upon? Unfornmately the rulers in both countries were deeply hostile to 
Prussia's previous policies and needed actions, rather than mere expressions of goodwifl, from the 
Prussians to convince them of their trustworthiness. In mid-September Grenville dismissed Prussia as 
Napoleon's tool and that he would demand the evacuation of Hanover before normalising relations 
with Berlin. 103 Windham agreed that any European operations at the time was pointless, since 'Our 
forces in the present case can be little in the scale of continental armies, and the expense is 
enormous'. 104 It is interesting to note that he seemed to have plenty of troops and cash available for 
his overseas adventures. Lauderdale, stiff in Paris in September negotiating with the French, argued 
more soundly against a Prussian alliance 'since in addition to my doubts of its honesty I have doubts 
about its power'. 105 Grenville, however, balanced the cabinet's understandable suspicion of the 
Prussians with the need to assist her against a common foe. Hence, while he sent Lord Morpeth to 
Berlin in September, 106 Grenville did not believe there was any rush to accommodate the Prussians' 
increasingly desperate call for British aid against the French. When Balan, a senior Prussian 
diplomat, arrived in London on 26 September to negotiate openly and directly with the British, his X-- 
overtures were met with cold caution by the cabinet. 107 Rehausen could not believe that the Talents 
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could negotiate with their deadliest enemy rather than with a potential ally such as Prussia. 108 
Grenville persisted with his suspicions against the Prussian government and its fighting resolve, 
arguing, on I October that 'if they are actually engaged in hostilities against a common enemy, one 
may assist those whom one can neither esteem nor trust. Still it will require strong proof to convince 
me that Prussia really is disposed to bring things to this extremity'. 109 The Prussians, through their 
hazardous foreign policy twists and turns, had managed to alienate a vital potential ally and thus 
faced the Napoleonic war machine without effective British financial support. 
The Prussians could equally not expect much succour from Sweden, whose government (but not king) 
was as cynical about their fate, and uYtinterested about European affairs, as the British. They 
believed, like Grenville, that the Prussians would buckle under French diplomatic pressure before it 
came to a serious war, and that their only, narrow-minded interest was to keep their mercurial king 
from aiding the Prussians. 110 May Sweden be a mere spectator to the coming war as long as it does 
not touch Sweden directly', Ehrenheim exclaimed with fervent hope in September. I 11 From 
Ehrenheim's hopes one would have thought that Sweden was some distant neutral power, like the 
USA, an ocean away from the war, when in fact she was allied to Napoleon's enemies; one of her 
provinces, Pomerania, was about to be engulfed in a war only a short distance away, if the allies, 
including Sweden, did not give the Prussians their immediate and greatest assistance. Prussia had 
shielded not only Pomerania, but also Sweden, from the real repercussions of war with France, and 
deserved some Swedish assistance. 
Pierrepoint, like his Swedish colleague in London, displayed more support for Prussian than either of 
their governments. On 14 September, during an audience with Gustavus IV, he tried to convince him 
of the need for Sweden to aid Prussia with all force available. To his consternation Gustavus IV not 
only refused to co-operate militarily with Prussia and limit his role in the Franco-Prussian war solely 
to the defence of Lauenburg. Afterwards Pierrepoint reflected that the hostile Swedes would not have 
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have- ýoeevt , proven a reliable ally of Prussia anyway nor, with only 7,000 troops in Pomeraniaýable to play any 
role in the war, making him doubt the entire value of the Swedish alliance. 112 In defence of Gustavus 
IVs attitude, one can simply note the Talents' own indifference to Prussia's plight. In addition, their 
decision not to increase Sweden's subsidies crippled Gustavus Ws ability to aid Prussia militarily had 
he chosen to do so. Pieffepoint's views were without doubt coloured by the unedifying delight of 
Swedish ministers in Sweden's de-facto neutrality, 113 typified by Ehrenheim's statement to 
Wetterstedt on 19 September that 'I savour more than anyone the joy at the news that have been 
conveyed that RM. has separated from coalitions and war projects and will remain at home'. 1 14 
Their joy turned to bitter disappointment when Gustavus IV offered Alexander I his co-operation in 
defending the Elbe on 25 September. 115 
Gustavus IV realised only too late the importance of aiding Prussia if the French were to be held at 
bay and his inability to assist Prussia. The situation was far from bright for the allies and a defeat 
now, at the hands of Napoleon, could spread his influence into hitherto untouched parts of the 
continent. Taking Prussia's place in 1805, the Austrians did not re-enter the alliance, Russia had not 
recovered from her previous defeat, Britain was distracted and aloof, while Sweden was unable to 
assist Prussia. Prussia was in October 1806 practically alone, but supremely confident that her 
formidable army, untried in battle against the upstart Napoleon, would finally put a check to his 
meteoric ascendancy. As will we will see shortly their self confidence was completely misplaced, 
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113 KUDHA_ Wetterstedt to Ehrenheini, 16 Sept. 1806.; KPA: Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 16 
Sept. 1806. 
114 KPA: Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt 19 Sept. 1806. 
115 KUDHA- Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 25 Sept. 1806. 
90 
Chapter Five. 
The Beginning of the End. 
Napoleon's Campaigns against Prussia and Russia, October 1806-March 1807. 
L Napoleon Crushes the Northern Sparta. 
Napoleon's Prussian Campaign and the Threat to Swedish Pomerania, October 1806 to January 
1807. 
The autumn campaign of 1806 between France and Prussia was a clash of military titansI. On the 
one side the upstart Napoleon and his brash legions while on the other side the much vaunted 
Prussian war machine. Napoleon had therefore a healthy respect for this army and most Europeans 
expected Prussia to defeat him. 2 In fact the Prussian army was an anachronism which had rested on 
its laurels since the days of Frederick the Great. "le Prussia's military leaders had not reformed the 
army to keep pace with France her political leaders had alienated her potential allies (except for 
Russia) and chosen the worst possible time for a single-handed confrontation with Napoleon. 3 After 
Jena-AuerstAdt 14 October both the Prussian army and state had ceased to exist enabling Napoleon to 
4 occupy Berlin without resistance on 27 October. 
The immediate effect of the war was to fiH the roads to the north and east with terrified Prussian 
refugees. For Sweden this was not a war in the distance, like 1805, but a frightening display of 
French armed might on Sweden's very doorstep, which left the country in a state of shock. One 
Swedish witness to Jena claimed the consequences of Prussia's collapse would be as great as those of 
the French revolution and would spell the end of Gustavian Sweden5 since, in his opinion, 'The All 
Highest was about to punish the Nation, which was ruled by a king with unlimited power to rule 
according to his own blockhead, combining Arrogance and Stupidity in equal MeaSUre,. 6 More 
intelligent Swedes must realise, he argued, that it was long overdue for Sweden to leave the war. 7 
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The expatriate Swedish observer found support among the 'blockhead's' advisers. Ehrenheim, safely 
in Stockholm, was more worried about French privateers making an unwelcome appearance in the 
Baltic than by the strategic implications of the vacuum left by Prussia-s collapse, which French 
soldiers were filling with alarming speed, He wanted Sweden to remain a spectator to the unfolding 
drama. 8 Wetterstedt, being ftulher south and closer to the events took a less 'Olympian' view of 
events than Ehrenheim and he was concerned for the safety of Morian's force trapped in Lauenburg 
and of Pomerania itself, as the French armies swept northwards like a tidal wave against the shores of 
the Baltic. 9 Unlike the complacent Ehrenheirn, Gustavus IV, who had received news of Jena on 23 
October, was shocked by the news but soon regained his usual optimism. He wanted to support 
Prussia by sending the Pomemman anny to the Elbe but he was discouraged by ToR, who told him the 
river had already been crossed by the French. 10 
Enormous pressure was put upon Gustavus IV to prevent him from coming to Prussia's aid but how 
could Sweden remain a passive spectator of Prussia's ruin? By occupying Prussia Napoleon became 
the undisputed master of Germany and he destroyed what remained of the continent's balance of 
power and could now threaten Russia, Denmark and Sweden with invasion. All three states, hitherto 
relatively insulated against the French threat by the Prussian bulwark, became front-line states. It also 
made the Baltic a theatre of war and raised the stakes for both the allies and Napoleon in their 
struggle. In fact Jena was a far more important battle than Austerlitz because of the strategic 
implications and the intensification of the war, raised yet further by the Berlin Decree issued by K- - 
Napoleon a few weeks later. Sweden's future now for the first time hung in the balance, her margin of 
error and room for manoeuvre having been drastically reduced, allowing no scope for Ehrenheim's 
fancifid hopes. Sweden looked to her ally to give the lead in relations with Prussia. The earlier 
Morpeth mission had collapsed in October, and it was not until late November that a new British 
mission, under general Hely-Hutchinson, was appointed. Hutchinson was chosen more for his 
political loyalties than for his diplomatic abilities, and thus personified the Talents' lack of interest in 
European affairs. That impression was reinforced on 21 November when Rehausen met Howick, who 
8 KPA- Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 7 Oct. 1806. 
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told Rehausen that his government would only pay subsidies for offensive operations. The Swedish 
ministers noted sarcastically how keen the British were to get Sweden into the war but not pay for it. II 
A0 who wanted to reduce As we shall see, Howick was acting on behalf of his sceptical colleagues, 
Britain's subsidy bill to faltering allies in whom they had little or no confidence. But British coldness 
towards her allies was fully reciprocated and prevented the coalition from functioning properly. 
Britain, by her government's short-sighted economies, scepticism and overseas adventurism, lost her 
opportumty to aid Prussia and fight Napoleon. This failure to act contributed to the collapse of the 
allied coalition and therefore prolonged the agonies of war by several years. 
IEL Russia Comes to the Rescue 
The Bennigsen's Counter-Offensive in East Prussia, and the Russo-Swedish Subsidy Crisis, 
December 1806-March 1807. 
Russia, like Sweden, faced the French for the first time on their very doorstep, in an escalation of a 
war which was not only becoming more intense, but also more widespreacL Jena was a catastrophe for 
Prussia but a severe setback for Russia and required her, despite her weakened state of her anny since 
Austerlitz, to rescue her neighbour before the French had occupied the entire country. On 9 
November Russia announced her intention to send 56,000 troops to East Prussia. This was the 
beginning of a period of improvement for the allied cause and increasing trouble for Napoleon who, 
no doubt with Austria in mind, had expected Prussia to beg for peace before Russia could muster her 
army. Prussia's determination to continue fighting, and Russia's equal determination to aid her, ruled 
out a swift end to a war which was proving unpopular with the French people, whose response to Jena 
had been lukewarm. It also gave an opportunity for Spain' 2 and Austria to conspire against Napoleon 
from behind the scenes. Jena proved in fact to be an indecisive victory as it did not lead to peace but 
to only prolonged war. Neither Napoleon or his army relished the prospects for a prolonged winter 
campaign against the Russians and the French did not prove adept at fighting a winter war since 
II Anglica. 489. Rehausen to Gustavus IV, 4,21 Nov. 1806; KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 12 
Oct. 1806; KPA- Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt. 7,17 Oct., 28 Nov. 1806.; Michael Glover. A Very 
Slippery Fellow. The Life of Sir Robert Wilson 1777-1849. London, 1978.29-30. 
12 Hilt. 164-9. 
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Bennigsen inflicted a severe setback to Napoleon's reputation for invincibility by defeating him at 
Eylau in February 1807.13 
The Russians had every justification to feel proud about their troops performance at Eylau. 14 Their 
troops had avenged their country's humiliation at Austerlitz and they had proved to the world that 
Napoleon was not invincible. 15 An army under his personal command had been checked for the first 
time on an open battlefield and their operational capacity, so far from home bases, had reached their 
Utmost limit . 
16 The winter campaign in East Prussia and Eylau had given Napoleon a due warning 
what would be in store for his army should he be bold enough to invade Holy Mother Russia itself. 17 
If Russia was to exploit her victory over the French then she needed allied aid; not only British arms 
and subsidies, but a Swedish diversionary offensive against Napoleon's vulnerable northern flank, 
possibly supported by a British expeditionary army. Neither ally showed much goodwill towards the 
hard pressed Russians who were exhausted by Eylau and the burden of shouldering the war against 
Napoleon almost single-handedly. The Talents, driven by internal dissension, suffering from a lack of 
direction, seduced by South American visions of wealth (as we shall see) and with false economy 
more in tune with peaceti= budgets than a world-war, cold-shouldered Russia's desperate pleas for 
succour. Russia! s relations with Sweden were even worse because of the British failure to pay out 
subsidies to Gustavus IV drove the king to undertake desperate gambles. He was infuriated by British 
niggardliness and by the Russians for their inadvisable re-opening of the contentions issue of the 
Rmsso-Finnish border in January 1807, since that border had not been properly delineated, the issue in 
general raised Swedish fears for the security of Finland and had brought the two countries, as seen 
earlier, to the brink of war four year before. Gustavus IV dealt a serious blow to both his allies a 
month later by seizing L80,000 worth of silver in Gothenburg which was destined for Russia. This 
seizure was a violent protest on the king's part against the total inadequacy of British subsidies and 
their interest in the Swedish alliance. Instead of co-operating with Russia, who had similar 
13 Weigley. 399403; Chandler. 509-510,513-5,517-8,527-548.; Connelly. 110; Home. 202-213. 
14 Sbornik. Vol. 54.246. Kotchubey to Richelieu, 10 Feb. 1807. 
15 Chandler. 551. 
16 Weigley. 403. 
17 Connelly. 110; Chandler. 73 9-86 1. 
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grievances against Britain, Gustavus IV claimed the sum seized was due to Sweden since the Russo- 
Swedish Drottningholm alliance of 1791. Wetterstedt and Ehrenheim, understandably worried, had 
strongly advised against this rash act, and justifiably feared an open conflict with both Britain and 
Russia because of it. Stedingk was instructed to tell the Tsar, that the seized subsidies would be spent 
on fighting for the 'common cause'. This seemed to have mollified the Tsar who had no wish to add 
to his enemies over some paltry piasters. But there was a sting in the tail. On I January Alexander I 
had warned Gustavus IV that, while he would continue fighting the French with all his might, 
circumstances beyond his control could force him to change political course. 18 
Both Gustavus IVs and British short-sightedness and mistakes had alienated the ruler of the country 
which was the continental and military backbone of the coalition. Britains ability to fight against 
France depended upon Russian bayonets and Sweden! s security, especially regarding Finland, 
depended upon Russia! s foreign policy orientation. The failure of Britain to give Russia adequate 
support would lead to Tilsit and the Swedish seizure of the British subsidies for Russia was one of 
several reasons for Alexander I to occupy Finland a year later. 
III The Old or the New World? 
British Strategic Dilemmas in a World War, October 1806-March 1807. 
Russian and Swedish resentment at British neglect of European affairs was understandable but their 
overseas interest were either limited or non-existent compared to Britain. The news of the British 
capture of Buenos Aires, which arrived in September 1806, opened up prospects to rebuild Britain's 
American empire on the Plate, which seemed a better prospect than supporting Prussia. On 9 October 
General Auchmuty, with 3,000 troops, set sail for the Plate to achieve this ambitious aim. Hence the 
British failure to send an expedition to the Elbe or Holland to aid Prussia. 19 
18 Muscovita. 505. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 2 Jan. 1807; ibid. Gustavus IV to Stedingk, 9, ibid. 
Alexander I to Gustavus IV, I Jan. 1807; KUDHA- Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 7,8,12,15,17,19,26, 
27 Feb., 15,26 Mar., 5,12 Apr. 1807; Muscovita. 50 1. Wetterstedt to Stedingk, 21 Aug. 1806; 
Svensson. 197-345.; Sherwig. 180-18 1; Trollc. 59-60. Feb-Mar. 1807; Zlobin. 65,70. 
19 Windham. 463.12 Sept. 1806; Fletcher. 53-5,57,138-9. 
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The decision to reinforce Beresford was not unanimous as Howick, leading the European' wing of the 
cabinet, opposed the expedition while most ministers, including Grenville, could not make up their 
minds. The cabinet decided to adopt a compromise 'system' which gave minimal support to the allies, 
passive defence against France and weak eVeditions overseas. Or, in other words, the cabinet failed 
to prioritise any of its stated strategic aims, which eventually ensured failure on all frontS. 20 
Windham, who led the wing of the cabinet which wanted to abandon Europe almost completely and 
concentrate on overseas expansion, entertained ever wilder and more ambitious plans for conquest, 
including occupying the Philippines, Chile and the Orinocco. Not surprisingly cabinet discussions 
became very heated. At cabinet meetings on 7 and 12 January Howick urged the cabinet to give 
Russia a realistically large subsidy instead of squandering precious funds on overseas expeditions. 21 
At the latter meeting Howick told his colleagues that by allowing Britain to divert her aftentions, away 
from Europe, and to overseas expansion, the cabinet would permit France to destroy Britain's 
remaining allies piece-meal and thus dominate the continent. This British lack of interest was 
destructive to the resolve of these remaining allies to resist Napoleon and stay loyal to Britain, whose 
reputation as a reliable ally suffered Erom this deliberate neglect. 22 Unfortunately Howick's eloquence 
did not change the govemment's policy. The Talents' neglect ensured that Russia deserted the 
'common cause'. Howick only managed to get limited relief expeditions against Egypt and the 
Dardanelles. Unfortunately the troops were sent to Egypt while admiral Duckworth's fleet of 8 ships 
of line, which arrived at Constantinople in February 1807, were lucky to escape with most of the fleet 
back through the straits between the Turkish batteries ( supervised by French officers). These 
operations not only failed to aid Russia, but aroused Russian fears for their own interests in the Levant 
and the Caucasus. 23 
20 Jupp. 383,392,411; Smith. 111-114. 
21 Smith. 113-5; Windham. 466-468.7,25 Jan., 12 Feb. 1807; HMC. Dropmore. IX 40-44:; ibid. 418- 
420; ibid. 449; Fletcher. 57-60; Jupp. 381-2.; ibid. 22-25.; ERB. Hudson, The English Invasion of 
the Plate, 1806-1807. The Army Quarterly, LXX, 1955.239; Deny. 136. 
22 Grey. SALG. 135. 
23 Mackesy. 154,157,159-161,163,166,170,176-7,179,182-3,186-7; Martin Gilbert, The First 
World War. London, 1195.6,4041,105,121,124-5,13 1,13 4-140,152-163,170,183,187,190, 
201-2,207-8,213-4,396,484,488; Richard Pipes. The Russian Revolution 1899-1919, London, 
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While the British floundered in the Middle East, general Auchmuty had arrived at the Plate and had 
Captured Montevideo in February. On 5 July general Whitelocke captured Buenos-Aires, but lost it 
again on 7 July to the Spanish forces. By the time these disastrous news arrived in London, 
September 1807, the Talents had been out of office for over six months. It represented the final proof 
of their policies' bankruptcy, which led to Alexander I's desertion at Tilsit. Their strategy was the 
more surprising since Grenville had seen the result of Pitt's, campaign in the Caribbean in 
the 1790's and his Whigs colleagues' violent opposition to it, especially the costly occupation of 
St. Domingue (1793-1798). 24 
IV. Defeatism, Discontent and the Great Diversion 
Gustavus IV's Plans for a Great Allied Offensive, his Discontent with The British and an Anglo- 
Swedish Pre-Occupation with Denmark, October 1806-March 1807. 
On 10 October Howick, Britain's new foreign secretary, pledged fiffl British support for Prussia, 
ending previous ambiguity. He urged Gustavus IV to put aside his previous aversion for the Prussians 
and order the Swedish army forward to the Elbe to assist the hard pressed Prussians. Pierrepoint 
found it difficult to see that Gustavus IV would follow Howick's advice, but he raised it with 
Wetterstedt who dashed British hopes by malcing it clear that the Swedish army had been ordered 
back to defend Pomerania. This was probably just as well since that very same day French troops 
pursuing fleeing Prussians had crossed the Pomeranian border. Fortunately they were expelled with 
great case. 25 
Pomerania's exposure was as nothing compared to Lauenburg's where the Swedish expeditionary force 
had just recently marched in. Lauenburg resembled an isolated island in a swirling sea of fighting. 
Despitd Gustavus M-personal wish, and British requests, Morian's corp had no realistic option but to 
retreat to Lfibeck, which was occupied by the Swedes on 3 November. Three days later the Swedes 
were caught in a Franco-Prussian crossfire and a thousand men were humiliatingly forced to 
1990.195-337,439-505,567-605; Smith. 114; Mackesy. 182-7; Windham. 464-5.8 Dec. 1806; 
Fregosi. 260-2. 
24 Fletcher. 54,61-72; 76,80,87,104-125,127-9,131-9; Hudson. 239; Duffy. 5-14,16-23,267-8, 
276-282,284-291,295-7,298-311; David P. Geggus. Slavery, War and Revolution. The British 
Occupation of Saint Domingue 1793-1798. Oxford, 1982.100-132,150-7,205-227,347-383. 
25 FO 73/36. Howick to Pierrepoint 8,10,23 Oct. 1806.; Grey MSS. Box 47. File 2. Pierrepoint to 
Howick, 30 Oct. 1806.; Bjdrlin. 136. 
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Capitulate to the French. Morian escaped to Stralsund with only some 450 men, and escaped a court- 
martial by a hair's breadth. Swedish public opinion was outraged at his incompetence and the ignoble 
26 end of their king's ill-advised re-occupation of Lauenburg. 
Morian's fiasco only served to strengthen the opposition in the Swedish government and in influential 
upper class circles. In the former, Pierrepoint believed that his old nemesis from the earlier subsidy 
negotiations, ToR, was behind a strong campaign to persuade Gustavus IV to abandon the affied 
cause. ToUs efforts were backed by the Swedish ministers remaining in Stockholm, who used 
financial arguments, which Gustavus IV had little understanding of, to argue for a return to 
neutrality. Public opinion in the increasingly oppositionist influenced capital blamed Gustavus IV for 
the continued war and military setbacks. Pieffepoint believed that their behef in an easy return to 
neutrality was mistaken. 27 A lone voice of support came from a Swedish admirer in London, praising 
the king for his bravery and championship of the 'common cause. 28 This was the opinion of a tiny 
mmonty of Swedes, and the unpoptdar alliance was viewed with ever greater hostility by the Swedish 
ruling classes. This would not bode well for either Sweden or Britain's alliance with her. Pierrepoint 4; W 
therefore requested that, after years of hard service in Sweden that he should be allowed to leave for 
home. 29 Howick greatly worried about increasing domestic and foreign threats to Gustavus Ws 
regime, requested that Pierrepoint remained at his post. 30 
Given this level of domestic discontent, Napoleon! s offer of peace in November 1806 from various 
channels was probably welcomed by many upper class Swedes. The French generals Grandjean and 
Bernadotte had intimated Napoleon's strong desire for peace with Sweden. Bernadotte had told count 
M6mer, who was his well cared for prisoner in Ldbeck, that Norway should belong to Sweden, and 
peace between Sweden and France should be restored. Bourienne, the French charge d! affaires in 
Hamburg, had given his Swedish colleague, Netzel, the same message during a highly private 
26 Bjdrlin. 126-13 5; FO 73/36. Pierrepoint to Howick, 11,18 Nov. 1806. 
27 Grey. Box 47. File 12. Pieffepoint to Howick, 26 Dec. 1808; FO 73/36. Pierrepoint to Howick, 30 
Oct. 1806. 
28 BLMC: Kp. 67. d'Albin to Gustavus IV, [No date] Dec. 1806. 
29 FO 73/36. Pieffepoint to Howick, 30 Oct. 1806. 
30 Grey. Box 47. File 2. Howick to Pierrepoint, II Nov. 1806. 
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conversation at the Hamburg Bourse. That Netzel, despite direct orders from Gustavus IV that there 
should be no diplomatic contact with the enemy, dared to hold talks with his colleague shows clearly 
how much the Swedish diplomatic service disapproved of the king's policies. Gustavus IV would not 
be bribed by the Norwegian morsel and Netzel was recalled for his labours. Napoleon's offer may 
have been made in good faith, but one cannot avoid sharing Gustavus IVs suspicion of a similar 
territorial offer having been made to the Danes, at Sweden's expense, in order to cause dissension in 
the aflied camp. (In fact it seems no such deal was made to Derumark). 31 
If Napoleon could not bribe or seduce Gustavus IV to the negotiating table, then an invasion of 
Pomerania could force the king to come 'to, his senses', as he and many Francophile Swedes put it. 
The fate of Pomerania seemed to be a matter of great indifference to most Swedes, except its governor 
Essen and the Icing himself. The common consensus in Sweden seems to view the present war as that 
of the Duke of Pomerania (i. e. Gustavus IV) fighting with the aid of British subsidies, and that 
Sweden should remain a calm spectator to the fate of a province that was both ruined and lost forever, 
noted a disgusted Essen. 32 Napoleon's hopes to take Gustavus IV to the negotiating table, by 
occupying Pomerania, seemed hopeless. The stubborn king would simply fight on, even if the 
province feH to the French. Amassing 12,000 French troops on Pomerania's border (against 9,000 
Swedes), marshal Mortier failed equally to intimidate Essen into informal diplomatic talks at the 
rnihtary IeVej. 33 
Ooinions about Essen's abilities, and the chances for an effective Swedish defence of Pomerania, K-- 
varied greatly. Swedish and Pomeranian opinion rated Essen poorly when compared to the apparent 
fighting spirit of Armfelt. Swedish chances of withstanding the French were therefore rated as quite 
low. British and Swedish observers in Pomerania were, however, no more impressed with Mortier's 
army, described as 'boys in uniform'. They also believed that Stralsund would be more staunchlY 
defended than the Prussian cities, which had fallen with such suspicious ease to the advancing 
31 HEM VIL 479-48 1. Dec. 1806.; Beskow. 130; FO 73/36. Pierrepoint to Howick, 18,27 
Nov. 1806.; Palmer. 136-137. 
32 Wieselgren. 109-110. 
33 Bj6rhn. 137. 
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French. In January they believed that Mortier's preparations for an attack upon Stralsund was only 
designed to mask a severe French setback in Poland. Their views were confirmed by events. Between 
mid December and late January Mortier remained frozen in ice on the frontier. Meanwhile, Gustavus 
IV was more worried about French privateers cutting off Sweden's vital Russian grain supplies across 
the Baltic when the weather thawed. He would soon have more acute worries, as Mortier suddenly 
invaded Pomerania on 28 January, and began besieging Stralsund. His young recruits, (a tell tale sign 
that Napoleon was running out of seasoned troops), failed to take Stralsund by storm between 12 and 
20 February. The Swedish defenders, reinvigorated by the tonic of Eylau and the strong hopes of a 
British expeditionary force arriving in the near future, had scored a major defensive victory. However, 
in a rush of overconfidence a costly frontal assault on the French lines on 14 March failed to dislodge 
the French, and left the troops demoralised. 34 
Indeed what were the British up to? Would they actually stop their 'wait and see approach' to Europe, 
or see the coalition flounder completely? Gustavus IV was not interested in the mere defence of the 
Pomerardan bridgehead, but in taking the offensive in northern Germany, relieving pressure on the 
Russians and inflicting a possible defeat on Napoleon. The main stumbling block to this, according to 
Gustavus IV, was continued British indifference in the continental war, and failure to give him 
adequate pecuniary and military support. Howicles only response had been to give tacit support for an 
unofficial mission by French emigre general Dumouriez to enlist Swedish support for his plans to 
launch a diversionary landing in Normandy. Without official backing, promises of subsidies or any 
real proof of influence with the British goverment, Gustavus IV politely ignored Dumouriez's 
schemes. Dumouriezs case was neither helped by Gustavus Ws support for the Bourbons, his own 
plans, dr his suspicions about Dumouriez's revolutionmy past. 
35 
34 GP. Mosheim to Gordon, 22 Jan., 6 Feb., 1,18 Mar. 1807; HECDNIH. 1-19. Jan-Feb. 1807; 
Bj6rlin. 144-155; Muscovita. 505. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 2,9,18,22 Jan. 1807; Muscovita. 505. 
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35 BLMC. Add. MSS 59,281. Dropmore MSS. Dumouriez. 'Note Sur la Ligue du Norde'. 13 
Apr. 1806.; Grey MSS. Box 47. File 2. Pierrepoint to Howick, (private), 8 May, 24 Oct., 20 
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The king was left even more unimpressed by the attitudes of the British government itself. On 9 
November Pierrepoint told a bitterly disappointed Gustavus IV that the British would only co-operate 
in the patrolling of the French occupied Prussian coast. The king told the envoy that he had hoped for 
serious British aid in defending northern Germany properly. Pierrepoint formed the opinion that this 
was only a ruse on behalf of Gustavus IV to increase subsidies. Two days later Gustavus IV was even 
more blunt in questioning British assurances of aid to Sweden. Pierrepoint did not hide his growing 
irritation over the king's questioning and accusatory tone. Gustavus IV, however, assured Pierrepoint 
that the province would be defended with the utmost vigour and that same day both military and naval 
reinforcements were sent to Pomerania. This new sign of Swedish vigour, coupled with the painfid 
fact that Stralsund was the only German port remaimng open to British shipping and trade, prompted 
Pierrepoint to urge Howick to increase Sweden's subsidy by whatever amount possible. On II 
November Howick sent assurances, which crossed Pierrepoint's despatch, that the British would 
honour Fo)es earlier pledge to defend Pomerania, but when the British treasury was facing rising 
expenditure it could not be expected to pay for troops that remained inactive. 36 
During a conference with Pierrepoint on 18 November Gustavus IV seemed be under the 
misapprehension that Pierrepoint had been givenplenipouvoir to negotiate about increased subsidies. 
Howick believed that 'misunderstanding' had arisen during talks between himself and Rehausen on a 
private level, at a Holland House dinner a week earlier. They had discussed Gustavus Ws plans for 
the defence of northern Germany, including an alliance between Denmark and Sweden, which 
Howick supported, but he told Rehausen that his government could not accept Swedish subsidy 
Aamands. 37 He was even more forthright, probably to placate Whig opinion in Parliament opposed to ,. w, 
increasing subsidies to-the allies, in his public despatch on 2 December, telling Pierrepoint that. 'You 
will represent that their own Interests, their own territories, their own safety are at stake and that 
these they are called upon to defend by every consideration of Duty & Patriotism-that in fact they have 
no choice left, that Resistance is now become absolutely necessary-but should the Swedish army be 
36 Anglica. 493. Wetterstedt to Rehausen, 13 Nov. 1806; FO 73/36. Pierrepoint to Howick, 10 
Nov. 1806. 
37 Anglica. 493. Wetterstedt to Rehausen, 13 Nov. 1806.; Grey MSS. Box 47. File 2. Pierrepoint to 
Howick, 18,20,27 Nov. 1806; ibid. Pieffepoint to Howick, 2 Dec. 1806. 
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required to move beyond its own borders & not have the means then British would supply Sweden 
with moneyl. 38 
Following a conference with Howick on 2 December Rehausen formed the distinct impression that the 
British were loath to risk either precious money or troops on uncertain projects. Gustavus IV was 
infuriated at this nonchalance and doubts about the sincerity of his plans, and lashed out against the 
British whose subsidies had not even been adequate in the first place. He tried to enlist Russian and 
Prussian support for a diversionary offensive from which they stood most to gain but Ehrenheim 
doubted that the Idng's efforts would succeed since their British ally seemed to be both cold and 
indifferent towards continental affairs. 39 
Ten days later Gustavus IV and Pierrepoint had yet another acrimonious debate about the lack of 
British interest in the king's plans. Gustavus IV was in no mood to compromise or mince his words. 
Either the British, whose pledges of support he doubted, paid Sweden adequate subsidies, thus 
proving their renewed support for their long neglected ally, or Gustavus IV would return Sweden to 
stnct neutrality Pierrepoint could not believe that this was the views of Gustavus IV and blamed this 
state of defeatism on the pernicious and damaging influence of his ministers. He told Gustavus IV 
that Britain! s payments of huge subsidies to her various allies during the war proved more than 
adequately that her pledges were fully honoured. Pierrepoint argued that neutrality was hardly a 
viable or an easy proposition for Sweden to pursue, as Gustavus IV well knew, since it depended upon 
the goodwill of Napoleon. In Pierrepoint's view, Gustavus Ws desperate attempt to threaten and 
bluster was due to his dire financial straits, caused by the ending of British subsidies. While 
Pierrepbint could not increase the subsidies, he had authority to renew subsidy payments, but at the 
old level, which could alleviate some of Gustavus IV more acute finaricial problems. 40 
38 FO 73/36. Pierrepoint to Howick, 2 Dec. 1806. 
39 Carlsson. 145; Anglica. 489. Rehausen to Gustavus IV, 25 Nov., 2 Dec. 1806; KUDHA. Wetterstedt 
to Ehrenheirn, 9,11 Dec. 1806; Muscovita. 505. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 25 Jan., 25 Feb., 31 
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40 FO 73/36. Pierrepoint to Howick, 12,16,18 Dec. 1806. 
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However, Pierrepoint's fears about a Swedish desertion from the 'common cause' were not stilled by 
his own reasoning or arguments with the king. Perhaps Gustavus IV, grown exasperated with British 
procrastination and delays, had really meant what he said. On 22 December he handed an official 
note to Wetterstedt which enquired openly and frankly if Gustavus IV had abandoned the common 
struggle against France (as no doubt his ministers wished) in favour of neutrality. Gustavus IV could 
assure a much relieved Pierrepoint two days later that he had in fact not abandoned his alliance with 
Britain and had no intention of doing so but that Britain needed to devote more attention to European 
affhirs and treat his plans with more seriousness. Howick did not heed his warnings and rejected any 
notion, on 7 January, of Sweden! s subsidies being raised for 'purely defensive' plans, and warned 
IXA 
F ierrepoint to keep a very cautious fine on the whole thorny issue of subsidies. A month later 
Gustavus IV had still not raised the matter of increased subsidies, or even mentioned any reversal of 
alliances. But when Gustavus IV was told in mid-February of Howick's decision not to raise the level 
of Sweden's subsidies, the king did not hide his disappointment, but given Pierrepoint's previous 
fears, assured him that this would not affect his attachment to the alliance. During PierrepoinVs last 
conference before his departure on 14 February, Gustavus IV wanted Pierrepoint to assure his 
government that he would rather die fighting the French than submit to Napoleon. But if he, for the 
benefit of Britain and the alliance as a whole, was to carry out the diversionary offensive against 
Napoleon, then the British had to send an expeditionary force to Stralsund. Gustavus IV claimed that 
41 the false 'economy of England had to end, was it not to wreck the allied coalition. 
On 19 February Alexander Straton, Pierrepoint's replacement, presented his credentials malcing a 
speech praising the king's attachment to the British alliance. Gustavus IV reciprocated by praising 
the British government and Pierrepoint personally. Three days later, during a customary dinner after 
the military parades, Gustavus IV studiously avoided all talk of the subsidies. 42 RehaUSejj W not 
avoided that subject or that of British military aid in general, which prompted flowick, on 10 March, 
to address himself specifically to these issues. Straton was to state that the British government was 
extremely interested in Gustavus Ws plans for a diversionary offensive from Pomerania. But Straton 
41 Anglica. 493. Pierrepoint to Wetterstedt, 20 Dec. 1806; ibid. Wetterstedt to Pierrepoint, 22 
Dec. 1806; FO 73/36. Pieffepoint to Howick, 26 Dec. 1806,14 Feb. 1807; Grey MSS. Box 47. File 2. 
Pieffepoint to Howick, 27 Jan., 14 Feb. 1807; ibid. Howick to Pieffepoint, 9 Jan. 1807. 
42 FO 73/39. Straton to Howick, 19,22,26 Feb. 1807. 
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needed to ask how many troops the king would mobilise for the offensive and what subsidies and 
military assistance Britain could provide. The British government believed that no less than 25,000 
Swedish troops would be needed. Howick offered one paltry brigade of dragoons and to pay the same 
level of subsidies as Austria had been paid in 1805. If that was not enough to kill any Swedish 
interest in Howicles proposals, the British foreign secretary would only pay these when operations 
commenced and only for two-three months at a time. 43 Given the conditions that Howick made for 
the granting of subsidies, one has to support the Swedish suspicion that Howick was, yet again, only 
stalling for time. Since Gustavus IV had not made any specific suggestion about the offensive, 
Howick seemed to have believed it was only a ruse to increase Sweden's subsidies. On 26 March 
Straton, having just received Howick's instruction, met Gustavus IV, who did not accept Howicles 
terms. He was willing to accept the 'AustriaW subsidy level officially but they would have to be 
increased, with additional secret clauses, far in excess of the actual numbers mobihsed-44 
V. The Neutral Nuisance 
Danish Foreign Policy,, the French Threat and Allied Fears about Danish Neutralityj October 
1806-March 1807. 
Allied plans for a diversionary offensive in northern Germany relied on, or hoped for, Danish co- 
operation, which was unlikely to be forthcoming since Denmark had remained neutral during the last 
few years of the war. But, given her strategic position at the entry to the Baltic and on Napoleon's 
northern flank, both he and the allies were interested in getting Denmark onto their side. Hitherto, 
virtually protected by Prussia's own neutrality and military strength, Denmark had been able to 
maintain her neutrality without major risks or dangerous choices. Prussia's collapse removed foreign 
policy security and the tremors from this debacle were most strongly felt in an increasingly 
beleaguered Copenhagen, which had observed strict neutrality since 1803. Danish satisfaction from 
her unprecedented prosperity during the neNI three years was always tempered by 
her strategic 
vulnerability to a French military threat against her continental provinces and a British naval threat 
to 
45 
her capital, Zealand, her trade, merchant marine and overseas colonies. 
43 FO 73/39. Howick to Straton, 10 March 1807. 
44 FO 73/39. Straton to Howick, 26 Mar. 1807. 
45 Soby. 232-234; Ryan. 39; SRE. 271-272. 
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The British envoy in Copenhagen, Benjamin Garlike, was convinced that the Danes could be relied 
upon to maintain strict neutrality and defend herself against aggression from all sides. This line was 
maintained and defended stubbornly by Frederick, the Prince Royal of Denmark, who resembled 
Gustavus IV, his cousin, in political prejudices, ideology and character. Like Gustavus IV he faced 
ministers, led by foreign minister count Christian Bernstorff, who were willing adapt Denmark's 
neutrality according to the vagaries of international events and the fortunes of the opposing camps in 
the war. All these factors were to ensure that Denmark's foreign policy would not be easy to maintain 
on course in the choppy seas of wartime Europe. 
Arl 
With Prussia occupied by the French, the allies were not about to allow DennWk to go on living in 
her peaceful oasis undisturbecL Britain, who had most to lose economically from the French 
occupying the Sound and shutting it against British trade and shipping, was increasingly worried 
about the secunty of Denniark. WHe Howick and Cwlike believcd the Pfince Royal was as good as 
his word, they found Bernstorrf too weak towards the French, and the government in general too pro- 
French in views to stand up to the threats and siren voices from Paris. Nor could the Russians, 
according to Garhke, be relied upon to support British demonstrations in Copenhagen because of the 
long-term alliance between them and Denmark. An added liability was that their ambassador in 
Copenhagen had stayed too long at his post, as many Russian ministers were prone to do, and had 
47 
gone 'native' in his views and loyalties. 
Gustavus IV shared Howicles suspicions of secret Franco-Danish collaboration based on Sweden's 
long held rivalry with Denmark and his fears that such an alliance could threaten Scania and 
Pomerdnia's security. Gustavus Ws hopes for a Dano-Swedish alliance were dashed when the Danes 
pulled back their 'Amiy of Observation! from Holstein, confirming, in his eyes, Danish collaboration 
with Napoleon. He believed a personal meeting with the Prince Royal, whose conservative views and 
honest character he admired, could prevent a budding Franco-Danish alliance. 48 
46 Tangeraas, 65,68-78. 
47 Soby. 234; Tangeraas. 43,81; Barnes. 53 1; Grey MSS. Box 15. File. 11. Garlike to Howick, 15 
Nov., 20 Dec. 1806; ibicL Howick to Garlike, 20 Dec. 1806; ibid. Howick to Hesse, 30 Dec. 1806. 
48 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 23,26,27,30 Nov., 4 Dec. 1806; FO 73/36. Pierrepoint to 
Howick, 18,24 Nov. 1806. See Ryan 42.; Anghca. 493. Wetterstedt to Rehausen, 22 Dec. 1806. 
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It did not take long, however, for Gustavus IV to abandon such moderation in favour of more drastic 
measures against the Danes; who had become his neutral bete-nojre (replacing the Prussians in that 
respect) when they failed to protest at the French occupation of Hamburg on 25 November. He told 
Pierrepoint of his plans to send a diplomatic mission to pin down the 'slippery' Danes and get a firm 
answer to the blunt question as to their relations with Napoleon. Should the answer prove 
unsatisfactory, then a British fleet should aid a Swedish landing and occupation of Zealand. (Similar 
to Canning's plans a few months later. ) Pierrepoint, pointed out that this would throw Denmark into 
the arms of Napoleon and thus achieve what Gustavus IV hoped to prevent. (Pierrepoint did not 
apply the same logic for obvious reasons to Canning's blunt strategy the following year). Despite his 
objections, Pierrepoint urged Howick to give Sweden his fullest support should she face a Franco- 
49 Danish invasion. 
Howick meanwhile experienced a similar metamorphosis in relation to Denmark as Gustavus IV did 
From trusting the Danes, in late 1806, he had come to question their neutrality and their government's 
honesty. In December 1806 Howick was still assuring the Danes of his trust in their strict neutrality 
and discouragement of Swedish aggression before diplomatic means of reconciliation had been 
exhausted. Underlying this conciliatory line was the British desire to maintain its European trade via 
Denmark. But by NIarch 1807 Howick's attitude had hardened, due to Anglo-Danish clashes over the 
British implementation of the Orders in Council (January 1807), Howicles umbrage at the Danish 
chargd daffaires strident protests about them and Rehausen! s constant undermining of British 
confidence in the Danes. Howick's attitude was further hardened toward the Danes by what spies 
reported was alleged mobilisation of the Danish navy. But by March time had run out for Howick and 
it was his Tory successor who had to act on this intelligence" 
49 FO 73/36. Pierrepoint to Howick, 27 Nov., 5 Dec. 1806; Anglica. 493. Wetterstedt to Rehausen, 22 
Dec. 1806. 
50 Anglica. 489. Rehausen to Gustavus IV, 2,9 Dec. 1806; Grey MSS. Box 43. File 1. Oddy to 
Howick, 10,26 Dec. 1806.; Grey. Box 15. File 13. Howick to Garlike, 2,9,22 Jan. 1807; ibid. Garlike 
to Howick, 21,30 Jan., 5,15 Feb. 1807.; Anglica. 490. Rehausen to Gustavus IV, 13,20 Jan. 1807; 
Tangeraas. 83,84-9,91-94; Moller. Historisk Tidskrift. VH, (1910-12). 318; Anglica. 490. Rehausen 
to Howick, 10 Mar. 1807. 
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Chapter Six. 
The Watershed. 
Tilsit, the Battle of Copenhagen, the Franco-Russian 'Continental' Coalition against Britain and 
Invasion Plans against Swedem, March 1807-March 1808. 
1. The Return to Europe 
The Portland Administration and Canning's New Pro-European Orientation, March-July 1807. 
On 26 March the new Portland administration took office with Castlereagh returning to his familiar 
duties at the War Office while Pitt's protdgd, George Canning, became foreign secretary. Under the 
latter's energetic leadership Britain returned to its European onentation which had been abandoned by 
the Talents. Canning, like no other British statesman, was to put his stamp upon the 'common cause' 
and the conduct of the war which probably explains why his coming to power was seen as such a 
watershed. I Canning, determined to rebuild allied trust, offered Britain! s allies L2,600,000 to share, 
and promised 30,000 British troops to contribute to the war on the continent. On 30 April he blamed 
the delays in giving the allies moire military aid upon the Talents dispersal of effort across the world 
which left Britain short of troops and tonnage for an intervention on the continent. This was a 
justified criticism but Canning perpetuated the mistakes of the Talents by not heeding Russian 
demands for increased subsidies and by not loosening Britain! s purse strings Canning contributed to 
Russia's further alienation from Britain. 2 
IL The Anglo-Russian Crisis, 1806-1807. 
That alienation had begun in late 1806 when Canning's predecessor had rebuffed Russia's attempts to 
rebuild their British alliancc. Russia retaliated by refusing to renew the Anglo-Russian trade treaty, 
which gave Britain unreciprocated. and unprecedented trading privileges in Russia, unless Russia's 
subsidies were increased. Neither Howick or Canning gave in to blackmail. 3 
Political difference and economic grievances only hid deeper Anglo-Russian rivalries which had 
escalated during the latter part of the century and by 1807 were quite sharp, marking a transition from 
1 Gray. 91,97,98,105; Hinde. 153-157. 
2 FO 65/69. Canning to Gower, 16 May 1809.; Harewood. 37. Canning to George 111,24 Apr. 1807; 
Harewood. 42. Canning to Rehausen, 30 Apr. 1807. 
3 Roach. 188-189,192; GLG. 244-245. Stuart to Gower, 7 Mar. 1807. 
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being natural allies to imperial rivals during the subsequent decades. The British, concerned with 
India's security as the new heartland of their Asian based empire, opposed the Russian advance into 
the Levant and Balkans by retaining Malta, invading Egypt and propping up the Ottoman empire. 
These British tactical moves aroused Russia's opposition and contributed to their alienation with 
4 Britain. 
III The Last Victory. 
The Sweden's Pomeranian Counter-Offensive and British Anxiety about the Franco-Swedish 
Armistice, March-June 1807. 
By late March the siege of Stralsund was a diversion of effort that Napoleon could ill afford and 
Mortier's army was recalled for service on the main ftont in east Prussia. The Swedes rejected 
Mortier's armistice proposals on Straton! s recommendation since it was only made to cover his retreat 
and on 1 April the Swedes took the offensive with 6,000 troops. Within ten days the Swedes, ably led 
by generals Cardell. and Armfelt, had not only captured 1,700 French prisoners but several towns 
including Rostock and Wismar. While Gustavus IV plotted to unleash a royalist crusade against 
Napoleon with Louis XVIII's help Armfelt was planning to capture Stettin on his way to Berlin- The 
victory gave Gustavus Ws popularity a temporary boost as the Swedes celebrated and the Russians 
praised the king for giving their hard pressed armies vitally needed relief from the French. 5 
The very stunning and unexpected nature of the Swedish victory proved its undoing as the French 
realised that they could not leave this secondary but important stretch of firont unguarded. The French 
cut short Swedish celebrations by regaining most of the lost ground and pushing the Swedes back into 
Pomerania. Essen was forced to agree on 20 April to a disadvantageous armistice which deprived 
Colberk and Danzig, besieged by the French, of much needed Swedish naval support. Canning 
denounced the armistice as a disgraceful capitulation to French demands which damaged SwedeWs 
reputation and on 26 April Straton warned Wetterstedt that if his goverment officially endorsed the 
4 Roach. 181,190; Pratt. 82-90; Saul. 185-187. 
5 FO 73/79. Straton to Howick, 19,22 Mar., 26,27 Mar., 7 Apr. 1807; Muscovita. 505. Ehrenheim to 
Stedingk 8 May 1807; GP. Mosheim to Gordon, 5,8,12,16 Apr. 1807; Bj6rlin. 144-154,159,162- 
172,174,176-181,183-187; Sbornik, (54). 254. Kotchubey to Richelieu, 21 Apr. 1807.; -Carlsson. 152 
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armistice this could damage Anglo-Swedish relations. But neither Straton or Canning believed the 
armistice signalled a change in Swedish foreign policy. 6 
British fears about Sweden's reliability as an ally were not unjustified since what Straton termed the 
I peace party' penetrated the army's officer corp, the Swedish government, the Pomeranian bureaucracy 
and even the advisers surrounding the king. He was equally aware of this that siwe'party' hoped the 
Franco-Swedish armistice talks would lead to the establishment of eventual peace with France and an 
end to the British alliance which they were making every effort to undermine. Gustavus IV always 
quashed these hopes and in late May he ended these talks to prevent any damage being done to his 
alliance with Britain. But his decision on 6 June to conduct talks with Mortier's successor, general 
Brune, made the British needlessly nervous that Gustavus IV may have, after all have succumbed to 
the siren voices of peace, coming from his advisers. The Brune talks did not lead to any political 
decision since Gustavus IV had spent his time trying to convince the bemused officer to serve Louis 
XVM. Straton could therefore assure Canning that Gustavus IV remained an implacable foe of 
7 Napoleon. 
W. Tilsit 
The Fall of Danzig, the Battle of Friedland, the Emperors Reconciliation on the River Raft and 
Russia's 'Desertion' from the Dying Common Cause, May-July 1807. 
British suspicions were misdirected since it was not Sweden but Russia that was faltering in its 
fighting resolve. The long-term causes of Russia's eventual abandonment of the allied cause have 
already been analysed and only contributed to Russia's desertion from the coalition. It was Russia's 
military setbacks which, in fact, paved the way to Tilsit. It began in May with the fall of Danzig 
which Prompted fears about French peace overtures to Russia. Shrewder observers expected, 
however, Napoleon to 'avenge' his partial setback at Eylau by defeating Bennigsen's army in battle in 
order to open negotiations with Alexander I from a position of strength. Bennigsen obliged Napoleon 
6 FO 73/39. Straton to Canning, 26,28 Apr., 1,7 May 1807; FO 73/39. Canning to Straton, 14 Apr., 
8 May 1807; GP. Mosheim to Gordon, 28 Apr. 1807; Wieselgren. 127-128; Bj6rlin. 100,182,193. 
7 FO 73/3 9. Straton to Canning, 20,259 27 May, 4,6 June 1807; ibid. Straton, 'Head of the King of 
Sweden's Conversation with Mr. Straton on the I Ith. June 1807; FO 73/40. Canning to Pierrepoint, 30 
May 1807; Harewood. 43. Canning to Pierrepoint, 25 Apr., 31 May 1807; GP. Mosheim to Gordon, 
14 May 3,8,12,16 June 1807. 
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and facilitated an outright French victory by placing his army with its back to the Alle, river at 
Friedland where he suffered a major defeat on 13 June at the hands of Napoleon. The extent of the 
Russian debacle could be judged by Russian losses of 20,000 men to 8,000 French. Napoleon had 
through his enemy's mistakes not only spectacularly avenged Eylau but also with one hammer blow 
8 brought the campaign begun at Austerlitz to a swift end. 
It would be deceptively easy to convince oneself that Alexander I intended to betray his allies from the 
very beginning of the period that followed Friedland. Alexander I seemed, however, to hope for a 
considerable time that a British or Austrian intervention would turn the tables on Napoleon but as this 
hope faded the emperor had to turn his morally fiwdble mind to negotiations with Napoleon. His lack 
of major scruples or ideological distaste for the French ruler (which contrasted with Gustavus IV) 
helped him to overcome whatever qualms that he had. (This may have made him a better statesman 
but also made him an unreliable ally). The guns of Friedland gave him a loud warning that it was 
time to talk peace before it was too late as his defeatist officers claimed. On 24 June Alexander I 
wrote a flattering letter to Napoleon which prompted Napoleon to attend talks in Tilsit where 
Napoleon could play the role of the attentive host to perfection on the raft in the Niemen river. 
Napoleon, often a destructive and ham-fisted political actor, showed enormous skill and finesse in 
seducing Alexander I into abandoning his allies and siding with France. Having just fought one of 
the bloodiest battles of the war the two rulers, hitherto deadly enemies, transformed themselves into 
apparent friends by their shared hatred of Britain and fascination with each other. 9 
But it was not all camaraderie since Tilsit was also about dividing up the European continent between 
Russia and France. Napoleon was willing to give Alexander I lenient terms for peace with France 
since We had respect for Russian power, did not relish the prospects of a campaign deep inside Russian 
territory and faced growing demands for peace from a disgruntled French home front. The only 
reward for peace that Napoleon asked for was for Russia to cede her Ionian and Dalmatian territories 
to France which seemed a small price to pay. Though small the Ionian islands were of great strategic 
8 GLG. 264. Gower to Bessborough, 19 June 1807; Home. 213-229; Chandler. 560-585; Alistair 
Home, Napoleon. Master of Europe 1805-1807. (London, 1979). 210-216; Schroeder. 318-320; 
Palmer. Alexander 1.127-133. 
9 Grade. 4-6,9,20.; Hinde. 165-166; Home. 225-229; Hartley. 75-76. 
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value to Russia. They were the key to Russia's naval presence in the Mediterranean and Balkan 
aspirations. Ceding them to France deprived the Russian Mediterranean Fleet of its operational bases 
and doomed it to eventual capture by the British. Furthermore it was Prussia, not Russia, that paid 
the rest of the price for peace by seeing her population and territory halved by the creation of 
Westphalia in the west and the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw in the east while what remained of the gutted 
Prussian state was effectively occupied by France. Alexander I had in fact paid a high price for his 
peace with Napoleon by sacrificing Russia's strategic interests and strategic security in return for 
vague French promises of compensation. The Napoleonic empire had expanded to the very doorstep 
of Russia by Alexander I allowing Prussia to be dismembered and to become useless as a buffer for 
Russia against France. Alexander I had given his country's deadliest enemy carte blanche to 
dominate Europe without Russian interference. Flis popularity in Russia reached rock bottom as 
St. Petersburg circulated with rumours of revolution and discontent among his nobility (as Stockholm 
did against Gustavus M. His alliance with France also earned him the distrust of the British who 
could prove formidable opponents especially as Alexander I had agreed to join the Continental system 
as well. 10 
V. Too Little and Too Late. 
Anglo-Swedish Subsidy Negotiations, General Clinton's Mission to Sweden and General 
Cathcart's Expedition to Pomerania, March-July 1807. 
As seen, the failure of the British to send adequate military support to the allies was used by Russia as 
an excuse to leave the war. Although he did not do the same to leave the war Gustavus IV had kept 
reminding the British about the value of a diversionary offensive from Pomerania against French 
occupied Prussia and complained bitterly when the British continued to procrastinate. II 
The main reason for this supposed procrastination was that Castlereagh, in addition to an acute 
shortage of tonnage, only had 16,000 troops available for continental service. 12 The British refused 
10 Hartley. 75-79; Palmer. Alexander 1.139-150; Koch. 161-162; Schroeder. 320-323.; Hinde. 166- 
171; FO 73/40. Pierrepoint to Canning, 9 July 1807. 
11 WO 1/412. ff.. I -11. Hutchinson to Clinton, 29 Mar. 1807; FO 73/3 9. Straton to Howick, 7 
Apr. 1807. 
12 WO 1/412. ff. 13-39. Castlereagh to Hutchinson, Apr. 1807. [No exact date given]. - 
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anyway to act before they knew exactly what Gustavus Ws plans were and how many troops they 
would be called upon to subsidise. 13 
This continued indecisiveness on the part of the British disappointed Gustavus IV greatly since he had 
hoped the new administration would prove more active than its predecessor. As a sop to Swedish 
feeling Castlereagh decided to send general Henry Clinton to assure the Swedes that the expedition 
would be sent as soon as he returned to England from his fact finding tour in Pomerania. 14 Gustavus 
IV gave Clinton, when he arrived in Stralsund on 16 May, a cold reception and asked him where the 
long promised British army was? Straton defended Clinton's mission and his own government by 
claiming that Gustavus IV failure to provide any concrete proposals prevented the British to act more 
A., sively. 15 %AI6-0%oi 
It was not surprising that the Anglo-Swedish talks were less than friendly since Clinton! s arrival 
coincided with the height of British fears about the Franco-Swedish armistice. Was Gustavus IV 
perhaps only using the diversionary offensive plans to provide a convenient mantle for his eventual 
betrayal of the British? British suspicions were fully reciprocated by the Swedes who disapproved of 
Clinton's fact finding work, which they took for badly concealed Spying. 16 Wetterstedt believed his 
real mission in Pomerania was only to check that the numbers of troops claimed to be in the field by 
the Swedes tallied with the numbers that the British paid. Clinton voiced his opinion about the 
diffiCUlties of landing in Pomerania and, if Wetterstedt is to be believed, the general was supposed to 
have claimed that the continental war was lost following the fall of Danzig. Clinton! s unfortunate 
opinions and remarks provided Wetterstedt with plentM arguments why the British could not be 
trusted to send any expedition at all. 17 One ally that could be relied upon was, most surprisingly, 
Prussia7who agreed to send 4,000 troops under the command of the redoubtable general Blacher to 
Pomerania. Although a gratifying gesture of allied solidarity, sending a Prussian army to Pomerania 
13 FO 73/39. Canning to Straton, 14 Apr. 1807. 
14 FO 73/3 9. Canning to Straton, 28 Apr. 1807; WO 1/412. ff. 41-45. Castlereagh to Clinton, 30 
Apr. 1807. 
15 KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 14 May 1807; Muscovita. 505. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 22 
May 1807; FO 73/39. Straton to Canning, 10,16 May 1807. 
16 WO 1/412. ff. 97-99,101-103,105-107. Clinton to Castlereagh, 3,8,12 June 1807. 
17 KUDHA_ Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 17 May 1807. 
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was counterproductive since it only served to weaken the main allied front line armies in Poland and 
east Prussia. 18 
The delay in any news about the arrival of the British expedition aroused the hope among Gustavus 
IVs ministers that the British had either cancelled or diverted the expedition following the fall of 
Danzig. 19 On 30 May Straton was recalled and Pieffepoint was re-appointed to his old post. 
Canning wanted Pierrepoint to assure Gustavus IV that as of 2 June the British had decided to send 
the expedition after all under general Lord Cathcart's command. While this must have been welcome 
news to Gustavus IV, Canning failed to be so forthcoming on the issue of subsidies. Nor did he give in 
to Gustavus IVs expected demands for actual command of the British force. On 19 June Rehausen 
signed a treaty with Canning which kept the British forces under Cathcart's separate, independent 
command at all times and reserved the right for the British government to recall Cathcart's army at 
any time. 20 That very same day Pierrepoint had his first audience in Stralsund with Gustavus IV who 
was delighted with the news of the expedition being sent at last. This positive reaction probably 
accounted for the fact that Toll did not object, to Pierrepoint's equally delighted surprise, to being paid 
the standard British subsidy rate plus 4 months additional subsides paid as a sweetener by Canning to 
keep Sweden at Britain! s side. 21 
At last all the obstacles to sending the British expedition to the Baltic had finally been removed but 
even though, as late as 3 July, no accurate news or confirmation of a Franco-Russian armistice had 
arrived in Pomerania this was hardly the most opportune time for such an expedition. The expedition 
might have been able to bolster Russian morale had it been sent just before or after Friedland. After 
that battle such an expeAtion could have much less impact on Russia's fighting spirit. Indeed if 
Russia made peace with France then this would free Napoleon to attack Pomerania where Cathcart's 
18 FO 73/39. Straton to Howick, 29 Mar., 2 June 1807.; WO 1/412. ff. 97-99. Clinton to Castlereagh, 
3 June 1807; ibid. ff. 49-5 1. Clinton to Cooke, 18 May 1807; KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 14 
May 1807; Bj6rhn. 194,200. 
19 KPA- Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 3,12 June 1807; KUDHA: Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 8 June 
1807; Muscovita. 505. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 16 June 1807; GP. Mosheim to Gordon 12,16 June 
1807. 
20 FO 73/40. Canning to Pierrepoint, 30 May, 2,9,11,16,19 June 1807; ibid. Castlereagh to 
Cathcart, 9 June 1807. 
21 FO 73/40. Pierrepoint to Canning, 19,24 June 1807. 
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armY might be trapped and forced to suffender. 22 It was now too late to put a stop to operations since 
on 5 July the first British division landed on Rfigen and Gustavus IV requested that it be immediately 
detached for the defence of Stralsund. The division's commander, general Drecksell, politely declined 
the king's request but detached 3 infantry battalions under colonel Duplat's command for Stralsund 
23 defence. 
The king's ministers failed to share Gustavus Ws enthusiasm for the British presence in Pomerania 
since they were convinced that Sweden should follow Russia's example24 and on 10 July Ehrenheim 
complained in a letter to Wetterstedt that'What I told H. M so many times when we were still neutral 
has now come to pass. In an alliance with the powerful, the weak must suffer. England has already 
caused us to make great sacrifices while Russia has made an armistice with the enemy without 
informing H. M. '25 
Whatever the truth to Ehrenheim's claim it was Gustavus IV, not his peace inclined ministers, who set 
the course of Swedish foreign policy and that course was for a continuation of the war against 
Napoleon whatever Russia did or did not do. The ministers were convinced that Pomerania would fall 
to the French without the British lifting a finger to save the province. 26 On 9 July the second British 
division landed bringing the number of Anglo-Swedish troops in Pomerania to 18,000, which gave 
Gustavus IV the requisite military muscle to cancel the ongoing armistice with the French with the 
defiant words 'I cannot treat with the Chief of the French Nation or one of his Delegates - if you 
attack - [then] I shall beat you '. 27 Gustavus IV thought mistakenly that his foolish bravado would 
either bolster his allies fighting morale or shame them to pick up their weapons, but of course it did 
nothing of the sort. It-was not just the British or the Swedes who were shocked by the king's decision. 
It left their enemy stunned too and Napoleon is supposed to have said 'that arch-madman, the king of 
22 KPA- Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 3 July 1807; GP. Mosheim to Gordon, 16 June, 3,4 July 1807; 
Bj6rlin. 201-202; Fortescue. VI. 57. 
23 GP. Mosheim to Gordon, 8 July 1807; Beamish. 104,106. 
24 KPA- Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 7,14 July 1807. 
25 KPA- Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 10 July 1807. 
26 Muscovita. 505. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 17,24,31 July, 4 Aug. 1807. Muscovita. 505. Wetterstedt 
to Stedingk 31 July 1807. 
27 Gp. Mosheim to Gordon, 15 July 1807. 
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Sweden, has seized this opportunity to denounce the armistice. It is a pity that they cannot put the 
fellow in a lunatic asylum'. 28 At least the renunciation gave the French the opportunity to defeat the 
Swedes, which forced Essen to ask for an armistice. Mosheim noted sarcastically on 15 July 'Thus 
much for the campaign in Swedish Pomerania'and, if Essen got a new armistice, then'the comedy 
may be looked upon as concluded. '29 
When Cathcart finally arrived in Pomerania on 18 July he failed to see the farcical side to the Swedish 
situation in Pomerania. The French had amassed 40,000 troops in the province, Stralsunds defences 
were weak and neither the Swedish army or the Pomeranians showed any fighting spirit. On 20 July 
Cathcart withdrew Duplat's force from Stralsund (which Cathcart expected would fall to the French 
vnth ease), but his intention Erom the moment he arrived had been to evacuate his army from 
30 Pomerania altogether. 
VL Canning's Copenhagen Coup. 
The British Invasion of Zealand and the Occupation of Copenhagen, July-October 1807. 
If Cathcart succeeded in withdrawing his army from Pomerania, the question arose what to do with it 
and where it was to be sent? Its original mission, to take part in an Anglo-Swedish diversionary 
offensive against Napoleon's vulnerable northern flank, appeared to be redundant after Tilsit and the 
only alternative was to return home. This might have happened, had not Canning convinced himself 
that the French were about to invade Denmark, seize her considerable fleet (17 ships of the fine, 12 
frigates* and 43 smaller vessels) and launch an invasion against Scotland or Ireland. In July came 
(exaggerated and unverified) reports that the Danes were readying their fleet at the same time that the 
French were preparing to invade Jutland. This seemed to confirm Canning's worst strategic 
nightmare (in addition to his fears the French might close the Sound and invade Sweden) and he was 
in no mood, following Tilsit, to take any chances with Britain's . strategic situation. 
He 
28 Bingham. 323-324. Napoleon to Fouchd, 10 July 1807. 
29 Gp. Mosheim to Gordon, 15 July 1807. 
30 WO 1/188. ff. 41-47,49-55,57-65. Cathcart to Castlereagh, 18,20 July, 6 Aug. 1807. 
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sent Francis Jackson to Denmark while admiral Gambier set sail for the Sound with a large fleet to 
conftont the Danes. 31 
In addition to the 16,000 troops that Castlereagh sent directly from Britain to Zealand he also ordered, 
on 19 July, Cathcart to leave Pomerania and support the British invasion of Denmark. That very 
same day Pierrepoint warned Gustavus IV informally that the British army might be withdrawn for 
service elsewhere. Gustavus IV took this in the worst possible way and claimed this was an act of 
desertion on the part of his ally and in violation of the British commitment to assist in the defence of 
Pomerania. Everything seemed set for a violent confrontation therefore when Castlereaghs orders for 
a withdrawal arrived on 3 August. Pierrepoint had the unenviable task of breaking this bad news to 
Gustavus IV and convincing the inftuiated king to give his formal permission for a British 
evacuation. It was only with the greatest of reluctance that Gustavus IV did so by 6 August which 
enabled Cathcart (who had anticipated CastlereagWs orders) to evacuate his army by 18 AUgUSt. 32 
While the British armed forces converged on Zealand, Jackson had arrived in Denmark for talks with 
'the Danes. Jackson seems to have forgotten Canning's offer of subsidies and naval and military 
assistance if the Danes agreed to hand over their fleet for the duration of the war in British custody. 
instead Jackson simply rammed the British demand for the surrender of their fleet down'the throat of 
the Danes. Neither the Prince Royal or the foreign minister, Christian Bernstorff, were in a mood to 
give in to threats or brusque British demands that not only violated their neutrality but humiliated 
their proud sense of sovereignty. As in 180 1, the Danes did not shy away from a military showdown 
with Britain if forced to it. Nevertheless Denmark's situation was worse than six years earlier. She 
faced an unenviable choice between having Jutland and Schleswig-Holstein invaded and occupied by 
the French (thus losing some of her most valuable provinces) or seeing Zealand invaded, her 
commerce destroyed, her small but rich colonies occupied, and her economy ruined by the British, if 
31 Trulsson. 320,322-323,326,328,334-335,351,354,356; Ryan. 39,46-48,51-52; Hall. 57; Gray. 
163-164; Barnes. 530,534-536; Derry. 202. 
32 FO 73/41. Pierrepoint to Canning, 20 July, 5 Aug. 1807; WO 1/188. Cathcart to Castlereagh 6,13 
Aug. 1807; GP. Mosheim to Gordon, 5,19 Aug. 1807; KUDHA- Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 4 Aug. 
1807; Muscovita. 505. Wetterstedt to Stedingk, 8 Aug. 1807; ibid. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 18 Aug. 
1907- Grade. 56-57,60; Atkinson. 82-83; Longford. 88-89; Beamish. 108; WO 1/188. ff. 67-75. 
Cathcart to Castlereagh, 6 Aug. 1807. 
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they rejected Canning's demands. Denmark was truly caught between the 'Devil and the Deep Blue 
Sea'. By rejecting the British ultimatum the Dams chose the marginally lesser of two bad COIS. 33 
Given Jackson's tone and Canning's perfunctory demands, that outcome seemed to have been expected 
and this gives the impression that this diplomatic overture was only a political fig leaf to camouflage 
the inevitable use of brute force and justify an unprovoked attack upon a hitherto neutral power. That 
impression seems correct since Canning, while probably preferring to get custody of the Danish fleet 
without bloodshed, at the same time probably thought that a short, sharp shock administrated to this 
old Russian ally would have a sobering and salutary effect in St. Petersburg. 34 
With the diplomatic interlude over the British could get down to the real business on the agenda and 
on 16 August some 30,000 regular British troops landed on Zealand. Since almost the entire regular 
Danish army (25,000) were in Schleswig to keep an eye on the French, the British only faced 13,000 
armed men (only 8,000 of whom were regulars). This motley force was defeated and the British laid 
siege to the well fortified capital while Gambier's ships threw an iron ring of ships around Zealands 
shores to prevent any supplies, reinforcements or relief reaching Copenhagen. Cathcart preferred to 
let time take its course or storm the city, but he was prevailed upon by less patient officers and 
Jackson to bombard the city into submission. The British shot 14,000 projectiles into Copenhagen in 
three days (2-5 September) which killed 2,000 of the city's 100,000 inhabitants and destroyed 400 
houses. The Danes capitulated and the British agreed to an armistice that left Copenhagen occupied 
by the British between 7 September and 17 October. The British captured a rich booty. In addition to 
the entire Danish fleet, V million worth of naval stores and hundreds of merchant ships on the high 
seas, the British also occupied Heligoland, the Danish colonies in the West Indies and 
finally in 
ianuarý 1808 the Danish colonies in India. Quite sensibly they left Denmark's north Atlantic 
territories in peace for reasons of economy. 35 
33 Muscovita. 505. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 18 Aug. 1807; SRE. 275-276; Ryan. 52-54; Barnes. 536- 
537; Hall. 160; Trulsson. 329-330. 
34 Trulsson. 338,341. 
35 Muscovita. 505. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 21 Aug., 12 Sept. 1807; KO. 387-388; Derry. 202-204; 
DsdH. 196-199; Barnes. 537; Hall. 160; Jorgen Teisen, Damnarks FlAde fra bue og pil til missil. 
(Copenhagen, 1984). 82-84; SRE. 277; WO 1/187. ff. 9-11. Taylor to Gambier, 2 Aug. 1807; WO. 
1/187, ff. 21-23,25-27,37-39,49-51,141-143. Gambier to Castlereagh, 8,16,20,21 Aug., 1,23 
Sept. 1807. 
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Britain had therefore scored an easy victory over a weaker power and reaped rich rewards. While the 
Tories congratulated Canning on a job well done that compensated somewhat for Britain's setback at 
TilSit36 the opposition (as in 180 1) found no justification for the attack on Copenhagen which 
transformed a former neutral into an implacable British foe. 37 Canning had also handed Napoleon an 
excellent propaganda weapon to turn against Britain and justify his plans to avenge Copenhagen by 
attacking Britain's only remaining European ally: Sweden. 38 Indeed Canning's Copenhagen 
operation had branded Sweden, by simple association, as co-conspirator against Denmark and it was 
not Britain, in safe isolation across the seas and inaccessible to the enraged French and Russians, that 
now faced the wrath of the continental coalition that had been formed between Napoleon and 
Alexander 1. EhrenheinVs sharp criticisms of Britain were for once justified, since he contrasted the 
delays and procrastination that Britain had displayed during the first half of the year when she was 
called upon to aid the allies and the speed in which she defended her own interests when these were at 
stake. He was convinced (in contrast to Canning) that the Copenhagen operation (far from having a 
sobering effect upon the Russians) would in fact lead to a full scale Anglo-Russian war that he 
desperately wanted Sweden to stay out of If Gustavus IV managed, despite his ministers best 
endeavours, not to stay neutral in such a war Sweden faced as unenviable a choice as Denmark had 
done between having her maritime and commercial interests ruined by Britain or having Finland 
invaded by Russia if she chose the 'wrong' side by staying belligerent. 39 
VH. Sweden's Last Stand. 
The Fall of Stralsund, Swedish Officer Conspiracies, the Retreat to Rfigen and Final Evacuation 
of Pomerania, July-October 1807. 
The British attack upon Copenhagen not only overshadowed but also, in Swedish eyes, contributed to 
the fall of Pomerania. Its eventual loss was not lamented by the king's ministers (who saw 
it as a 
strategic liability that embroiled Sweden in continental turmoil, and who did not share 
Gustavus Ws 
36 Harewood. 63. Hawkesbury to Canning, 17 Sept. 1807; Harewood. 37. Cumberland to Canning, 17 
Sept. 1807. 
37 Hinde. 175-176. 
38 Bingham. 330. Napoleon to Savary, 26 Aug. 1807. 
39 Anglica. 503. Ehrenheim to Adlerberg, 17,20,24 Aug., 7 Sept. 1807; ibid. Wetterstedt to 
Adlerberg, 24 Aug. 1807; KPA. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 7,18,25 Aug., 14 Sept. 1807; Muscovita. 
505. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, I Sept. 1807; Hinde. 178; Tegner. Engestr6m. 116. 
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attachment to the province or his determination to defend it all cost against Napoleon's equal 
determination to eliminate this irritating enemy bridgehead once and for all. 40 Ehrenheinfs view was 
clear 'We have not yet seen the ftdl extent of our bitter fate while H. M is standing with his anny on a 
patch of foreign soil, which must eventually be given up. '41 Gustavus IV was as out of tune with his 
people's feelings as much as he was with his ministers'. When Swedish hopes for an early peace 
following Tilsit were not realiSed42 discontent among the nobility and opposition circles rose 
considerably. Even those Swedes who had supported the king's war policies two years earlier had 
become disillusioned by Tilsit. 43 Instances of actual treasonous contacts with the French remained, 
however, low. 44 The strongest opposition was to be found in the noble dominated Swedish officer 
corps, especially in the Pomeranian army, where they seemed not only apathetic about defending 
Pomerania but were openly defeatist, discontented and seemed to connive in the province's demise at 
the hands of the French. This dangerously low esprit de corps among the officers; was not helped by 
being led by such uninspired and defeatist leaders such as Toll and Essen. 45 pierrepoint inforMed 
Canning privately that 'I do not see a single person here capable of maldng a vigorous and well 
46 conducted defence'. 
.Ir. -MI Pierrepoint s critiad views, which mirrored those of Cathcart, were fully justified and even cautious 
when compared with the actual situation in the army. When Gustavus IV took over personal 
command, exercised some exemplary leadership to inspire Stralsund's defenders and tried to inject 
some much needed vitality into its defence, his officers responded with a threat to resign en masse as 
a protest at the continuation of an increasingly unpopular war. As usual the Idng's efforts were to no 
avail in the face of his advisers', ministers and officers sheer despondent defeatism. They managed 
unfortWmtely to convince Gustavus IV that Stralsund had to be evacuated in the face of overwhehning 
40 KPA- Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 4,7,11 Aug. 1807.; SSX 108. Brinkman to Stedingk, 9 
Od. 1807; Bjdrlin. 214-216. 
41 KPA- Ehrenheim to WeUerstedt, 18 Aug. 1807. 
42 mnir, -wnntis4 T)e Lobo to Arauio. 9 Julv 1807. 
43 FO 73/40. picffepoint to Canning, 24 Junc 
44 RA- Nfisccllcanea. 42. Lbfvenskj6ld to Toll, 
L6fvenskjdld, 25 Jan., 22 Feb. 1807. 
45 FO 73/40. Picffepoint to Canning, 24 Junc 
Aug. 1807. Sec GAR 207; Bj6rlin. 218. 
1807. 
17,24,3 1 Jan., 4,10 Peb. 1807; ibid. HjArta to 
1807; FO 73/41. Pieffepoint to Canning, 27 July, 10 
46 Harewood. 43. Pieffepoint to Canmng, 15 July 1807. 
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French superiority. To Pierrepoinfs disgust the Swedes evacuated Stralsund, a proud symbol of 
Sweden's great past and Charles MI's heroic resistance a century earlier, without a single shot being 
fired by 21 AUgUSt. 47 
Between 22 and 25 August the city was occupied by the French who proceeded energeticaRy to make 
Preparations to invade Rfigen, the only part of Pomerania which now remained in Swedish hands. 
But the French hoped to take the island without a fight and requested that the Swedes capitulate a 
demand which Gustavus IV rejected out of hand. His proposal for Pomerania's neutralisation were in 
turn rejected by the French, and on 5 September an ill Gustavus IV left Pomerania for good. His 
parting instructions to Toll were to save the army from capture by any means, which Toll acted upon 
with speed and success by concluding a surprisingly favourable armistice with Brune two days later. 
By 25 September Toll had managed to evacuate the entire army to Sweden and was rewarded for his 
diplomatic skills by a grateful king with the field marshal's batoný8 
It is easy when viewing events in Pomerania or assessing the two year campaign there as an 
rtant sideshow without importance to the general conduct of the war. Such overly critical 
views are unjustified for several reasons. The Pomeranian front provided an important diversion for 
Napoleon's armies and was a constant thorn in his side. In 1810 Napoleon admitted that the 
Pomeranian army and the threat of a British landing tied down indirectly some 50,000 of his troops. 50 
The other was that the siege of Stralsund prevented, in Pierrepoint's opinion, the French from offering 
Denmark military aid during the siege of Copenhagen since they were preoccupied with their own 
siege of StralsuncL49 That may seem a less than plausible explanation for Pomerania's importance but 
it did r8lease vitally needed troops for operations at Copenhagen that might not have been available at 
all or only from further afield. However there was one final and more sinister reason why events in 
47 FO 73/4 1. Pierrepoint to Canning, 16,21 Aug. 1807; Harewood. 43. Pierrepoint to Canning, 16 
Aug. 1807; GP. Mosheim to Gordon, 19 Aug. 1807; WO 1/188. ff. 57-65. Cathcart to Castlereagh, 6 
Aug. 1807. 
48 FO 73/4 1. Pierrepoint to Canning, 25 Aug., 4,5,8,19 Sept. 1807; Muscovita. 505. Wetterstedt to 
Stedingk, 4,5,13 Sept. 1807; ibid. Ehrenheim to Stedingk, 12,19 Sept. 1807; KPA. Ehrenheim to 
Wetterstedt, 28 Aug., I Sept. 1807; KUDHA- Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 30 Aug., 7 Sept. 1807; 
Bj6rlin. 123,221-226. 
50 FO 73/60. Foster to Wellesley, 9 Feb. 1810. See Scaevola. 93-94. 
49 FO 73/41. Pierrepoint. to Canning, 10 Aug. 1807. 
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Pomerania especially during the summer months of 1807 were of such importance. Pierrepoint 
discovered in September that some Swedish officers intended to arrest Gustavus IV on the pretext that 
his was out of his mind and declare duke Charles Regent of Sweden instead, a role that the scheming 
duke seemed to have prepared himself for. 51 Pierrepoint had got some but not all of the picture. 
Some Swedish officers had in fact approached generals Essen and Wrede to lead a regular army coup 
against Gustavus IV, but the timid generals declined the offer not out of loyalty to the Idng (whom 
they failed to inform about these treasonous plots) but because they did not believe the time was ripe 
for such drastic actions. But dangerous germs had been planted in the minds ofjunior Swedish army 
officers that bore fruit eighteen months later when two other generals proved more decisive and 
oVerthreW GUStaVUS IV. 52 
VUL Colonies and Conquests. 
Canning's offer of Colonies, the Occupation of Zealand and Gustavus IV's Plans for Expansion, 
September-November 1807. 
The fall of Pomerania was inevitable, given the deplorable defeatism in the Swedish army's officer 
corps and sheer French military and numerical superiority. The loss of the province was humiliating 
and a major blow to Gustavus Ws prestige and his British alliance. But his ally was determined to 
soften that blow by several means and give her one remaining ally all possible assistance in the face of 
the inevitable French, Danish and Russian threats against Sweden if she remained a British ally. 53 ()n 
4 September Canning proposed to AcUerberg that Sweden share in the occupation of Zealand. 54 
Zealand was, Canning pointed out in his instructions to Pierrepoint, a vital, common objective to 
Britain and Sweden. Not least of all to Sweden, since the importance of the Sound and Zealand to 
Britain had declined with the discovery that the Great Belt was deep and broad enough to allow the 
MR pa-sagd of 
larger war and merchant ships. Canning's offer was, therefore, an altruistic one, based on 
his desire to give as much succour to Sweden as possible. An Anglo-Swedish occupation of Zealand 
would not only reduce, but also possibly even remove the threat of a French invasion, and would bring 
the two allies closer together following the removal of Cathcart's army from Pomerania. If Sweden 
51 HarewoocL 43. Pierrepoint to Canning, 8 Sept. 1807.; EnSO. MIL Charles to Engestr6m, summer 
1807. [No exact date] 
52 GAR 207-210. 
53 FO 73/4 1. Canning to Pieffqpoint, 5 Sept. 1807. Most secret. 
54 Anglica. 495. Adlerberg to Gustavus IV, 4 Sept. 1807. 
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PaMcipated in the occupation by providing 14,000-20,000 troops, Britain would pay her new 
subsidies, which had ended with Toll's evacuation of Rfigen. Furthermore, Zealand could be used as a 
bargaining counter in future peace negotiations with their enemies. Canning would only restore the 
island to the Danes if Hanover and Pomerania were restored to the allies' respective control and 
T'19% 
Denmark was restored to fidl sovereignty, with no French troops present in the country. Canning 
admitted, however, that his plans rested upon the ass=ption that Zealand had not been, nor was it 
going to be, restored to the Danes by the British commanders. 55 
But that was exactly, as seen earlier, what the British conmianders did, and it was not the last time 
that British officers were to cause Canning great diplomatic trouble or sabotage his carefully laid 
plans. This plan made more sense than most. It would have rendered the Danish contribution to the 
French cause a huge, crippling blow since the British would have controlled not only the Sound, but 
the Great Belt. Zealand would have been transformed into a huge naval and military base for the 
British to control the entry to the Baltic and neutralise the Danish gunboat threat to her convoys, but 
also lessen the effectiveness of French privateers in the Baltic. An allied occupation of Zealand would 
not only lessen the invasion threat against Scania, but also lessen the economic burden on Sweden, 
since the Swedish occupation force would be fed and supplied by the Danes. Zealands considerable 
economic (especially agricultural) resources would, possibly together with the Sound dues, be at 
Sweden's disposal. 56 Now Cathcart's armistice had of course secured Copenhagen for the British, but 
also pulled the rug from under Canning's feet, and Wetterstedt concluded that the British proposal 
was only made to compensate for the loss of Pomerania. 57 Gustavus IV on the other hand was very 
interested in the Zealand plan, 58 but while appreciative of Canning's solicitous offer, he wondered, 
quite st: nsibly, how it could be compatible with the terms of the Anglo-Danish armistice. 59 He also 
wanted no new subsidy treaty until the old one had run its course. 60 Canning regretted that the 
military had been given powers to negotiate with the Danes without any reference to London, but 
55 FO 73/41. Canning to Pierrepoint, 4 Sept. 1807. 
56 KUDHA_ Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 24,27 Sept. 1807. 
57 Muscovita. 505. Wetterstedt to Stedingk, 24,27 Sept. 1807; KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 
30 Sept. 1807. 
58 Anglica. 495. Wetterstedt to Adlerberg, 24 Sept. 1807. 
59 FO 73/41. Pieffepoint to Canning, 19 Sept. 1807. 
60 Harewood. 43. Pieffepoint to Canning, 19 Sept. 1807. 
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perhaps there would be no need to occupy Zealand since Canning hoped to secure Danish neutrality 
by sending a special mission to Copenhagen. He hoped to secure Danish neutrality with the help of 
Russia and asked for Swedish diplomatic assistance. 61 Gustavus IV expressed his scepticism about 
Canning's hopes for Russian mediation since Stedingk reported their deep hostility to Britain. The 
king did, however, support Canning's neutralisation plan since he believed it would preserve Swedish 4;; P 
security more than an Anglo-Swedish occupation of Zealand. The main reason was that a neutral 
na 
, nmark would be a buffer state between Sweden and her enemy. 62 Swedish scepticism was quickly 
confirmed, not only about Russia which re ected its assigned role as a mediator, but also by the Danes, i 
who were in no mood to listen to overtures from the British after their brutal attack. Nor were they 
willing to alienate her soon-to-be allies, France and Russia, by accepting a return to neutrality. In a 
post-Tilsit, post-Copenhagen sort of world the kind of neutrality that Canning outlined was a 
dangerous day-dream. The Swedish government proved no less sceptical about Canning's schemes 
than the Danes. Sharing in the Zealand occupation would implicate Sweden in Canning's 'crime' at 
Copenhagen and provoke her neighbour's hostfle reactions. 63 
Canning did not give up his quest to assure Britain a vital presence on the Sound which also provided 
Sweden some protection against an invasion. Canning had, therefore, already on 17 September 
proposed an alternative, second plan to the Zealand one, by placing an army in Scania and a British 
squadron in Gothenburg. 64 On I October Pierrepoint made a formal proposal to land 10,000 of 
Cathcart's troops in Scania65 and to use them, at a later stage, to re-occupy Zealand66 The Swedish 
ministers were aghast at the very idea and Wetterstedt (for once) dared to raise political objections to 
British proposals. By admitting troops that had taken part in the Copenhagen operation, Sweden 
would be implicated in that 'episode' which would arouse both domestic and foreign discontent. He 
also dared to claim that the British presence in Scania would undermine Sweden's independence by 
handing over the security of a strategically and economically vital province to a foreign power. 
61 FO 73/42. Canning to PierrePOint, I Oct. 1807. 
62 FO 73/42. Pieffepoint to Canning, IIW, 1807. 
63 KLMHA_ Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 10,13,24,27,30 Sept. 1807; KPA. Ehrenheim to 
Wetterstedt, 28 Aug., 8,15,18,27 Sept. 1807. 
64 Harewood. 43. Pierrepoint to Canning, 17 Sept. 1807. 
65 FO 73/42. Canning to Pieffepoint, I Oct. 1807. 
66 Anglica. 495. Adlerberg to Gustavus IV, 1 Oct. 1807. 
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Gustavus IV rejected Wetterstedt's dubious arguments that stationing a mere 10,000 troops belonging 
to a friendly power could undermine Sweden! s independence. Nor did he think it any business of 
foreign powers whom Sweden allowed to stay on its soil. The ministers counter-attacked (since they 
had obviously lost the political argument against a British landing in Scania) by hitting Gustavus IV 
where it hurt the most. His reforms of Scania's agriculture had transformed the province into the 
bread basket of Sweden and Gustavus IV was inordinately proud of his achievement. Toll claimed that 
ScanWS agriculture could not supply the British (which contradicted previous claims) and trying to do 
so would ruin the province's eConomy. 67 
On 14 October Gustavus IV told Pierrepoint that he had to decline, with the greatest reluctance, 
Canning's Scania plan since the province would be unable to supply the British army. This was clearly 
his negative ministers talldng through the mouth of the king and Pierrepoint tried to convince 
Gustavus IV to accept a plan which would bolster Sweden's long-term security. (Unfortunately the 
Swedes, in Pierrepoint's opinion, did not anticipate events, but merely reacted to them. )68 BUt 
Pierrepoint persevered and entreated Gustavus IV to reconsider. Gustavus IV took issue with 
Wetterstedt, claiming that subsidies would cover the expense of their stay in Scama and provide 
valuable protection against a French invasion. Wetterstedt failed to grasp this point and claimed (in a 
letter to Ehrenheim on 18 October) that 'The entire cause of our precarious position is the king's 
determination never to move close to France. England knows this and makes [such] a union ever more 
difficult [to aChieVel'. 69 Gustavus Ws and his ministers' perceptions were therefore completely at 
odds. The former recognised the benefits of British protection against Sweden's hostile neighbours 
and France, while the latter saw such protection as the very cause of such threats.. On 20 October 
Pieffcpbint made his final unsuccessful bid. Gustavus IV turned it down, to the relief of his ministers 
and Scania's population, which persisted in viewing a British presence in Scania, as a direct 
provocation against Denmark. Pierrepoint disagreed viewing that same presence as a valuable 
deterrent to future Danish (or French) aggression, and a valuable addition to Sweden's long-term 
67 KUDfIA_ Wetterstedt to Ehrenheirn, 8 Oct. 1807; FO 73/42. Pieffepoint to Canning, II Oct. 1807; 
SRE. 256; KUDHA- Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 11,15 Oct. 1807. 
68 FO 73/42. pieffepoint to Canning, 14 Oct. 1807. 
69 KUDHA_ Wetterstedt/Ehrenheim 18 Oct. 1807. 
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defensive security. 70 A few months later both Gustavus IVs ministers and his Scanian subjects, who 
opposed British protection with such vehemence, would be clatnouring (with equal vehemence) for 
that very same protection and blame the British for not providing it. 
Nfistaken ministerial interference had not only succeeded in undermining Sweden's long-term security 
but crippled Gustavus Ws plans against Norway. The autumn of 1807 seemed an opportune time to 
strike a pre-emptive blow against Denmark, but also, by occupying Zealand, force the Danes to 
exchange the island for NorWay. 71 He had lost a golden opportunity to invade Zealand with British 
military aid and a year later, when he tried to rekindle plans for an Anglo-Swedish invasion of the 
island, it was too late. Neither his ministerS72 nor the Swedish pubhc73 were sympathetic to his 
Norwegian plans, while Pierrepoint avoided the issue since he (mistakenly) thought Britain had 
ambitions against Norway herself. 74 
Norway could have proved a valuable, long-term addition to Sweden, both from an economic, but 
even more from a strategic point of view - by eliminating the need to defend a long, straggling 
western frontier and gaining a long western coastline facing Sweden's ally and main trading partner, 
Britain. To compensate for this potential loss, the real loss of Pomerania, economic losses (which 
alienated the Swedish merchant classes) and to serve as a bargaining counter in future peace talks, 
Canning offered the Dutch colony of Surinam to a delighted Gustavus IV in October. Even the 
ministers did not oppose this safer expansionist option (compared to the higher risk Norway-Zealand 
plans), but Ehrenhcim preferred the Dutch islands of Saba or St. Eustace to Surinam or the adjacent 
colonies of Demerara, Essequibo and Berbice. 75 On 20 October Ehrenheim outlined his olýections to 
70 FO 73/42. Pierrepoint to Canning, 20,21,24 Oct., 1 Nov. 1807; Muscovita. 505. Wetterstedt to 
Stedingk, 15,22,30 Oct. 1807. 
71 KUDHA_ Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 4 Aug. 1807. 
72 Muscovita. 505. Wetterstedt to Stedingk, 3 Dec. 1807. 
73 Trolle. 78-80. Oct. 1807. 
74 Harewood. 43. Pieffepoint to Canning, 25 Aug. 1807. 
75 FO 73/41. Canning to Pieffepoiný 5 Sept. 1807; Harewood, 43. Canning to Pieffepoint, 5 Aug. 
1807; FO 73/41 and 42. Pieffepoint to Canning, 19,27 Sept. 1807; Anglica. 503. Wetterstedt to 
Adlerberg, 24 Sept. 1807; KUDHA- Wetterstedt to Ehrenheirn' 20,24 Sept. 1807; KPA. Ehrenheim 
to Wetterstedt, 16,27 Oct. 1807; Anglica. 503. Ehrenheim to Adlerberg, 8 Oct. 1807; FO 73/42. 
Canning to Pieffepoint, 9 Oct. 1807; FO 73/42. Pierrepoint to Canning, 20 Oct. 1807; Anglica. 503, 
Wetterstedt to Adlerberg, 21 Oct. 1807; KUDHA. Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 4 Oct. 180-7. 
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Sweden acquiring any colony, particularly Surinam, by claiming that: 'I am fearful of Colonies in 
general, they demand great Capital, the odious Slave trade, and emigrants, who will either be 
corrupted or die in an unbearable climate. Surinam has not made any profit for Holland since 1770 
while costing huge sums to defend. 76 Ehrenheim's objections were valid up to a point but Surinam 
could have boosted Swedish overseas trade and be seen a small gain from the alliance. But yet again 
ministerial opposition had deprived Sweden of this prize as well. 77 
DL War across the World. 
Napoleon"s Strategic Choices and Plans, October 1807-1808. 
The Swedish rejection of British military aid in October was doubly unfortunate since Napoleon (who 
hoped that Gustavus IV might come to his senses and make peace with France) had turned with some 
reluctance to planning an invasion of Sweden. But he preferred that his Russian and Danish allies 
should carry out this task for him and displayed unusual tardiness in issuing the French invasion force 
under the command of marshal Bernadotte (situated at Hamburg with 18,000 French and allied 
troops) with orders to advance. Napoleon's uncharacteristic lack of interest in the invasion was quite 
deliberate. He had no interest in seeing Sweden defeated too fast since he hoped to divert both his 
main ally and enemy's attention towards Sweden while he concentrated on dealing with problems 
further South. 78 
Napoleon's eyes were in fact on Portugal and not Sweden. The former, unlike the latter, was an 
ancient British ally which had the temerity, in the eyes of Napoleon, to continue that alliance under 
the cloak of bogus neutrality. Like her northern counterpart (Denmark), neutrality had served 
Portugal well, since her foreign trade had quadrupled between 1789 and 1807. This Portuguese 
prosperity, however, was built on perilously insecure grounds since it depended upon the belligerents' 
goodwill. Such goodwill was not forthcoming from Napoleon, who warned the Portuguese (on 19 
July) that they had to shut their ports by I September or face a French invasion. The Portuguese faced 
76 KPA- Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 20 Oct. 1807. 
77 FO 73/43. Bathurst to Canning, 25 Dec. 1807; FO 73/45, Canning to Thornton, 31 Dec. 1807. 
78 Bingham. 3 30. Napoleon to Savary, 26 Aug. 1807.; H6jer. 369-37 1; Palmer. 144. 
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the same deadly dilemma that Denmark had found only a few months earlier. If Portugal accepted the 
French demands, her flourishing trade, her economy and her colonies, especially the rich prize of 
Brazil, would be in direct peril from the British. The Portuguese government was also acutely aware 
that Lisbon (like Copenhagen) was open to a British naval attack - as was the rest of her long exposed 
coastline. At the same time her equally long and indefensible land boarder with Spain made Portugal 
especially vulnerable to a Franco-Spanish invasion. When Portugal prevaricated, Napoleon recalled 
his embassy as a warning not to delay in answering his deMandS. 79 
Napoleon lowered his Damocles sword over Portugal's head by ordering general Junot's army (25,000) 
mto Spain and on 27 October signing a treaty with that power to divide up Portugal between them. 
Portugal's ruler, the Prince-Regent Don John placated the British and assured their envoy in Lisbon 
that he would evacuate his government, treasury and fleet to Brazil should the French invade. Don 
John's assurance was not to be trusted, however, since he did not relish the prospect of an Atlantic 
crossing or a long-term residence in Brazil. Canning could not afford (as in the Danish case) to see 
the Portuguese fleet (12 ships of the line and 26 other vessels) fall into French hands. He sent the 
meddling, but ruthlessly decisive admiral Smith, therefore, with 6 men-of-war to the Tagus to ensure 
that prince John kept his word, or else see his fleet either sunk or captured by the British. Smith 
managed only a few hours before Junot's entry into Lisbon on 29 November to evacuate the entire 
Portuguese court, fleet and treasury. Canning was delighted with another coup that had snatched 
another fleet from under Napoleon's nose, but the French had reduced yet another country to 
submission. 80 
Napolebn could now, with Portugal safely in Junot's hands, shift the focus of his avaricious territorial 
appetite to Portugal's next door neighbour and long-standing adversary, Bourbon Spain. If there was 
remarkable similarity between Portugal's and Denmark's position in 1807, then their respective 
79 Livermore. 244-247; Chandler. 596-597; Ems1ey. 59; Maxwell. 4,6-9,16,38-42,51-55,111-120, 
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neighbours, Spain and Sweden, shared some similarities too. Although having been imperial powers 
in the previous century, by the eighteenth century only the support of Bourbon France and the 
formidable efforts of King Charles III of Spain and Gustavus III of Sweden to reform their autocratic 
states entitled either country to claim a secondary power status. The revolution deprived both states of 
French support and France was seen as an ideological threat to their domestic tranquility from 1792 
onwards and forced them to adopt neutrality. Both Spam and Sweden, by their relative peripheral 
position in Europe and isolation from the rest of the continent, behind the Pyrendes and the Baltic 
respectively had managed to escape the worst effects of the war. That this was about to change by late 
1807 and early 1808 was blamed by Spaniards and Swedes upon their unpopular rulers. 81 
in both countries the nobifiWs opposition to their respective rulers, Don Manuel de Godoy and 
Gustavus IV, was fuelled by domestic and foreign factors. They resented their rulers' exercise of 
unfettered autocratic power at home and their extremely unpopular foreign alliances that embroiled 
Sweden and Spain in wars that were not'theirs'. (Spain had been an ally of France since 1804 and 
that alliance was as Unpopular with the Spaniards as the British alliance was with the Swedes). 
Napoleon was therefore assured of noble support should he chose to invade either country. Having 
come to mistrust Godoy, Napoleon chose to overthrow Spain! s 'dictat& and replace him with 
Napoleon's elder brother, king Joseph of Naples. Exploiting Godoy's greed, Napoleon offered southem 
Portugal as a personal principality for the prince m return for a French occupation of Spain north of 
the Ebro. But he failed to get Joseph, in December 1807, to rule Spain in place of Godoy, since Joseph 
recommended that Napoleon use king Charles IVs popular son, Don Ferdinand as a French puppet 
instead. Unfortunately for Napoleon he failed to follow his brother's sensible advice. 82 
Godoy remained oblivious to these Napoleonic plots until February 1808 when he belatedly realised 
that he was not going to secure his Portuguese principality while the French tightened their grip on 
Spain. In late February (at about the time the Russians invaded Finland) Godoy urged the Spanish 
government to mobilise the army and evacuate the court to the safety of Mallorca (which could be 
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protected by the British) or the America. s (as the Portuguese had). Neither the government nor the 
Spanish people at large heeded his recommendation. Spain, like Sweden, was hampered by political 
divisions on the home front from putting up an effective resistance against their ancient foes (France 
and Russia respectively). In fact the Spanish response between 16 and 18 March was to overthrow 
Godoy. The French took full advantage of Spain's trouble with Marshal Murat's 23,000 troops 
occupying Madri(L83 
What reconciled the Spaniards to this alien presence, symbolised by Murat's Mameluke cavalry that 
reminded the Spaniards of an earlier invasion, was their mistaken belief that Don Ferdinands 
simultaneous arrival in Madrid with Murat was due to French support. Napoleon had concluded, in 
fact, that Ferdinand and his supporters posed an even graver threat to his control over Spain than 
Godoy ever did. Napoleon arrogantly assumed that with force the Spanish people would accept 
whatever ruler he chose to impose on them. He had committed three major errors ofjudgement. 
Firstly, he had erroneously concluded that the Spanish people was as pliable as its spineless 
government and secondly, that he could solve a complex political problem (ruling Spain) by an 
exercise of brute military force. Finafly, he aflowed, himself to be seduced, like the British had been 
earlier, by prospects of conquering Spanish America. Ifis decision to occupy the Iberian peninsula 
contributed to his eventual downfall in two crucial ways. It provoked Portugal and Spain to fight him 
for years and opened up a secure front for the British to grind down his armies. A less apparent 
consequence of his diversion into Spain was his inability to invade Sweden. Sweden was far from the 
centre, of French power and did not hold the same prospects that Spain seemed to offer. Yet Sweden 
held one of the main keys to the ultimate failure or success of the Continental system which could 
only sudceed if Napoleon managed to strangle Britain's all important commercial artery Into the Baltic 
where her exports to Europe were smuggled in and where her vital supplies of tar, hemp, wood and 
other naval stores came from. Only by occupying Jutland, Funen, Zealand and Scania, could 
Napoleon, with long range artillery, privateers and large gunboat flotillas, hope to shut the British out 
of the Baltic. Napoleon's attempt to make the Continental system succeed without bottling up the 
83 Hilt. 179-186,199-207,213-223; Rudorff. 24-28. 
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Baltic was like trying to fill a bath tub without putting in the plug first. But in March 1808 that was as 
little apparent as was the growing Spanish disenchantment with the French occupation of Madrid. 84 
Should Spain become unruly it could prove very problematic to Napoleon since the Iberian peninsula 
was only a paving stone on his road to world domination. Napoleon hoped to use Spain to launch an 
invasion of north Africa that might extend as far east as Egypt which might assist his invasion plans 
against India (as in 1801 when he hoped to cripple the British by threatening their most valuable 
colony) where Russia's participation would be ensured by offering her Finland as a reward. Napoleon 
also wanted Austrian support and with these forces at his command Napoleon hoped to reach India 
through the Ottoman and Persian empires. 85 On 2 February 1808 Napoleon revealed his plans to 
cripple Britain by invading India and Sweden simultaneously. A month later Bernadotte was ordered 
to invade Sweden. 86 Neither the BritiShV nor GUSUVUS M8 took theSe groteSqUely grandioSe 
projects seriously. Tle Swedish ministers, however, took them at face value, which to them would 
89 require a large British effort in the Baltic to stave off such a catastrophe. 
X Before the Storm 
Sweden and the Russian Invasion Threat, September 1807-March 1808. 
It was the effects of an Anglo-Russian conflict in the Baltic, rather than India, that was a cause of 
concern to both Sweden and Britain. Canning remained complacently confident that Russia would not 
prove hostile to Britain. In October the Russians reinforced their Baltic coastal defences while the 
newly appointed Francophile foreign minister, count Nicolai Rumyantsev, made unsuccessful 
proposils to Sweden to revive the 1801 armed league of neutrality. A month later history repeated 
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itself again when the Russians placed an embargo on British ships and goods in their ports. 90 
Obviously, as both Budberg and Alexander I had already warned Stedingk in August, the British 
alliance put Sweden in great danger from a Franco-Russian coalition, which the two Russians 
suggested Sweden should join without delay. Stedingk did not care for the implied threat and pointed 
out that with her long vulnerable coast the British could do great damage to Sweden, even do to 
Stockholm or Carlscrona what they had done to Copenhagen. 91 
The Swedes were deeply divided how to meet this threat. Was Sweden to stand up to Russia in the 
hope of deterring an invasion of Finland or appease her? Gustavus IV and Stedingk believed in 
deterrence rather than appeasement. Gustavus IV believed Russia's peaceftd overtures for a new 
armed league or friendship were only made to gain time; time to prepare for an inevitable invasion. 
In early November Gustavus IV proposed therefore to his horrified advisers and ministers a pre- 
emptive Swedish strike against CronStadt. 92 Stedingk. (while not supportive of such an attack) took 
an equaUy realistic view of Russian intentions. Alexander I was determined to invade Finland 
whatever the political, military or economic costs of such an invasion. Appeasement of Russia under 
these circurnstances, was therefore not only counter productive, but downright dangerous. Nor could 
one realistically hope for a revolution against Alexander I despite his unpopularity. Stedingk, 
therefore, hoped that the Finnish army would be mobilised in time to meet a Russian invasion that he 
expected to be launched before the spring. 93 
Unfortunately it was not this line that prevailed in Stockholm or decided Swedish foreign policy 
towards Russia. It was the appeasement line that dominated Sweden! s Russian policy. Ehrenheim was 
me main exponent of this pohcy and he beheved, that if Finland! s army and defences were put on fidl 
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alert it would not only brand Sweden an aggressor, but also provoke a Russian attack. If instead 
Russia invaded Finland, then Alexander I would be the one to be branded an aggressor and 
Napoleon's tool. 94 Ehrenheim also hoped that Russia would be deteffed from invading Finland by the 
95 consequent ruination of her remaining foreign trade, which used Sweden as a conduit to Britain. 
Ehrenheim's reasoning was as flawed as it was dangerous. In the post-Tilsit world there was no longer 
any room for the kind of strict neutrality Ehrenheim advocated. If Sweden was not to find herself 
invaded by Russia then she would have to join the Continental system and submit to the absolute will 
of the continental coalition. Anything less would provoke a fearful retaliation. Gustavus IV had no 
intention, as Ehrenheim. weH knew, to submit to either. The poor state of Finlands defences and its 
army, which was blamed upon the king, was a direct result of the ministers', especially Ehrenheim's, 
mistaken policies. Sweden! s domestic political situation would not be improved by military setbacks. 
As for Russia victories in Finland would appease the emperor's critics. Finally, had Alexander 
I's policies been motivated by economic interest, then Russia would hardly have become a member of 
the Continental system. What made appeasement more puzzling was that the Swedes were aware of 
the large scale build-up of Russian strength at Viborg. 96 By February it was also obvious that 
Ehrenheimls policy had failed since Swedish appeasement encouraged Russia to be more aggressive 
(not IeSS)'97 and GUStaVUS IV , Who MiStakenly had followed Ehrenheim's advice, was reduced to 
asking his Alexander I if his previous loyalty as an ally would be rewarded with a Russian invasion of 
Finland. 98 
Indeed what was the Russian motivation for making an unprovoked attack on a much weaker 
neighbour and former ally? Alexander I could, and did, excuse his actions by blaming it on 
Napole6n's insistence that Sweden be defeated. This coincided with Alexander I's own wish to avenge 
himself indirectly upon Britain by attacking its last European ally. He also hoped that an easy victory 
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over Sweden would prove popular, restore some of his army's morale and reconcile his critics by 
adding Finland to the Russian empire. (Most Russians found Finland a meagre reward of the Tilsit 
pact. ) At least annexing Finland would remove once and for all the Swedish threat against St. 
Petersburg. " 
But in Ehrenheim's view Alexander I still seemed to hope that by building up his invasion army at 
Viborg Sweden would abandon the British alliance. 100 Even when it became apparent that Sweden 
would not yield to Russia's demands, Alexander I wanted to avoid a purely military solution (unlike 
Napoleon) to his political problem (subjugating Sweden and conquering Finland without too much 
bloodshed). Swedish oppositionists, in Russian exile, gave sound advice. G6ran Sprengporten, the 
longest serving of Russia! s Swedish 'advisers', wanted Finland to be given virtual independence under 
Russia's protection, while Carl Klick urged outright annexation. Both urged Alexander I to lower 
taxes, preserve Finlands structure, woo the nobility to his side and placate the peasantry by assuring 
them that serfdom (which they dreaded) would not be imposed on the conquered. This advice was 
sensible and subtle, but undermined Russia's military plan. By only amassing 24,000 troops against 
Finland the invasion, set for 21 February, would be too weak to defeat the Swedes outright. 10 1 
Thus poor advice to Gustavus IV was matched by similar mistakes on the Russian side. If the Russian 
army was in poor shape after its defeat at Friedland and the Russian nation as a whole hostile towards 
a war against Sweden, then its enemy to be was in even more parlous shape. Sweden had considerable 
material resources and far from negligible military muscle. The army could muster 70-100,000 troops 
while Sveaborg and the Finnish field army gave good protection against a Russian invasion. But the 
Kymmdne river, the Savolax lake system and even Sveaborg were affected by winter conditions. The 
weather, however, was the least of Sweden's worries. What really reduced Sweden's military potential 
was the lack of leadership in the Swedish goverrument, and the political disunity and discord that 
prevailed among her nobility and upper classes. That was Sweden's greatest weAness. 
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October Armfelt exclaimed that 'Discontent and despair have reached new heights while Sweden is 
approaching a [foreign] crisis that will decide the final fate of Sweden: Death or continued Life'. 103 
Few Swedes believed their army, after its poor showing during the latter stages of the Pomeranian 
campaign, would be able to stand up to the Russians. 104 Gustavus IV believed Sweden's resources for 
war were adequate, 105 but that the Swedes lacked the will to fight for their SUrViVal. 106 
Of greater interest than the state of Sweden was the state of Finland itself. One British traveller, 
Robert Ker-Porter, who left St. Petersburg found all roads towards the Finnish frontier choked with 
Russian troops, but when he crossed the Kymmene there was no military activity whatsoever to be 
seen anywhere in Finland He concluded that it had to be a consequence of deliberate Swedish 
poliCy. 107 '1 was totally at a loss how to account for so unguarded a security. Whatever the occult 
reason for the present tranquility all is at perfect rest in Swedish Finland. Liberty and comfort smiles 
everywhere. Peace sits in every countenance, and decorates the landscape, as if it had been her chosen 
to reign for many a year., 108 Having seen what the Russians were up to Porter pressed on towards 
Stockholm. 109 One Swede did not remain complacent about the looming Russian threat: Stedingk. 
On 28 January he sent the latest intelligence reports about the Russian invasion plans to Sveaborg 
with the old courier Nils Ostbom. I 10 The question was if there would be any commanding officer at 
Sveaborg who would be able to act upon Stedingk's warnings. The Finnish army's commander, 
general Mauritz Klingspor, was absent on his estates in Sweden when Finland faced its gravest crisis 
ever. To the disgruntled Finnish nobility the appointment of this courtier as their Generalissimo only 
heightened their discontent of what they saw as deliberate neglect of Finland. It did not help that they 
had remained since the days of Anjala the largest hotbed of opposition to the Gustavian regime. III 
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Both they and the Finns in general would have preferred to have had Armfelt (who declined the post), 
a fighting Finn, than the universally reviled Klingspor, as commander of the Finnish army. 112 
Ostbom arrived a Sveaborg on I February with Stedingk's warning. The acting commander-in-chief of 
the Finnish army, general Nathaniel Klercker, issued an order for general mobilisation on 7 February. 
Klercker had at his disposal 11,000 troops along the Kymmene, 6,500 inside Sveaborg, 400 in 
Svartholm. and 4,000 in Savolax, or in other words almost equal to the numbers the Russians had. 
Klercker wanted therefore to make a stand along the Kymmene but his defeatist colleagues 
disapproved of such a bold idea . 
113 In Abo, Finlands capital, the population was convinced that 
Sveaborgl 14 and the Finnish army would be able to halt the enemy's advance. ' 15 In fact Sveaborg, 
the supposed 'Gibraltar of the North' was far from impregnable. ' 16 In StoCkholM the goVernment 
shared the Finnish public's over confident hopes and saw the ominous silence along the frozen 
Finnish frontier as a re-assuring sign of continued calm. 117 
The sign the Finns were waiting for was that Gustavus IV was prepared to return to Stockholml 18 in 
order to rally the nation against the Russians. His ministers failed to fill the gap in his absence and he 
did not seem to be in any hurry to leave his beloved Scania. When he did return he not only 
Aeb 
deliberately snubbed a delegation awaiting his arrival at the city gates (he detested the capital) 
but he 
failed to provide desperately needed leadership. When he returned to Stockholm in late December, 
Gustavus IV deliberately avoided meeting the assembled inhabitants and the city's leaders who had 
gathered to met him. 119 Bathurst the British chargd d! affhires, was appalled that Gustavus IV failed 
to rally his people, many of whom were generally loyal to the king, to his side. 'The people of 
Stockholm were never amongst the most zealous advocates for Ifis Majesty's interests, but this late 
occurriAnce has left an impression which will not be easily effaced, and converted an occasion that 
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seemed favourable for recovering their attachment into a source of fresh discontent'. 120 By residing in 
the deepest isolation and inactivity at Gripsholm outside Stockholm, Gustavus IV continued to snub 
the capital and failed to provide wartime leadership. 
His lethargy and inactivity made some ministers (forgetting to mention or blame their own) claim that 
the king was incapable of ruling the country. 121 Despite the looming danger in the eaStI22 the 
government and Gustavus W seemed oblivious to its eNistence. False rumours circulated that 
Gustavus IV was indifferent to Finlands fate. 123 Nothing could have been further from the truth and 
it was his ministers who were mainly to blame for the state of Finlands defences. By early January 
1808 Gustavus IV finally took issue with his ministers' shortcomings and denounced Essen and 
Wrede as traitors who should have been court-martialled for their military failures in Pomerania. 124 
(Had he known about their part in the officers' plots against him, this would have doubly justified 
court-martialling the generals. ) Of course there were other generals who were over-ripe for 
replacement and by not removing them Gustavus IV ensured Sweden's eventual defeat and his own 
demise. Wingspor should have been replaced by Armfelt, and admiral Cronstedt, the defeatist 
commandant of Sveaborg, by an army general. ) The king should have dealt similarly with weak 
spirits in the government, mobilised the armed forces, prepared for war and rallied the nation to his 
side. By not doing so, Gustavus IV had undermined both Sweden and his own position, as he failed to 
provide leadership to a disunited nation that fitced the worst threat to its eýdstence for over a 
century. 125 
Swedish public opinion (i. e. the rich, politically conscious and the nobility) blamed this acute threat 
upon Gustavus IVs alliance with Britain. Both were equally unpopular with those Swedes who, like 
Ehrenheini, preferred neutrality or an alliance with Napoleon, such as Lagerbjelke. Both groups of 
opinion would probably have agreed with the latter's claim on 6 November that 'Our only dangerous 
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neighbour is now allied to our present enemy; Our only so-called Ally is through the latest events [i. e. 
Copenhagen] divided from us in political interests. ' 126 The departure of British officers at 
Gothenburg was greeted with relief and clanus that at last Sweden was rehu-ning to neutrality. 127 In 
mid-September a British visitor to Stockholm, Henry Crabb Robinson (on his way home having 
escaped from the continent) became quickly aware how equally unpopular Gustavus IV and the 
British were. When he tried to defend the alhance or praise the king's heroic policies against 
Napoleon his remarks were met with stony silence or outright hostility, especially when it became 
apparent that he was English. 'This anti-English feeling was so general in Sweden at this time that I 
was advised to travel as a German through the country', noted Robinson. 128 Not a SWe&S SaW 
Britain as an encumbrance to their conspiracies against Gustavus IV (maybe their country's ally would 
support their plans) and on 15 January Bathurst (who was quite sympathetic to such plans) informed 
Canning privately that the 'neutralist party' in Sweden had approached him. This 'party' or parties 
wanted to call a Riksdag, possibly dethrone the king and end the British alliance to avoid a Russian 
ir, VaSiorL 129 Canning made no comment on this approach, nor would he support any anti-royalist 
(and therefore anti-affiance) conspiracies in the future. 
A. c long as these were the sentiments of private individuals neither Gustavus W nor the British had 
much to fear. But Anglophobia and criticism of the king's policies permeated all the Swedish 
ministers and the government. These emotional prejudices were a private reflection of the Swedish 
government's conscious policy of trying to establish Sweden's neutrality in the Anglo-Russian war. 
The first part of this precarious political platform was to appease Russia even at the expense of 
Finlands security and in order to appease Russia yet further distance Sweden as much as possible 
from Bhtain. Hence the negative response to all of Canning's various offers of aid, colonies, support 
and subsidies. This policy would only have made sense had the Swedish government been in charge 
of the countr3ýs foreign policy and Gustavus W had been deprived of all power and influence. Even 
then the policy was extremely risky since it could have left Sweden (as she was to be in 1809 when 
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Gustavus IV was removed from power and that very same ministry was in charge) isolated, deprived 
of British aid and at the mercy of her enemies. With Gustavus IV in sole charge of foreign policy and 
as determined as ever to continue the British alliance (which could only lead to a Russian invasion), 
the ministers' neutrality schemes could only lead to disaster. Unfortunately, by isolating himself at 
Gripsholm, refusing to lead the country or impose his contrary views upon his ministers, Gustavus IV 
allowed a vacuum to appear that his ministers could fill. It was they, not he, who decided what little 
policy there was in Sweden, and Ehrenheim, the chief architect of the 'return to strict neutraliW policy 
outlined it as pulling 'ourselves from a falling England without it falling on Sweden first; and then 
managing to avoid being embroiled in a conflict with her on the side of Russia and France'. 130 
Thus Sweden had to avoid renewing the British alliance (by signing a new subsidy treaty) at all cost 
since it would only lead to 'storms on all sides'131 and Ehrenheim praised Toll for preventing the 
British army from being stationed in Scania. 132 But perhaps Sweden would be 'spared' a new alliance 
with Britain since he believed that the Portland goverment was about to fall and be replaced by the 
isolationist Whigs. 133 Wetterstedt, unfortunately, simply paffoted Ehrenheim! s mistaken views and 
believed Sweden had to make peace with Napoleon on French terms. 134 Otherwise the future would 
'see us implicated in a series of mishaps and attacked simultaneously on two fronts. We will be 
separated so far from England, through our precarious situation and the usual English inactivity in aid 
of Her allies, that we will only hear the distant thud of their fall while we lament our own'. 
135 
This kind of defeatism and negative criticism of Sweden! s one single support did not bode well for the 
survival of the Anglo-Swedish alliance or the vigorous defence of Sweden. In fact by persisting too 
long in their neutral daydreaming the ministers had brought Sweden into a dangerous watershed 
between war and peace where Sweden was left without British support but unable to rebuild relations 
with her hostile neighbours and French enemy. The ministers did not 
have the courage to confront 
Gustavus IV directly with their political objections to the Anglo-Swedish alliance since they 
knew he 
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would reject any notion of neutrality towards Napoleon. Since they knew how adamantly opposed 
Gustavus IV was to this and the fact that he had total, undisputed final powers to decide foreign policy 
it beggars belief that they even persisted in such ftitile speculations as neutrality. Neutrality was never 
a realistic option for Sweden, even less so by late 1807, and it was only far too late that the ministers 
woke up to reality and accepted that their neutrality schemes not only had no hope of life but had also 
undermined Sweden! s strategic and military security. On 15 November an agitated Wettersteck who 
had finally sobered up to reality, told Bathurst that Sweden expected her ally to ftumish all possible 
aid. Bathurst assured him that Britain was not in the habit of running out on allies in need without 
specifying what Britain would furnish to Sweden. 136 Wetterstedt wanted more specific assurances 137 
such as some L2,000,000 in subsidies, 6 ships of the line and troops by the spring. 138 
The Swedish ministers had changed their diplomatic tune completely. Instead of accusing Canning of 
deliberately embroiling Sweden in Britain's (not their shared) conflict with the continental powers 
with his offers of aid, they were now accusing him of being tardy in assisting Swedem Canning could 
therefore be excused for being sceptical about the Swedish change of heart139, especially since 
Ehrenheim, as late as 25 December, persisted in believing a British alliance would expose Sweden to 
'unnecessary dangers'. 140 Of course the opposite was true since without a British alliance Sweden 
would face her enemies bereft of all outside support and Ehrenheim had yet again undermined British 
confidence in Swedish reliability. The Swedish ministers support of the alliance was only made as a 
last resort, a parallel strategy to their futile neutrality hopes and was wholly opportunistic and 
insincere. Canning was not impressed with Ehrenheim's views. But he knew that Sweden 
desperately needed support and that Gustavus IV was completely committed to their'common cause'. 
He offered L1,000,000 -in subsidies, a strong fleet to protect the Swedish coasts and troops when they 
became available. 141 
136 FO 73/43. Bathurst to Canning, 15,19,25 Nov. 1807. 
137 Anglica. 503. Wetterstedt to Adlerberg, 19 Nov. 1807. 
138 KUDHA_ Wetterstedt to Ehrenheim, 3 Dec. 1807. 
139 Carr. 58. 
140 FO 73/43. Bathurst to Canning, 25 Dec. 1807. 
141 FO 73/45. Canning to Thornton, 30,31 Dec. 1808.; Caff. 58. 
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Gustavus IVs pleasure at Canning's generous offer was not shared by Wetterstedt since it did not meet 
his earlier demands. 142 The new British envoy, Edward Thornton, had therefore a far from easy task 
to overcome ministerial disapproval of the alliance and defeatism. His first and most delicate task 
was to find out if Gustavus IV shared these views and if so to support the establishment of harmonious 
relations between Russia and Sweden but without arousing Gustavus Ws fears that Britain meant to 
abandon her. If Gustavus IV did not then Thornton was to sign a subsidy treaty, a commercial treaty 
and assure the king that he had the full support of his ally. 143 Thornton arrived in Stockholm on 22 
January and it was evident from his initial talks with Gustavus IV that he intended with all force to 
continue the common cause with Britain. By 26 January Thornton put Canmng's assurances of 
support for Sweden to the test by suggesting that the British subsidies be increased to L1,200,000 to be 
paid even before the outbreak of hostilities, since Thornton judged Sweden's situation to be very K- --- 
precarious and this cash injection would improve Swedish chances of resisting a Russian invasion. 144 
Thornton's zeal for the 'common cause', the increase in the subsidies and his wish to conclude the 
subsidy talks met with the full approval on the Swedish side. 145 Thornton seems to have been equally 
impressed with Ehrenheirn but did not share his complacent hope, as late as 26 January, that Russia 
would not invade Finland after all. 146 The subsidy talks progressed speedily under the pressure of 
what seemed like an ever increasing threat of war and Swedish counterproposals were of form rather 
than substance. 147 Thornton; S optimistic reports failed to mention that, although he may have built 
up a good rapport with the Swedish govermnent, he had not made a good impression upon his 
surroundings. One very hostile Swedish observer claimed that Thornton had the look of a 
crimina1148, while an equally scathing British observer claimed that Thornton! s'looks and manners 
were not calculated to conciliate the hostile or confirm the friendly'. 149 Gustavus Ws gloom was 
therefore not lifted by Thornton's presence and the king treated the British envoy like a physician who 
142 KpA_ Wefterstedt to Ehrenheim, I Jan. 1808. 
143 FO 73/45. Canning to Thornton, 15 Jan. 1808. 
144 FO 73/46. Thornton to Canning, 22,25,26 Jan., 2 Feb. 1808; Anglica. 504. Wetterstedt to 
Adlerberg, 8,20 Jan. 1808. 
145 Anglica. 504. Ehrenheim to Adleftrg, 28 Jan. 1808. 
146 Harewood. 43. Thornton to Canning, 26 Jan. 1808. 
147 FO 73/46. Thornton to Canning, 4,9 Feb. 1808. 
148 Trolle. 89-90.8 Feb. 1808. 
149 Brown. 283. 
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had come to tell him that a good friend was dying. 150 Thornton and Gustavus IV may therefore have 
failed to build up a good relationship, a factor which was to have importance for the future but there 
was no doubting Thornton's abilities as a trusted and capable diplomat. 151 
Nor was there any doubt about his support for Sweden since in February Thornton urged both 
Canning and the Admiralty to send a strong squadron as early as possible into the Baltic to protect 
Sweden! s long and exposed coastline. 152 At the same time Thornton offered the Swedes 35,000 
muskets and large supplies of gunpowder. 153 Thornton had also negotiated a new subsidy agreement 
with Sweden whereby Britain provided 0,200,000 in subsidies, a strong naval squadron and, at some 
future, unspecified date, troops as well. In return Sweden pledged to fight their common foes with all 
her strength and both sides undertook not to pursue separate peace negotiations with those same foes. 
So at the eleventh hour the 'common cause' had at last been restored but it was not a minute too early 
since on 3 March came unconfirmed reports that the Russians had invaded Finland and it seemed that 
the StOrM had broken at lag. 154 
150 Brown. 284. 
151 Hinde. 379. 
152 FO 933/34. Thornton to Barrow, 9 Feb. 1808; Harewood. 43. Thornton to Canning, 23 Feb. 1808. 
153 HarewoocL 43. Thornton to Canning, 26 Feb. 1808. 
154 FO 73/46. Thornton to Canning, 11,16,19,20,23,26 Feb., 1,3 Mar. 1808. 
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Chapter Seven. 
Peninsular Priorities. 
The Anti-Climax of the Common Cause, the Futile Expedition, the Peninsular Campaign and the 
Finnish Front, February -September 1808. 
L The Finnish Front 
The Invasion and Occupation of Southern Finland, February-May 1808 
The Swedes had lived with their country being at war for well over two years by the time of the 
Russian invasion. But that war was being fought a long way off on the continent and had failed to 
affect daily life too much (Pomerama excepted). All that was about to change with frightening force 
as the Russian army was about to march into Finland. The Russian invasion army, under general 
Buxhdwden, numbered 24,000 troops and was divided into 5 divisions. Two of the Russian division 
commanders, general Barclay de Toffy and prince Bagration, were to achieve great fame some years 
]Later. On 21 February the Russians crossed the bridges over the frozen Kymmene river with orders to 
occupy southern Finland as quicidy as possible. I 
Those orders reflected the Russians's low opinion of their enemy since they were more concerned with 
occupying territory than defeating the Swedish army which they did not expect would resist their 
advance with much force. The Russian suspicion was quite accurate since Kfingspor had no intention 
to resist their advance at all which enabled them to occupy the southern and most heavily populated 
part of Finland without much opposition. This boosted Russian self confidence and undermined 
Swedish morale. General L6wenhjelm, Kfingspor's most energetic and capable officer, urged him to 
counter attack at the first opportunity or at least harass the long and exposed Russian invasion 
columns. 2 
I Homborg. 6,13-14,18,20-26,35-36,47-50; KWAH. 120-122; SSK. 16; BFK. 18-24. 
2 Homborg. 51-52,54-58,213; SSK. 16-23,62-67; KB. D. 1054. M6mer to Duke Charles, 10 
Mar. 1808; SSKB. XV. f 58,62 Adlemlark to Silverhjelm, 8 Apr. 3 May. 1808; ESKB. -VI. ff. 132- 
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Given the orders of the Russian army their main objectives were to occupy Finlands main cities as 
quickly as possible. On 26 February the Russians marched into Helsingfors which exposed Sveaborg 
to an attack and then Bagration, who spearheaded the invasion force, advanced on AW where the 
retreating Swedes set fire to all the military stores. As the troops departed the population, in anger at 
the poor performance of the army and the supposed treason of the nobility (and officer corps), rioted 
It was therefore with some relief that the city's governor received Bagration's arrival in the city on 22 
March. Abo and Aland were occupied without bloodshed which convinced the Russians that the 
conquest of Finland was almost over and Alexander I to issue a manifesto which demanded of his new 
subjects that they swear an oath of loyalty to hiM. 3 
It was not only in Finland where the Russians encountered feeble resistance. The Russians feared that 
the British might establish a naval base on Gotland from where they could threaten St. Petersburg, 
Cronstadt and the Russian Baltic coast. Admiral Nicolai Bodisco, was ordered to set sail on 19 April 
with 7 transport ships and 1,800 troops from the port of Libau. General Erik af Klint Gotland! s 
military governor, wanted to mobilise the peasant militia to resist the invaders but his plans were 
aborted after the islands nobility and bureaucrats vetoed the project. Visby, Gotland% capital city, 
therefore capitulated on 24 April and yet another part of Sweden had been conquered by her 
hereditary enemy without any resistance- I 
Unfortunately the defeatism so evident in those who governed Gotland and Finland was amply 
matched by their colleagues in Sweden proper. By 2-3 March it was known, in Stockholm, that the 
Russians had invaded Finland. Yet despite the rapid Russian advance the Swedish public was 
confident all was not lost as long as Sveaborg held out. 5 Those few officials who supported Gustavus 
IV believed Sweden would share Prussia's fate and lose the war unless the nation rallied around the 
133i' 138. Bergstedt to Engestr6M 4 Mar., 8 Apr. 1808; BMth- 62-70; Bladh. 5-7,20,28 Feb., 7,20, 
22-23 Mar. 1808.; Tillotson. 121-148.; SKA- H. 10 1- 152.; BFK. 27-3 9; DE. 401-412; Tingsten. 52-54. 
3 ALS. Albom to Alstedt, 25,29 Feb., 17 Mar. 1808; Josselson. 47,49; Tatischev. 382. Alexander I to 
Napoleon, 5/17 Apr. 1808. See Josselson. 49; ESKB. VI. ff. 126-127. Adlerbeth to Engestr6m, II 
Mar. 1808; SSK- 62-67; Persson. 95,98-104; SKA- 11.10 1-152; SKA. 11.10 1-152; SKA- ii. Bilaga 
27. Buxh6wden to Alexander 1,22 Mar. 1808. 
4 SKA_ IV. 117-123; BFY, 89-91; Ga. 185-187.; Ga. FAhreaus. 48; Homborg. 108.; SSKB. XV. f 64. 
Adlermark to SilverhjelM 6 May 1808. 
5 Porter. 150; HBATL. 211. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, I Mar. 1808,; ESKB VI f 176. Casstr6m to 
Engestr6m, 29 Feb. 1808; ibid ff. 132-133. Bergstedt to Engestr6m, 4 Mar. 1808. 
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king. (A prediction that unfortunately came true). 6 4; 7 The hope for unity was never realised and no 
little part was due to the king's failure even after the war had broken out to provide direction and 
leadership to the war effort. Gustavus IV, unlike his theatrical and oratorical father, could not rally 
the nation around him by making rousing speeches to the Diet had he called one. He was not fond of 
public speaking and feared (not without reason) that a wartime Diet could become an embarrassing 
forum for the nobility to oppose the war. 7 Others who had opposed an unwinnable war all along 
believed their predictions of disaster would come true. 8 Such defeatism seemed to be confined to the 
upper classes and Stockholm while the peasantry which constituted nine tenths of the populations 
remained patriotic. 9 Provincial Sweden complained, however, about the fall of Gotland and 
Klingspoes retreat which damned the performance of both the Swedish navy and army. It also 
dreaded the prospects of enemy invasions from the west and east, the 'crippling' war taxes that the 
government had imposed without m return showing any clear leadership or ability to mobilise the 
country's defences exemplified by the inadequacy of the home guard units. 10 
Morale in Sweden itself was therefore no better than in Finland but rumours that duke Charles was 
about to lead a revolution against his nephew were false. II To those that knew the duke it seemed 
preposterous that this decrepit and frivolous man could be thought of as capable of leading such an 
enterprise. 12 It cannot be proved if such conspiracies wdsted but what was an undeniable fact by early 
1808 was that both Gustavus IV and other Swedes pinned their hopes for Sweden's salvation far too 
much upon British ai(i 13 Ker-Porter hoped that the arrival of British troops would silence Swedish 
claims that the British did not support Sweden enough. 14 This was part of a widespread Anglophobia 
and distrust of an ally that many Swedes dismissed as a nation of shopkeepers. 15 
6 ESKB VI. ff. 164-165. Brinkman to Engestr6m, 10 Mar. 1808; Borelius. 230. Brinkman to Essen, 9 
Mar. 1808. 
7 HBATL. 211-212. Ehrenheim to Wetterstedt, 4,8 Mar. 1808. 
8 ESKB VI. f 230 Lagerbjelke to Engestr6m, 22 Mar. 1808. 
9 Porter. 183. Mar. 1808. 
10 SSYB. VI. ff. 47,53-58,62-64. Adlermark to Engestr6m, 11,18,29 Mar., 1,5,8,12 Apr., 3,5,6 
May 1808. 
11 SRO. Melville Papers. MS. 1043. H. 93. Diemar to Melville, 30 Mar. 1808. 
12 Borelius. 246. Brinkman to StAgemann, 28 Apr. 1808. 
13 Tegner. Engestr6m. 316-317. Engestr6m to Brinkman, 25 Apr. 1808. 
14 Porter. 183,213. March-April 1808. 
15 ESKB VI. ff. 305-306. Rosenhane to Engestr6m, 15 Apr. 1808. 
144 
IL Mistrust and Misunderstandings. 
Gustavus IV's War Plans, Armfelt's Invasion of Norway, the Wrangel-Wingird Missions to 
Undon, and General Moore's Plans, February-May 1808. 
For Sweden the paramount question that needed to be answered, even before British military aid 
arrived, was how the country was to meet the challenge of the invasions that she faced, The secret 
War Council set up in January 1808 had endorsed Klingspor's plans to retreat to Ostrobothnia, while 
the Swedes remained on the defensive in the south and west. 16 This general plan was as cautious and 
unenterprising as the men who proposed it and it was no surprise that Gustavus IV rejected it in 
favour of a bolder approach. Gustavus IV believed that Sweden, surrounded on three sides by enemies 
had to defeat the weakest , Norway, first by taking the offensive on her western frontier, secure in the 
knowledge that Klingspor and Cronstedt's respective forces were sufficiently strong to keep the 
Russians occupied. On 14 March Gustavus IV ordered that the Reserve and Western armies should 
be merged under the command of general Armfelt who was to invade and conquer Norway. 17 
Thomton, who shared Gustavus Ws view that the best defence was to attack urged Canning in late 
February to send both arms and troops to aid Gustavus Ws plan. On 15 March Ehrenheini, having 
only a few months earlier rejected British assistance to take Zealand, had changed his tune, urged 
Thomton to prevail on Canning to send troops as quickly as possible to take the island. (Had he 
accepted the troops in late 1807 then the enemy threat he feared so much would have been 
neutralised). Thornton chose not to remind Ehrenheim of his previous opposition to British troops 
being stationed in Scama which was now under threat. Instead he asked the Royal Navy to send 
additional warships to block the Sound against the Danes. 18 
Wetterdedt tried frantically to get Adlerberg to put mammum pressure on the British to aid her hard- 
pressed ally with all the means at her disposal. 19 On 17 March, three days after Denmark declared 
war on Sweden, Wetterstedt abandoned all constraint by writing to Adlerberg that 'Now is the time to 
16 TSLUB. D. Defensionsplanen 30 Jan. 1808; TSLUB. C. Toll to Gustavus IV, 31 Jan 1808; Tingsten. 
24-37. 
17 Syk IV. 187-188; SRE. 281; Anglica. 504. Wetterstedt to Adlerberg, 25 Mar. 1808; FO 38. 
Gordon to FO, 25 Feb. 1808.; Tegndr. 146.; Tingsten. 38-43. 
18 Harewood. 43. Thornton to Canning, 15 Mar. 1808; FO 73/47. Thornton to Canning 21,26 Apr. 
1808. 
19 Anglica 504. Wetterstedt to Adlerbcrg, 17 Mar. 1808. 
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push England without fail since Sweden has never been in a more perilous position than the present 
[and] England should [therefore] send massive aid quickly, quickly, both troops and ships, and more 
money, of course. This aid is imperative if Sweden is to survive at all'20 Wetterstedt's hysterical tone 
was in sharp contrast to his cynical cold shouldering of Britain in late 1807 and his present panic was 
in no little way caused by his earlier mistake. Wetterstedt's demands were not trifling since he wanted 
the subsidies raised from 0,200,000 to L2,800,000 while Gustavus IV wanted 10,000 British troops 
to assist his plans to invade Norway. Last but not least the Swedes also wanted a powerful British 
fleet to protect their coastline agamst invasion and conduct, in conjunction with the Swedish fleet, 
operations against the Russian navy and its Baltic installations. 21 
Britain! s immediate response, as agreed earlier, was to send 25-30,000 muskets, powder, shot and 
thousands of Swords to the Swedes by Mid-April. 22 Canning continued, however, to be cautious about 
furnishing Sweden with military aid on the scale that Gustavus IV wanted or giving premature 
promises which could raise false Swedish expectations that then turned to disappointment and 
complaints about British indifference to her ally. On 15 March Cannin instructed Thornton to be 
very circumspect about promises of any military aid since it would take a long time to work out the 
usual command problems when dealing with Gustavus IV. Canning also rejected Sweden's unrealistic 
subsidy demands which would never be accepted by either the British Parliament or public. Nor would 
they be keen to denude Britain's own defences by sending a large army to conquer either Norway or 
Zxaland-23 
As in Pomerania the year before Gustavus IV, was too impatient to wait for British support which 
could have ensured the Swedish offensive succeeded and he cajoled Armfelt in to invading Norway as 
soon as possible. Gustavus IVs haste ensured that Armfelt attacked Norway with only 6,000 troops 
without the benefit of the support of his entire army or adequate artillery. The element of surprise, 
20 Anghca 504. Wetterstedt to Adlerberg, 17 Mar 1808. 
21 Anglica 504. Ehrenheim to Adlerberg, 17,24 Mar., 11,16,19 Apr. 1808; ibid. Wetterstedt to 
Adlerberg, 3 May 1808; ibid. Lagerheim to Adlerberg, 14 Apr. 1808. 
22 Gp. Mosheim to Gordon, 17,21 Mar. 1808.; ESKB. VII. ff. 251-252. Lagerbjelke to Engestr6m, 
12 Apr. 1808. 
23 FO 73/46. Canning to Thornton, 14,15 Mar. 1808; ibid. Thornton to Canning, 15,17,21 
Mar. 1809; Harewood- 43. Canning to Thornton, I Apr. 1809. 
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however, compensated for the inadequate preparations as Armfelt defeated the startled Norwegians at 
Lier on 17 April, two days after his invasion, and the general was confident that he would capture 
Christiania in a matter of dayS. 24 In Christiania the civilian population shared Armfelt's belief and 
expected the Swedish invaders to arrive at any moment-25 The Swedes were heartened by the 
victories in the west the sight of glum Norwegian prisoners and the expected fall of Christiania. 
Perhaps losses in the east could be compensated by gains in the west but most Swedes believed the 
Norwegian offensive was a dangerous diversion from the eastem front. 26 Then in late April the 
overconfident Arnifelt suffered two serious reverses, losing 600 prisoners to the Norwegians. Arnifelt, 
furious at this unexpected setback, blamed his reverse on the withdrawal of BergenstrAffie's northern 
detachment to UmeA and on the British for failing to support his offensive. Premature Swedish 
jubilation at their initial Norwegian successes turned to bitter disappointment as Armfelt's offensive 
ground to a Ut27 
Meanwhile, the Anglo-Swedish military talks in London had not been able to resolve what role, ff 
any, the British were to play in the operations in Norway. Captain Johan af Wingfird and Armfelt's 
ADC, Colonel Henning Wrangel, arrived in London on 4 and 26 March respectively. WingArd was to 
supervise the delivery of British arms while Wrangel had come to discuss Anglo-Swedish operations 
in NorWay. 28 Wrangel, as hot-heacW as Armfelt, had meetings at the War Office in late March and 
early ApriL with generals Stewart and von Decken, where he in his optimistic and outspoken way, 
similar to his superior, tried to persuade the British to land in Norway as early as possible to support 
Armfelt's offensive. An Anglo-Swedish invasion of Norway, simultaneously, from the east and the 
south or west would ensure the country's early reduction assured Wrangel. 29 The British, with good 
reason, were not convinced by WrangeVarguments which prompted Wingfird to intervene in the I 
24 Tegndr. 146-148; SKA- IV. 189-190,196-199; Gustaf Annfelt Pr&-is de la Campagne de Norvege 
Fan 1808. (Uppsala, 18 11). 1-20; KrA- VAstra, armeen. 295. Armfelt to Gustavus IV, 16,31 Mar. 
1808; Lindeberg. 178; VAM. V. 454.; SSKB. XV. f. 47. Adlemiark to Silverhjelm, 18 Mar. 1808. 
25 Lindeberg. 178. Christiane Koren! s diary. Easter day, 19,21,22 Apr. 1808. 
26 SSKB. XV. ff. 56,58,64. Adlermark to Silverhjelm 8 Apr., 6 May 1808. 
27 Tegndr. 146-147,162-163; GP. Mosheim to Ankarstr6m, 18 Apr. 1808; Lindeberg 179.; VAM. V. 
454.; Ramel 268-269. 
28 Wingjrd. 62,98; Trulsson. 150. 
29 Anglica. 497. Wrangel's report, 29 Mar.; ibid. Wrangel to Decken, I Apr. 1808. See Trulsson- 150- 
151. 
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stalled military talks and this self-confident young officer saw Castlereagh himself on 14 April to 
convince the British to aid Sweden militarily. He claimed that Norway could (like Finland) fall 
through a combination of an Anglo-Swedish invasion and rising Norwegian discontent. Once 
Norway had been reduced, Wingfird proposed turning the victorious Anglo-Swedish army against the 
Russians by retaldng Finland- Castlereagh was not convinced by Wingird! s enthusiastic and 
oversimplified arguments and he showed the same marked reluctance as his colleagues to use British 
troops on offensive operations against Norway. Five days later Wingird and Wrangel saw Decken 
again. This time they discussed plans for an occupation of Zealand Again the British preferred to 
blockade the island and use Marstrand as a base for such limited defensive operations. Neither 
Swedish officers relished the prospect of the British controlling the entry to their country's main port 
and second city. Nor were they pleased about the passivity of the British planS. 30 Most Swedes had 
hoped that the British would intervene actively in the Russo-Swedish war and help Sweden retake 
Finland. 31 To them it was only natural that the British should aid their last ally and the best way was 
to send an army to fight against the Russians in Finland. Such plans were not part of Canning's 
cautious northern policy. The Anglo-Swedish talks, therefore, remained inconclusive and 
unsatisfactory from a Swedish standpoint. On 14 April Canning told Adlerberg, the Swedish envoy in 
London, that if a British expeditionary force was sent to Sweden it would have to be limited to coastal 
operations, remain under British command and be free to be recalled at a moment's notice. 
32 
It was an almost incredible oversight, by both sides, that the designated commander-to-be of the 
Swedish expedition, general Sir John Moore, never had any talks with either WingArd or Wrangel. If 
he had , then some of 
the later misunderstandings might have been avoided. Despite not having 
any contacts with the visiting Swedish officers Moore went ahead with his own plans. In 
late March 
and early April, Moore had predicted that an unsupported Swedish invasion of 
Norway would fail. He 
believed, however, that if he had 25,000 men operating in combination with the Swedes then the 
country would fall. An alternative plan of more limited scope was to seize 
Christiansand, fortify it 
and garrison it with 10,000 troops to convert it into a 'Northem 
Gibraltar'. Thus the British would 
30 Anglica. 497. Wingaord's reports, 15,19 Apr. 1808; MP. V. Baltic Plan of 
Operation. (Undated); 
CC. 231-236. Memorandum. Defence of Sweden. (Undated). 
31 Tegndr. Engestr6m. 316-317 Engestr6m to Brinkman, 25 Apr. 1808. 
32 Anglica. 497. Adlerberg to Gustavus IV, 15 April 1808. 
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have a secure base near the entry to the Baltic whatever happened to Sweden or Norway. 33 On 17 
April Moore, now officially made commander of the Northern! expedition had his orders which were, 
firstly, to secure Britain! s vital communications with the continent and the Baltic. Secondly, to 
provide a secure base for his troops and the British navy to use. Finally, by taking up a defensive 
position along the coast to release Swedish troops vitally needed for duties in Finland. 34 Moore had 
anticipated Castlereagh's wishes by drawing up plans to convert Marstrand into a British base. 35 
Moore finally received his instructions concerning Norway three days later and Castlereagh did not 
want to risk the British army by invading Norway. Castlereagh was even more cautious about 
Zealand. Yet if Gustavus IV could spare the troops from other fronts without jeopardising the 
Swedish war effort, then the island! s occupation could be desirable. 36 It is difficult to believe that 
Gustavus IV would have accepted a British army's presence in Sweden which was to remain out of his 
control and limited to a strictly defensive role. 
III The Fall of Fhdand's 'Gibraltar' 
The Cronstedt Conspiracy and Sveaborg's Capitulation, February-May 1808. 
Gustavus Ws plans rested upon the dangerous assumption that Finland's defences were sufficiently 
strong to withstand the Russians without reinforcements from Stockholm leaving the bulk of the army 
free to fight on other fronts. Unfortunately this assumption was proven false when, on 17 IýWch, the 
fort of Svartholm capitulated to the Russian without a regular siegc. 37 Svartholnfs capitulation raised 
Russian hopes that Sveaborg, the lynchpin of Finland! s fixed defences, would fall with similar ease. 
Both the Russians and Swedes realised. that southern Finland would never be truly conquered unless 
Sveaborg fell into Russian hands. But the fort would be difficult to subdue since it had a garrison of 
6,500 tfoops, 1,200 guns and six well fortified forts to protect it. 38 
33 W V. Memorandum respecting an attack upon Norway, 29 Mar. 1808; ibid. Memorandum 
respecting an Attack upon Christiansand, 2 Apr. 1808. 
34 Aspinall. 65. Castlereagh to George 111,17 Apr. 1808. 
35 Ne. V. Memorandum, 17 Apr. 1808. 
36 WO 1/ 189. Castlereagh to Moore, 20 Apr., 2 May 1808. 
37 SSK. 39,41-42.; Hornborg. 72-75; BFK. 64-68; BAAth. 77-80.; SKA. 11. Bilaga 66. Svartholm's 
capitulation, 17 Mar. 1808.; Welberg. 371-373.; SKKII. 366-390. 
38 ()delberg. 374-378,367-371.; BdAth 65-72.; DSH. )a. 69-7l.; SKA- fl. 219-285. 
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The Russians did not however intend to storm Sveaborg since it was considered one of the strongest 
forts in Europe. They hoped instead to undermine the garrisons morale by using their Swedish 
advisers, such as Klick and Hagelstr6m, to persuade disgruntled officers inside the fort to capitulate. 
Hagelstr6m and Klick opened correspondence with colonel Rigerhom, who despite his known anti- 
Gustavian Political opinions, had been allowed to become the deputy commander of Sweden's most 
sensitive military installation. Rigerhorn, exPlOiting admiral Carl-Olof Cronstedt's bitterness against 
Gustavus IV for his demotion to command the fortress in 1802, persuaded Cronstedt, to hand over the 
fort with its troops, supplies and installations intact to the enemy's control on 5 May. 39 
This treacherous capitulation totally undemuned the Swedish ability to counterattack and resist the 
Russians. As long as Sveaborg had remained in Swedish hands the Russians would continue to he 
vulnerable to a counteroffensive from the north while the garrison attacked the Russian positions in 
and around Helsingfors. Then, as if this was not bad enough, Cronstedt had allowed 110 gunboats to 
fall into Russian hands which strengthened their ability to threaten the Swedish east coast. The 
Swedish public was sumned by the news from Sveaborg and for once they whoffy agreed with 
Gustavus Ws denunciation of Cronstedt and his fellow officers as traitors. British confidence in 
Sweden was completely undermined by the news from Sveaborg which in British terms would have 
been equivalent to Gibraltar capitulating without a fight. 40 
unfortunately news of Sveaborg's capitulation coincided with the arrival of Moore's quartermaster 
general colonel Murraýs`in Stockholm on 13 May. Castlereagh wanted Murray to find out first hand 
what he could about conditions inside Sweden and its army. The Sveaborg affair could not have 
improved Castlereagh's misgivings about any Anglo-Swedish offensive planO I Murray did not form 
39 SSK. 43-59; Homborg. 75-86; Odelberg 378-406; 421-426.; BUth 72-74,76; BFK 69-82; SKA-11. 
Bilaga. 48. Cronstedt to Gustavus IV, 1 Mar. 1808; ibid. Bilaga 49. Protocol Sveaborg War Council, 3 
April 1808; ibid. Bilaga 5 1; Convention between Suchtelen and Cronstedt, 25 Mar/6 Apr. 1808; 
SKkII. 286-365.; Lars Ericsson, Svenska knektar. Indelta soldater, ryttare och b4tsman i krig och 
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a very favourable opinion about the Swedish military capability due to Sveaborg, Klingspor's retreat 
and the widespread defeatism among the upper echelons of the Swedish army command and 
government. He feared that the Swedes would leave the real fighting to Moore's army. To him it 
", P%e to seemed the Swedes were only waiting for the British to-%eir rescue without making efforts on their 
own behalf. Murray formed an equally unfavourable impression of Gustavus IV during an audience 
on 17 May where he insisted upon exercising real command over Moore's army and occupying 
Zealand at all Cost. 42 
IV. Spain's Savage War 
The Second of May Massacre in Madrid, the Siege of Saragossa and the Beginning of Spain's 
War of Liberation against Napoleon, May-July 1808. 
Another dangerous assumption that Gustavus lVs plans rested upon was that the British would be 
willing to support his military efforts. In early 1808 that assumption seemed valid since only Sweden 
and Sicily could provide the British with a bridgehead for operations in Europe. Unfortunately the 
news of Cronstedt's treachery coincided with that of Spain having risen against Napoleon. Both had a 
devastating effect upon the alliance and Sweden! s military survival. 43 Napoleon's Spanish trouble 
began on 2 May when the Madrileflos revolted against the presence of their French occupiers who 
retaliated with great brutality. For the moment Spain was quiet but for how long? 44 
The silence listed less than two weeks when in mid May one province after another revolted against 
the French who suffered the added humiliation of seeing one of their armies capitulate on 19 July at 
Baylen to the Spanish army. No city in Spain resisted the occupiers as violently or heroically than 
Saragoýsa (the capital 6f Aragon) which came to symbolise Spain's determined defiance of her 
45 invader as much as Sveaborg became one for Swedish submission to hers. 
42 WO 1/ 189. Murray to Castlereagh, 8,13,16,17,18 May 1808. 
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V. The ]Futile Expedition. 
Moore's Expedition to Sweden, May-July 1808. 
The Spanish were now in an open state of war with their former ally. But the British were as yet not 
Prepared to support them since they had committed the liori share of their disposable military strength 
to operations in Scandinavia. Murray's critical reports, coloured. by Sveaborg, failed to arrive before 
Moore left England on 10 May. A week later Moore arrived in Gothenburg to a less than warm 
welcome from his hard-pressed allies. Despite Adlerberg's assurances, Moore's troops were refused 
permission to land while their presence was blamed for creating supply problems and driving up 
prices. Moore was irritated with Swedish surliness, ingratitude and refusal to co-operate with his 
army. He grew increasingly disillusioned with his task, the planned operations and the ally whom he 
distrusted, foflowing Sveaborg, as much as the Swedes distrusted him and the British in general. 46 
During his enforced mactivity in Gothenburg Moore was briefed by a Hanoverian officer, Ludwig von 
Mosheim, who was head of the recruiting depot at Gothenburg, about conditions in Sweden. 
Mosheim believed that Sweden was a terminally ill. patient infected with the gangrene of defeatism 
and Francophile sympathies that had ensured the fall of Sveaborg and the failure of Armfelt's 
NorWeglan offenSVe. 47 When Murray returned to Gothenburg on 21 May he too must have given 
Moore his gloomy reports about the Swedes in general and their intransigent king. Moore now 
questioned SwedeWs military capacities and her reliability as an ally which meant that Britain would 
have to shoulder the main military burden. That burden could become quite heavy should the allies 
undertake offensive operationS. 48 Moore concluded that 'the Swedes have no right to look to 
conquests, the danger to be apprehended is that they will be overpowered and invaded, and unless 
they themselves arc enabled to make far greater efforts in their [own] defence, I doubt if a corp such 
46 Maurice 204-205; WO 1/189. Moore to Gordon, 22,23 April 1808; VIP. 3aV. Moore to StewaM I 
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Moore, 26 May 1808; D. Robertson, The Journal of Sergeant D. Robertson, late 92nd. Foot, 1797- 
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as the one I command, limited to operations on the coast, can either render them essential services, or 
for any length of time protect their fall'. 49 He dismissed Thornton's support for the occupation of 
50 Zealand as unfeasible, since he did not share the envoy's belief in Sweden's military capabilities. 
Back in London the War Office and Horse Guard! s (the Army High Command) began to share 
Moore's misgivings about the Swedish expedition. 51 At the same time they grew impatient with 
Moore's lack of progress and recalled Murray to London to account for this. Murray defended Moore 
by blaming the lack of progress since 17 May upon Gustavus Ws intransigent refusal to allow the 
British to land in Gothenburg. 52 Colonel Gordon, the Duke of Yorles ADC and the recipient of 
Mosheim's critical intelligence reports, drew up a memorandum for the cabinet on 29 May which 
, -I -A claimed that Finland was lost after the fall of Sveaborg leaving Sweden in a hopeless position. 
I"N-- 
Gordon concluded the goverment had to decide if Britain was 'either to abandon our ally in his 
greatest extremity, or to be compelled to undertake an operation beyond our means and the issue of 
which may be very doubtftd'. Having dismissed Zealand as a possible offensive target Gordon 
claimed that Spain offered better possibilities for a victorious campaign than Sweden. 53 Moore was 
therefore issued with a new set of instructions that only repeated previous British demands to be 
allowed to land and station troops around Gothenburg. 54 
Time was running out if Anglo-Swedish operations were to be completed during the short 
Scandinavian summer so Moore left Gothenburg on 12 June and arrived in Stockholm four days later. 
The day after he had a blunt meeting with the king who pulled no punches and showed clearly how 
the British pre-emptive (as he put it) demands to land had irritated him already. He asked if Moore 
would agree to partake in operations against Zealand which Moore declined. Gustavus IV then 
claimed he would undertake the operation without British aid. That was a calculated bluff since 
49 Ne. -, aV. Moore to Castlereagh, 19 May 1808. 
50 FO 933/35. Thornton to Moore 27 May 1808; ibid. Moore to Thornton, 30 May 1808. 
51 WEP, XIV. Gordon to Moore, I June 1808. 
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53 Mp VV Military memorandum upon affairs in Sweden and the expedition under Sir John Moore. 
Gordon, 29 May 1808. 
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Gustavus IV`s own general staff believed such an operation was beyond Sweden's military strength 
and therefore unfeasible without British support. On 18 June Gustavus IV suggested to Moore that he 
land in Finland, Regaining Finland was as important (if not more important) to Sweden than taking 
Zealand. He even sent his chief of staff major general TibeH (who had opposed both the Norway and 
Zealand plans) to Moore's quarters to persuade the general to land in Finland. Tibell, who was the 
Personification of the Swedish army's Francophile sentiments, proved an unsuitable messenger and 
contributed considerably to Moore rejecting Gustavus lVs suggestion for a British landing at Viborg 
in conjunction with a Swedish offensive against the Russians in Savolax. A rejection that both 
dismayed and angered the king. 55 
Until now Moore's and Gustavus IVs talks had been civil, if cold, but when they met again on 20 June 
the atmosphere was much more heated and sharp. Gustavus IV was eNlremely irritated by Moore's 
rejection of his offensive plans of military action. They had a final and stormy meeting on 23 June 
that left both men even more hostile to each other. Moore grew tired of the long drawn and 
acrimonious dispute about the merits of the Icing's different plans and projects. Moore promised to 
stay in Stockholm until he had new orders from London but then the day after changed his mind and 
he informed the Swedes that he intended to return to London. When he was told of Moore's resolve, 
Gustavus IV lost his patience and caution completely by ordering Moore to be placed under house 
affest. Thornton! s forceful endeavours to end Moore's involuntary confinement only caused a 
diplomatic rift and Murray's talks with the king on 26 June were equally counter-productive. Moore 
managed to escape and made his way to Gothenburg where he arrived on 31 June. (He sailed back to 
England with his troops on 2 July). Gustavus IV was infuriated by the escape, which to him typified 
the underhanded way Britain had treated Sweden since the Spanish rebellion begun. For once his 
opinions and views were fully shared by his ministers who distrusted British motives for insisting 
'55 Granberg. 54-55. Ehrenheim to Thornton, 18 June 1808; TSLUB. C. Wetterstedt to Toll, 17 June 
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upon landing at Gothenburg. In London, Canning's spontaneous reaction had been to retaliate against 
Sweden with all possible force, short of war, but George III's suspicion that Moore was to blame for 
the expedition's failure as much as Gustavus IV was soon confirmed. Canning's temper cooled but the 
Anglo-Swedish alliance had been given a fatal blow firom which it was never to recover. In fact from 
now on the life and soul of the 'common cause' was gone, to be replaced by a less than warm formality 
of a MUtUal ConMitMent. 56 
VIEL Peninsular Priorities: Sweden or Spain? 
Britain's Strategic Chokes in a World War, Intervention in Iberia and Lost Opportunities in 
Scandinavia, April August 1808. 
Gustams IV believed, as did many other Swedes and even George III, that Moore had deliberately 
provoked a rift in Anglo-Swedish relations in order ftt he could use his army in Spain. 57 (Indeed 
Moore was urged by his friends in London in late May to return home and try to get command of the 
expeditionary force being prepared to be sent to Spain58). Ehrenheim believed Britain had 
'abandoned Sweden because it had not proven itself to be as lucrative a base for smuggling 
contraband to the continent as they had imagined. But the main reason for Britain's 'desertion' of her 
Swedish ally was their growing preoccupation with Spain. 'In Spain there are fleets to win, trade to 
revive, colonies to raise and a mass of power to direct against points far more sensitive to Bonaparte 
than Russia and Denmark, noted Ehrenheim sourly on 7 July. 59 
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Ehrenheim had put British reasoning and ambitions in Spain, which mirrored Napoleon's grandiose 
schemes, in a nutshell. Yet that was only apparent by July and not earlier. The British had kept a 
close eye, through their Gibraltar post, on Spain since December 1807. As Napoleon's legions 
marched into Spain Britain's only main concern was to defend the straits of Gibraltar against the 
French. If the French managed to reach the Straits, or worse, cross over to Morocco, then they could 
begin to cut British communications with the Mediterranean. Had Napoleon aimed his armies against 
the Gibraltar straits, instead Of being diverted into Portugal, and if Bernadotte had been given the 
right support to shut the entry to the Baltic, then the British would have been facing a very real 
prospect of being shut out of the Baltic and Mediterranean simultaneously. It would have taken great 
effort to conquer Gibraltar but if it fell into French hands ( supplemented with a French occupation of 
Ceuta and Tangier) then Napoleon would have been able, slowly and painstakingly, to build up 
gunboat, privateering and regular flotillas of ships to make the passage through the straits as difficult 
as possible. Had he managed to make it increasingly difficult then British exports to Europe via the 
Austrian and Ottoman empires would have been severely crippled. But Napoleon was more interested 
in flashy and easy conquests than the meticulous and painstaking process of crippling Britain's war 
economy and strategic position. A crisis on such a scale might have forced Britain to negotiate on 
Napoleon's terms. The British had the same limited, but vital strategic concerns in the Baltic. 
Sweden's fate was less important to her ally than keeping the Belts and the Sound open. Hence their 
support for Sweden and eventually Spain for the same reasons. In early 1808 (before Spain was in 
open state of war with France) the British planned to occupy Tetuan, Tangier, Ceuta and the 
Balearics. It was only after the Madrid massacre and the provinces' state of war with Napoleon that 
the British realised how their enemy's fatal mistakes had given them a fine opportunity to revive the 
war on the continent. M%en delegates arrived from Asturias and Galicia in June-July they were feted 
as heroes,. while the British gave themselves up to euphoric support for the Spanish cause. For once, 
and only for a brief moment, His Majesty's Government and'loyal' opposition were united in one 
cause: aiding Spain. Adlerberg noted with astonishment how the British handed out huge sums to the 
Spanish, which contrasted to their usual subsidiary prudence. By the end of the summer of 1808 the 
British had given the Spanish over 0,000,000 in silver. Britain paid since they knew that the 
Spanish would use it to fight the French with all possible force and Canning had made a thunderous 
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speech in the Commons that made it clear that any nation, even former enemies, were Britain's 
60 automatic allies the moment they made war on Napoleon. 
But money was only one way to aid Spain. The British had to find troops quickly if they were to 
strike at Napoleon while the Spanish iron was hot. The most obvious and available action was to 
recall Moore, which had been done on 5 jUly. 61 But it would still take weeks for Moore's army to be 
available for service in Spain and in the meantime, therefore, other troops had to be found. In early 
1808, as they lacked a bridgehead in Europe (besides Sweden) the British had planned to send general 
Sir Arthur WeHesley with 9,000 men against South America. The Portland administration was saved 
from emulating their predecessor's folly by the outbreak of the war in Spain. But the Spanish were as 
unenthusiastic as the Swedes were about a British anny on their soil. In Spanish eyes the British were 
as dangerous as the French and who was to say they would not arrive, as the French had, as allies but 
end up as enemies? With suspicious enthusiasm and speed, the Spanish delegates suggested that 
Wellesley land in Portugal instead of Spain. Fortunately for the British the Bishop of Oporto had 
declared 'his' region in rebellion against the French which ensured that Wellesley could land at 
Mondego Bay on 8 August in relative safety. He set out southwards to Lisbon with 18,000 Anglo- 
Portuguese troops. Wellesley's French counterpart, Junot, had thought the better of trying to control 
Portugal and concentrated his 25,000 men in Lisbon. One of Junot's deputies was defeated on 17 
August at Rolica, which enabled a reinforced Wellesley to defeat Junot at Vimeiro on 21 August. 
There seemed to be nothing to stop Wellesley from throwing the French out of Portugal and invading 
Spain too. Back in London, the British hoped that Italy (if the Pope could be saved from French 
imprisonment) would follow the Portuguese and Spanish example. Canning, showing clearly how the 
Spanish situation had got the better of his judgement, hoped even Napoleon's Danish and Russian 
allies would follow Suit. 
62 
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There was however yet another and more unusual way for Britain to assist her Spanish ally and that 
9 
was to provide Spain with much needed regular Spanish troops from northern Europe. These 15,000 
Spanish troops, under general Don Pedro Caro y Sureda, Marquis de la Romana's command, had been 
handed over by Godoy (Romana's patron) as hostages for Spain's continued loyalty to Napoleon and a 
way of weakening SpaiWs resistance should Napoleon need to occupy Spain. But in this increasingly 
complex war and web of intrigues Napoleon used Romana's army to spearhead his invasion of Sweden 
by stationing them in Denmark with Bernadotte's polyglot force. Thus a potential enemy was used as 
c, ck%wvi fodder to subdue an existing one. Unlike his troops who showed their dislike of the French 
quite openly, Romana was only biding his time since some news, despite the best French efforts to 
keep the Spanish isolated, had filtered into Denmark about the outbreak of the Spanish rebellion. 
Romana hoped to contact the British so that his army could be rescued but his French 'allies' kept a 
close eye on his troops. 63 
The British shared Romana's wishes for contact in order to send his vitally needed troops back to 
Spain and thus boost the rebellion with reinforcements from the most unlikely quarter. In April 
Canning had showed great interest in evacuating Romana's army from Denmark. 64, and this was 
repeated in late June by Castlereagh_65 But how were the British to establish contact with Romana 
without arousing French suspicion which could lead to their capture and imprisonment in France? In 
May Wellesley introduced Castlereagh to a Father Robertson, who undertook, disguised as a 
merchant, the perilous journey through Denmark to Romana's headquarters in Funen. He was given a 
cold and suspicious reception from Romana but he managed to convince him that he was a Catholic 
priest in the service of the British. Once he had broken down the wall of suspicion Robertson told the 
delightod Spaniards that the British were doing everything possible to rescue them. 66 In June the 
British knew that Romana was aware of their efforts and that they hoped to use, a month later, the 
Asturian delegates to accompany the rescuing flotilla to establish contact with Romana's troops many 
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of whom were from this same region of Spain. To organise the rescue, in stage two, Canning sent a 
special agent, captain MacMahon, to Scania to organise the actual embarkation of the Spanish. 67 
Once Romana had established contact with Parker's squadron in the Great Belt he ordered his troops 
to Langeland where he managed to concentrate 10,000 troops by 13 August. Despite admiral 
Saumarez's appeals to the Swedes to aid in the rescue, they proved quite uncooperative. Nevertheless 
Parker managed to rescue Romana's forces, but 4,000 were unfortunately captured by the French in 
Jutland and on Zealand. Parker realised that if Romana's troops were to be fit to travel all the way to 
Spain and then begin an arduous campaign against the French, then they had to have a rest, or least 
somewhere on shore where the wounded and ill could be cared for. Naturally the British assumed that 
Sweden, as an ally of Britain and now Spain, would provide that sanctuary for Romana's men. As 
usual Gustavus IV was a loyal ally who approved of landing the Spanish troops in Scania but Parker, 
for ease of passage back to northern Spain, wanted to land the Spaniards in Gothenburg. Gustavus IV 
was not so keen on that idea but his officials in Gothenburg took that as a signal to deny the British 
permission to land the Spanish in large numbers. Only 700 of the most sick Spanish troops were 
allowed to land and then, as if they were plague carriers, only under strict quarantine. Neither Parker 
nor Saumarez appreciated the limited and begrudging assistance Sweden was willing to eNfend to 
their brave allies (who could aid their common cause in Spain) and this cannot have served (after the 
Moore affair) to reconcile the two estranged allies. The Swedes on their part resented Britain's 
favouritism towards Spain and Saumarez's pre-occupation with Romana's rescue when it meant that 
the allies had lost the chance of inflicting a potentially crippling defeat on the Russian Baltic fleet. 68 
The rescue of Romana's Spanish troops clearly showed how the Napoleonic War by 1807-1808 had 
become a true world war where each front, however widely separated, was inter-connected and inter- 
dependent. it also showed the breadth and width of Britain's remarkably flexible naval power and 
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how it could be used to good effectagainst her land bound enemy. The tragedy for Sweden was that 
Britain's growing pre-occupation with Spain coincided with her own remarkable recovery on the 
Finnish front. As in Spain it was a combination of the regular army's counter offensives and the 
spontaneous action of anned, peasant partisans which accounted for a series of solid successes. The 
regular army led the recovery when Klingspor finally stopped his retreat northwards and found how 
overextended the Russians were because of their rapid advance. Klingspor's more energetic deputies, 
generals Adlcrcreutz and L6wenhjelm., led the Swedish counter-offensive leading to limited but 
morale-boosting victories over the Russians at PyUjoki, Siikajoki and Revolax. Unfortunately 
L6wenhjelm was captured and his leadership and drive was to be sorely missed during the following 
months. 69 
But the most spectacular Swedish counteroffensive was made in eastern Finland under general Sandel 
and captain Wilhelm Malm's command. Sandel was a veteran of the 1788-1790 war against Russia 
and he had seen the potential the Savolax bulge had as a bridgehead for an attack on Russia before the 
invasion. Having made proper reconnaissance along the intended main route he let Malm with 800 
regulars and peasant partisans begin the advance on 2 May. Savolax was lightly garrisoned by the 
Russians and Malm's mixed force took Kuopio, Savolaxs 'capital', on 12 May. A week later Sanders 
main force (1,500) marched in. Since the Russians thought they were being attacked by a large 
Swedish army, their troops fled across the border into Russian Finland. Rumours spread that the 
Swedes were about to take Viborg and threaten St. Petersburg itself. It was only by reinforcing 
Barclay de Tolly's 6th Division to 8,000 troops that Sandel's 5th brigade (1,500) was brought to a 
standstill. Sandel decided instead to divert Malm's force into Swedish Carelia where his small force 
forced 2,000 Russians -under general Alexeyev's command back across the Russian border. It was not 
until a year later that this wild and sparsely populated province was finally occupied by the 
Russians. 70 
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But it was not only in Finland that Sweden had retaken the initiative. On 28 April Gustavus IV 
ordered colonel Fleetwood, supported by admiral Cederstr6m's small squadron, to retake Gotland. 
Some 2,000 troops in 7 warships set sail ftom Carlscrona on II May and disembarked at Slite on 14 
May. Bodisco, thoroughly demoralised, capitulated on 16 May and his army, allowed to return home 
71 on parole, reached Libau three days later. 
Across the Baltic in the Aland archipelago the Russians were, almost simultaneously, thrown out. 
The 13,000 independent minded islanders had not taken kindly to the Russian oath of allegiance nor 
Trod's 'orders' for them to collaborate with the Russians like he had. Instead on 8 May they took up 
arms, captured the 700 strong garrison and arrested all collaborators. By 15 May they had retaken the 
entire archipelago and a small Swedish garrison was sent over to retake control. The collaborators 
(like the Gotland ones) were treated leniently and were spared Spanish revolutionary justice. 72 
On the Finnish mainland, in the staunchly anti-Russian province of Ostrobothnia, trouble had been 
simmering for similar reasons since late April. Here the peasant uprising was triggered by a landing 
at Wasa by the Swedish army. Hundreds of anned peasants attacked Russian transports, lines of 
communications, guard-posts and smaller garrisons. Nfixed forces of regulars and peasant partisans 
were operating by June-July as far south as Tammerfors, under the guerrilla commanders Feiandt, 
Spoof and Rooth. Like the French in Spain, the Russians reacted with a mixture of terror, impotent 
fury and bloodlust. Entire villages were burnt to the ground, suspected partisans shot where they 
stood and to top it all when Wasa rose against the Russian, general Demidov the commander of the 
surrounding Russian army aHowed his troops to sack the town. Had Demidov been a French officer 
fightirflg in Spain he would not have been reprimanded but the Russians were shocked and humiliated 
at his barbarous conduct. He was demoted and never given an independent command again. 73 
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The Swedish high command was completely divided about the opportunities these successes offered 
them. Tibell who had opposed the king's strategic plans of offensives in the west urged Gustavus IV 
on 19 May to send 15,000 men, released by the cancellation of the Norwegian offensive to the Finnish 
front. As Buxh6wden's 34,000 troops were stretched to the limit by occupation duty in the south and 
watching the coast there a possibility of defeating them Gustavus IV felt such reinforcements would 
be unnecessary, as he pinned his inflated hopes on a general uprising in Finland 'd la Espagne' which 
could be supported by limited landings on the coast. The first of such landings took place at Wasa on 
24-25 June when colonel Bergenstrilhe landed near the city. It failed to cause a national insurrection 
in Finland and ftu-ther landings failed as well. To Tibell and other critics of Gustavus IVs'penny- 
packet' strategy, this vindicated their criticism. But was that criticism justified? The king should 
probably have sent a large contingent of troops to support Sandel's Savolax offensive, which 
threatened the Russians communications with St. Petersburg, as Tibefl suggested. But it was wrong to 
ignore the Finnish guerrilla forces. Malm, Sandel and D6beln had all used peasant partisans in 
combination with regular troops to good effect against the Russians. In Spain the combination proved 
lethal but there, as in Sweden, it was the often lacklustre perfonnance of the regular army that let the 
side down. Klingspor's failure to advance quickly enough against Wasa ensured the failure of 
BergenstrMhe's landings. Yet another opportunity to inflict a major defeat had been lost as by late 
August the Russians had 50,000 in Finland - enough to ensure a victory over Klingspor's army. The 
Swedes lacked one final ingredient for an Iberian-style success: a British army at their side. The 
Swedes believed that Moore's presence could have turned the Finnish war in their favour. They might 
have been right. The British had squandered their initial triumph in Iberia by agreeing to transport 
Junot's 25,000 intact back to France by the convention of Cintra on 23 August. The British had their 
own Cionstedt's and Khngspor's in the shape of Messrs general Burrard and Dalrymple who preferred 
to parley with the enemy instead of pursuing him. The British public and government were all 
infuriated by Cintra. Wellesley was lucky not to be cashiered for his part in the treaty. 74 
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VM. The Shield of Sweden. 
Admiral Saumarez's First Baltic Expedition, May-October 1808. 
The farcical outcome of the Moore expedition which did such damage to both allies reputations and 
interests overshadowed the Royal Navy's successful work in the Baltic. In fact the British Baltic fleet 
would remain from now on the one tangible support (besides subsidies) that remained to Sweden. It 
had rendered and would continue to render invaluable support to Sweden from 1808 onwards. In late 
February the Admiralty appointed admiral Sir James de Saumarez, a distinguished naval officer of 
great integrity, intellect and ability to the Baltic command taking the 'Victory' and 12 other ships of 
the line into his squadron. It was an excellent choice since Saumarez was not only a first rate naval 
commander but a sldfled diplomat as well. He would be in need of both during 1808 and the 
subsequent expeditions he headed in the Baltic. In XWch admiral Parker had already prevented the 
Franco-Danish army from crossing the Sound and accomplished one of the tasks the Admiralty had 
set up for Saumarez. When he arrived with Moore's forces in mid-May the British admiral reached a 
binding agreement with his Swedish counterpart, admiral Rajalin, which divided the Baltic into two 
parts. The British concentrated on the western part leaving the east, or the naval war with Russia, 
solely to the Swedes. Saumarez was more interested in seizing Bornholm to be used as a British naval 
base in the Baltic than getting entangled in the Russo-Swedish naval war. After all the British 
government did not really want to start a real war with its former ally Russia. Britain's war, unlike 
Sweden's, was with Napoleon and his Danish underlings. But Saumarez did send his 'Nelsonian! 
subordinate, admiral Hood, with two ships of the line to keep an eye on the Russians and assist the 
Swedish navy. He kept weH out of the Moore crisis by assuring the Swedes, whatever happened, that 
he would continue to keep watch on their coastline. 75 
The re9cue of RomanYs expeditionary force from the beaches of Langeland delayed Saumarez's 
sailing into the eastern Baltic until late August. In the meantime Hood had in good Nelsonian fashion 
sunk a Russian ship of the line while he chased the Russian Baltic fleet into Baltischport. When, on 
31 August, Saumarez turned up at the blockaded port he found it well defended and the Russian fleet 
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well ensconced behind numerous coastal batteries. Worse still was the deplorable state of the Swedish 
fleet. Since Sveaborg Gustavus IV had a justified suspicion of his higher naval officers, which 
included the defeatist commander of the Swedish blockading squadron, admiral Rajalin. The fleet 
itself was suffering from scurvy, which spread from ship to ship. Saumarez decided therefore that a 
frontal assault was out of the question and to attack with fire ships too time-consuming, when the 
campaigning season was nearing its end, and too uncertain. Thornton who had become persona non 
grata with Gustavus IV because of his involvement in the Moore crisis, joined Saumarez at 
Baltischport and convinced the admiral that they might try some unofficial diplomacy based on 
Canning's hopes that the Russians might follow the Iberian example. Their overtures to Alexander I 
and admiral Chichagov, the Russian naval minister, had no effect however. To the chagrin of the 
Swedes, who had hoped to put a check to Russia's advances in Finland by destroying the enemy's fleet 
with the help of the British, they saw Saumarez abandon the Baltischport blockade and return home 
in late November vowing to return in the spring to destroy the Russian fleet. To the Swedes this was 
yet another blow to their chances of survival. 76 
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Chapter Eight. 
Endgame. 
The Decline and Fall of the Common Cause, October 1808-March 1809. 
1. Friends Fall Out. 
The Final Anglo-Swedish Crisis, October 1808 - March 1809 
In October 1808 it was imperative for Sweden to rebuild relations with Britain if her financial 
problems were not to overwhelm her. Gustavus IV chose the capable Gustav von Brinkman for this 
task. In late September when Brinkman accepted this demanding post he believed that nothing could 
save Sweden from disaster but he accepted his unenviable task out of loyalty to the king. Gustavus IV 
had few such diplomats and Brinkman earnestly sought to rebuild the 'Common Cause' with Britain. 
He was therefore given a warm welcome from Canning when he arrived in London on 21 October 
since the British shared Brinkman's wish to rebuild the alliance. 1 
Assurances of renewed friendship could not heal the deep rifts revealed by the Moore crisis or resolve 
further causes of rift between the allies. One issue which the Swedes had taken great offence to and 
which could cause serious problems allied relations was the agreement that the British had struck with 
the Russians concerning the fate of the Russian Mediterranean fleet. At Tilsit this fleet, commanded 
by admiral Siniavin, had been deprived of its base on Corfu and Siniavin decided in September 1807 
to sail for what he supposed was a safe sanctuary in the Tagus. But this fleet was engulfed by the 
French invasion of Portugal and for a year the Russians remained on their ships to observe the 
Peninsular campaign unfolding. Finally in September 1808 admiral Cotton, commander of the 
British Tagus squadron, made a deal with Siniavin which left his ships in British ports for the 
duration of the war. So far the agreement was no cause of concern for the Swedes, but Cotton 
had 
also agreed to release Siniavin's sailors and this left them free to return to Russian service which 
including fighting in the Baltic fleet against Sweden. Siniavin's experienced sailors could prove a 
valuable addition of strength to Baltic fleet to the detriment of 
Sweden. Cottob had ignored that 
Russia was not only Britain's enemy but that of her ally, Sweden, too and this 
kind of nonchalance 
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(reminiscent of the Cintra agreement that infuriated Britain's Iberian allies) only served to arouse 
Swedish fears about an Anglo-Russian peace at her expense. Again an event in Iberia had a direct 
effect on Sweden's war with Russia and showed yet again the scope of the war. Canning who realised 
both the political and miliviry consequences of the Tagus treaty denounced Cotton's shortsighted 
measure and assured Brinkman that the British would delay the Russian sailors return home as long 
as poSsible. 2 
Sweden's unfounded fears about her aRy betraying her to her enemies were heightened yet further by - 
the appeals for peace that Napoleon made to Britain during the Erfurt congress ( 27 September-14 
October). On 12 October Napoleon offered Britain peace if Russia could retain Finland and Napoleon 
Spain. NapoleoWs terms were of course completely unacceptable to Canning, who assured Brinkman 
that unless Spain's full restoration to independence and Sweden's security was assured the British 
would not entertain any similar peace overtures from the continental coalition. Canning's assurances 
must have sounded hollow in Brinkman! s ears since he failed to mention Finland! s restoration as a 
precondition for peace talks with enemy. At the same time rumours, that later turned out to be untrue, 
came out of Erfurt that claimed that Russia and France had agreed to divide Sweden between 
themselves. To those unacquainted to the Byzantine workings of the Tilsit alliance, these rumours 
and proposals seemed to indicate Franco-Russian harmony and a continuation of the deal made a year 
earlier on the Niemen. In fact the situation was quite different and from Napoleon's perspective, since 
he had been in control at Tilsit, most unsafisfactory since with Spain still defiantly resisfing in the 
south, he had to ask Alexander I to keep Austria in check while he dealt with the Spanish once and 
for all. Russia's new found bargaining position, which led Alexander I to regain some of his former 
self colifidence and independence, also led to the first, fine hairline cracks in the Tilsit alliance that 
would eventually destroy the entire alliance. 
2 SYk VII. 440; Grade. 276-279.; Harewood. 38. Canning to Bathurst, 16 Sept. 1808.; Anglica 508. 
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Swedish fears about Britain making a deal with their common enemies at her expense mirrored those 
that Canning had about Sweden. Brinkman quite wisely kept quiet about the annistice with Russia at 
LohteA in northern Finland that Ehrenheim hoped, following the peace overtures to Britain at Erfurt, 
would lead to a Russo-Swedish peace. Canning shared Ehrenheim's hopes so long as such a peace did 
not jeopardise Britain's vital trade conduit via Sweden to the continent or closed Sweden's ports to her 
shipping and Baltic fleet. Mutual fears remained groundless as long as Gustavus IV and Canning 
were left in charge of the foreign policy rudders of Sweden and Britain respectively since they had no 
intention to parley with the enemy. On the surface the steady course towards continued war seemed to 
be assured since both the Swedish or British opposition groups were far from retaldng power in either 
country. 4 
Gustavus IV had ambitions to launch a major spring offensive against the Russians but this required 
that the southern and western Eronts remained quiet. He therefore sent colonel Borgens&rna to 
Elsinore where on 20 October he met with king Frederick VI. Gustavus IV offered his cousin two 
alternatives. A long-term armistice to their mutual benefit or generous peace terms whereby Britain 
returned Denmark's colonies and fleet. Denmark would thus have the benefit of peace and a return to 
commercial prosperity as before the war. This time Canning had nothing against such a separate 
peace since he hoped to end Britain's conflict with Demmark too. But when he was told of the 
Swedish terms Canning proved less than co-operative in handing back the Danish fleet without a 
peace treaty. The prospects for peace with Denmark seemed good since the war was as unpopular 
there as in Sweden. Frederick VI did not however share his subjects' dislike of their Franco-Russian 
allies. He had been given a tempting Russian proposal to invade and annex southern Sweden. By 
December 1808 the Swedes realised the Danes had only been playing for time since they had revived 
their plans to invade Scania by crossing the ice covered Sound while the Norwegians and Russians 
distracted the Swedes finiher north. By late January 25,000 Danish troops, 6,000 horses and 80 guns 
4 Anglica. 508. Brinkman to Gustavus IV, 1,4,8 Nov., 2 Dec. 1808.; Anglica. 512. Wetterstedt to 
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had been assembled on Zealand for the invasion but they were not ready to cross until 20 February 
1809 by which time the thaw had melted the ice bridge across the Sound. 5 
The Norwegians who planned to occupy Carlstad and Gothenburg in support of the Danish invasion 
fared no better. Prince Christian, the Norwegian Generalissimo, made it painfully clear to Frederick 
VI on 13 January that his army was too weak to invade Sweden. He had therefore agreed a month 
earlier to sign an armistice with general Cederstr6m the commander of the Swedish Western army. 
The Swedes hoped that it would be eýdended indefinitely thus ensuring that Norway stayed neutral in 
the war against Denmark. It might also help Gustavus IV to achieve his Norwegian dream by 
peaceful means - The Swedes therefore kept the Norwegian talks secret to encourage a split between 
11U, 
., enmark and Norway. To a certain exlent those plans succeeded since Frederick VI begun to distrust 
his royal cousin and suspected him of harbouring political ambitions that were detrimental to the 
unity of the double monarchy of Denmark-Norway. 6 
Gustavus Ws peace endeavours had failed but at least the agreement with prince Christian ensured 
that the western front remained quiet while he turned his military attentions eastwards. He was, 
however, to suffer his greatest diplomatic defeat (not at the hands of his enemies) but at the hands of 
his ally. It was a self-inflicted defeat triggered by Sweden's desperate financial situation. Aside from 
their mutual political differences and suspicions the main area of conflict centred upon trade and 
subsidies. Canning, who had hoped to deflect the opposition's attacks upon his subsidy generosity to a 
faltering ally, had grown very irritated with continued Swedish delays. Canning believed that the 
Swedish delay was due to Gustavus Ws wish to prevent Thornton from gaining any credit for its 
signing. The real reasons in fact for the delay was that Sweden wanted to get Britain to grant trade 
5 Grade. 281-294.; Anglica. 512. Ehrenheim to Brinkman, 29 Oct. 1808; Anglica. 508. Brinkman to 
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concessions such as full and unfettered access to Britain's colonial markets, as well as a lower tariff on 
Swedish exports. It was a source of much Swedish resentment that Britain's enemy, Norway, had 
lower tariffs on her timber exports than Sweden. Finally, and to Canning's intense irritation, they 
wanted to link the commercial talks with the subsidy negotiations. That was an unwise decision since 
the British were adamantly opposed to uniting commercial and subsidy negotiations, and Canning 
resented such obvious means of pressurising him into giving into Swedish subsidy demands. 
Brinkman had realised from Adlerberg that he had to adopt a cautious approach to the subsidy 
question. His slow approach to negotiations with Canning did not meet with the approval of his 
superior in Stockholm. Lagerheim, who opposed the war and used financial arguments to support an 
end to it, claimed that Sweden was facing bankmptcy and economic min. 7 
The obvious solution to SwedeWs financial situation would have been to raise taxes and increase 
domestic borrowing. None of these sensible measures were taken since Lagerheim opposed them and 
blamed Sweden's war with Russia on Britain. In Lagerheim's opinion, that obliged Britain to pay for 
the Swedish war effort with increased subsidies. As the ministers had tried in 1805 to prevent the 
alliance by demanding excessive subsidies, they now tried, three years later, to end it with the same 
method. Ehrenheim, taken in by Lagerheim's pessimistic prognosis, savaged Brinkman's 'failure'in 
late November to bring up the subsidy question during his first conferences with Canning. In a most 
perfunctory manner Brinkman was to bring Sweden's desperate need for increased subsidies to 
Canning's attention. Shmed by this unusually sharp rebuke, Brinkman pointed out to Ehrenheim 
that Canning had refused to increase the subsidies since neither the British public or Parliament 
would support doubling Sweden's subsidies (to L2.4 million per annum). Sweden's subsidies 
remainEd a delicate qutstion made more tense since the Moore fiasco. No British minister, even one 
so powerful and influential as Canning, would dare to go against his cabinet colleagues or public 
opinion on such an important matter. The British treated such subsidies as mere matters of 
commercial and financial calculation. When he saw Canning on 13 December, Brinkman had his 
7 FO 73/50. Canning to MerrY, 19,20 Dec. 1808.; Anglica. 508. Brinkman to Gustavus IV, 25 Oct., 
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sensible suspicions fully confirmed. Canning made it clear that Sweden's excessive subsidy demands 
would call for a totally new treaty and new negotiations. When Brinkman asked Canning to increase 
the subsidies based on political consideration for a loyal ally rather than economic ones, Canning 
made it clear that he was already criticised for excessive financial generosity to Sweden by his cabinet 
colleagues, especially the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Increased subsidies to Sweden when she and 
Spain were faltering in the war against France would only add to the opposition's attacks against the 
government. 8 
Since Brinkman's talks with Canning had proven inconclusive, Gustavus IV hoped that he could 
persuade Canning to give in to his demands for increased subsidies through talks with the new British 
envoy, Anthony Merry. That diplomat had only with the greatest reluctance agreed to take up the 
arduous post in Stockholm because Merry believed that his weak 
nerves would collapse when he confronted the violent temper of Gustavus IV. (His suspicions proved 
to be amply justified). 9 Canning, who brushed aside Merry's warnings, should have heeded them but 
there was no one else available at such short notice to take up the post. Canning gave Merry a set of 
instructions which would be enormously difficult to achieve for Meffy given his nervous disposition 
and Gustavus IVs previous demands. Merry was only to sign a subsidy convention at the 1808 level 
or L1,200,000 a year to be paid out, as far as possible, in paper pounds and bills of exchange because 
of the drain of specie to Spain. Both of Canning's terms ran completely contrary to Gustavus IV 
wishes for over L2,000,000 in silver. As if this was not enough fuel for a violent confrontation, 
Canning also insisted upon the signing of the commercial convention which Gustavus IV would delay 
until Canning had given in to his subsidy demands. Finally Canning wanted Merry to promote peace 
between Sweden and her neighbours without sacrificing Anglo-Swedish interests too much and not 
arousing Gustavus IVS suspicions that Britain intended to abandon her northern ally. 10 
In other words Canning wanted a man, who doubted his own abilities and suitability for this 
diplomatic mission, to perform the Herculean feat of removing all the previous problems that had 
8 Anglica. 512. Ehrenheim to Brinkman, 21,22 Nov. 1808. 
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troubled the 'common cause' for months. Merry's worst fears about violent confrontations with 
Gustavus IV were confirmed immediately upon arrival in Stockholm (29 November) since Ehrenheim 
immediately asked him if the new subsidies could be paid with a larger share of specie. Merry made 
it qtute clear that the drain of specie to Spain made this impossible but he did not state this in stronger 
terms since he had no wish to provoke a showdown. IIA showdown, however, was inevitable since 
Gustavus IV was determined to considerably increase the British subsidies with every means at his 
disposal. On 6 December, a week after his arrival in Stockholm, Merry met Gustavus IV who voiced 
his angry disappointment that Merry Only had Powers from Canning to negotiate a new subsidy treaty 
at the old level. The British subsidy level paid out in February was totally inadequate then and even 
more so after ten months of war. Gustavus IV voiced his frustration at the futile attempts his 
diplomats had made for several months to raise the subsidy level to a more realistic level of 
L2,000,000 that would help Sweden overcome her financial problems. Britain placed no value upon 
her Swedish alliance, argued Gustavus W with some truth, since she would not raise her subsidies to 
this level when she poured endless millions of pounds into the Spanish war and the king had grown 
tired of British indifference and neglect Unless Merry paid out L300,000 as an immediate advance of 
the minimum that Sweden needed or fl, 700,000 Gustavus IV would shut his ports to British shipping 
and put an embargo on all British shipping. This extreme action was the consequence of Sweden's 
desperate situation, argued Gustavus IV, and Britain! s failure to come to her ally's rescue in her hour 
of desperate need- Merry gave in to Gustavus IV ultimatum since the goods in Swedish ports alone 
were worth more than the demanded instalment. 
12 
When Canning received Merry's reports on 23 December, his reaction was as uncompromising as 
it 
had been when Gustavus IV had practised similar blackmail upon Moore. The 
British government 
did not accept foreign powers, least of all allied ones, blackmailing 
its diplomats. If Canning gave in 
to Gustavus IVs blackmail then other powers could emulate his tactics to the 
'ruination' of Britain's 
state finances. Merry would be recalled unless the 
Swedes agreed to sign the new subsidy agreement 
based on British terms. Canning, infuriated at Gustavus 
IVs clumsy extortion attempt, was in no 
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mood for compromises but he told Brinkman that Merry's notes would be honoured by the Treasury 
and that he would not do anything precipitous. 13 
The threat of a Swedish embargo had its most immediate impact upon admiral Keats's squadron 
which had remained on the Swedish west coast during the winter. His and admiral Bertie's squadron 
had played a sterling role in saving Sweden from invasion by the Danes, Keats believed Merry had 
been too slow to warn him, but once Keats's got Merry's warning he acted immediately upon it. He 
told his commanders to be on the alert without arousing Swedish suspicion or provoking them into 
attacking British warships or seizing British merchant shipping or goods in their ports. He withdrew 
his squadron to Marstrand from Gothenburg's congested port and he declined an invitation to meet 
Gustavus IV in Stockholm. But neither side could afford to see a total breakdown in British naval 
protection for the Swedish coast or Swedish co-operation in providing supplies and safe anchorage for 
the British squadrons. Gustavus IV assured Keats, when his invitation was declined, that British 
warships would be given unfettered access to Swedish ports whatever the political situation while 
Keats, on his part, assured Gustavus IV of his fleets continued protection of Sweden's coasts. 14 
in early January when he saw Brinkman again Canning seemed more sad than angered by the Anglo - 
Swedish crisis. He admitted that if Sweden closed her ports to British ships, trade and goods, then 
this would be a serious blow to Britain's economic interests. But could Sweden really make peace 
with her enemies as easily as Gustavus IV seemed to believe? If Sweden and Britain had to part 
company, then it was preferable they did so as friends rather than enemies. Canning rejected the 
argument that Sweden! s sacrifices were due to the British alliance as he had advised Gustavus IV, on 
severar occasions, to nuke peace with his enemies if Sweden's interests required it. Britain did not 
oppose Sweden making peace if she could and Britain had every interest in preserving unbroken 
amity with Sweden even after such a peace. Brinkman tried his best to defend Gustavus JVs actions 
13 FO 73/50. Merry to Canning 6,9 Dec. 1808; Granberg. 154-158. Ehrenheim to Merry, 7 Dec. 
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but Canning rejected his argument that Sweden's actions were justified by British negligence. 
Brinkman re-iterated the Swedish argument that British indifference had forced Gustavus IV to his 
desperate acts which fuelled widespread rumours of imminent war between Sweden and Britain that 
Brinkman had only been able to suppress with great difficulty. 15 
The Swedes lived in blissful ignorance of the British governmenfs reaction to Gustavus Ws threats 
U-- 
because the bad weather had prevented the packet boats across the North Sea reaching Gothenburg. It 
was only by late February therefore that a courier arrived with news of Canning's reaction and his 
fears that the Swedes were engaged in secret peace talks with the enemy. On the evening of 22 
February Merry informed Ehrenheim of his recall unless the Swedes signed the new subsidy treaty on 
the old terms. Ehrenheim was conciliatory and suggested a personal meeting with the king. That 
meeting took place at the Palace two days later when Merry tried to persuade Gustavus IV to agree to 
the subsidy treaty. The king repeated his grievances and then, having used up his limited reserves of 
patience, interrupted Merry. 
The measures which I took cannot be considered as an offence. It was a natural consequence 
of no attention having been paid to the repeated representation I had made for additional 
succour. The Opposition in your Country had already taken notice of it. You will feel severely 
the Effect of your Refusal to grant me what I have demandecL Is your trade to the Baltic and 
your intercourse with the Continent through Sweden of no consequence to you? Will you not 
feel the Sound being shut against you, or do you think that your Commerce to the Spanish 
Colonies will indemnify you for loss of that in Europe? I am much reduced as to my Means, 
but I can still do much Harm and you will feel it. 
When Merry refused to overstep his instructions given the sharp reprimand he had suffered on the 
previous occasion Gustavus IV lost his temper and ordered Merry out of the audience chamber. 16 
Gustavus IV had threatened to do what he had set out in 1801 to do; shut out the British from the 
r, %. % Baltic with the aid of Russia and enmark. It was not an idle threat. That same day Gustavus IV 
gave orders for an embargo to be imposed upon British shipping at Gothenburg which caused a 
sensation. All British ships, including the Marstrand packet boat, were put under embargo 
for 48 
15 Anglica. 509. Brinkman to Gustavus IV, 3,4,6,10,13 Jan. 1809; FO 73/50. Canning to Merry, 23 
Dec. 1808. 
16 FO 73/54. Merry to Canning, 24 Feb. 1809. 
173 
hours. Ehrenheim tried to rescind the order but to no avail. The day after tensions had dampened 
sufficiently for a much calmer Gustavus IV to meet Merry in the afternoon. He repeated, with 
composed calm, his previous grievances but he was willing to sign if the British government was 
willing to guarantee him the restitution of Finland. Merry made it clear to Gustavus IV and to 
Ehrenheim, who came to see him that same evening, that his government would never endorse such a 
guarantee and would only recall Merry if he agreed to sign a treaty which included this gUarantee. 17 
Canning was capable of blackmailing Sweden just like Gustavus IV had tried to do with Britain. On 
27 February Merry tried to convince Ehrenheim to sign a subsidy treaty based on Canning's demands 
but without pressing for the signing of the commercial convention. On I March the subsidy 
agreement was finaUy signed and the Anglo-Swedish alliance had been restored. Merry continued to 
press for the signing of the commercial convention. In fact the subsidy treaty was destined to be the 
last and the commercial convention was never signed. In fact British satisfaction at the resolution of 
their mutual dispute was short-lived. Time had run out for the alliance - on 17 March when Canning 
wrote to congratulate Merry upon getting the subsidy treaty signed Gustavus IV had already been 
overthrown and the treaty signed was a dead letter. 18 
IL The Last Act 
The Finnish Army's Winter Retreat to Westerbotten, Moore's 'Martyrdom' and the Failure of 
Canning's Spanish Campaign, October 1808-January 1809. 
While the allies almost came to blows over the acrimonious subsidy question which had bedevilled the 
alliance since the beginning, their respective annies were falling apart under the weight of their 
1, use of the term respective here is justified since Sweden was not enemies military superiority. (The 
fighting the French nor were the British fighting the Russians. Since the summer of 1808 the allies 
had in fact been fighting separate wars on either side of Europe). In late October, what remained of 
17 FO 73/54. Canning to Merry, 27 Feb., 7 Mar. 1809; Harewood. 43. Merry to Canning, 24 Feb. 1809; 
A ý, Aif-2 r, VA Rhrenheim to 
Brinkman, 7 Mar. 1809; HSh. 1.157-159,162. 
18 FO 73/54. Merry to Canning, 27 Feb., 1,7,10 Mar. 1809; Anglica. 513. Ehrenheim to Brinkman, 
I Mar. 1809. 
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the Finnish army retreated ever northwards. Northern Finland could not provide the troops with 
adequate rations and the army left the region as quickly as it could. It was small consolation to the 
army that the Russians were almost as badly off as themselves or that Klingspor had finally been 
removed from the command. Adlercreutz , Klingspor's successor, was unable to perform miracles and 
the only thing that saved the Finnish army from destruction was the enemy's reluctance to invade 
Sweden north of the Kemi river and Buxh6wden gladly agreed to an armistice until 12 January 1809 
which enabled the Finnish army to escape across the Kemi and Ule rivers by 13 November. The army 
may have escaped from the Russians but its worse enemies, hunger, death, disease and desertion 
followed it all the way to the sanctuary of Tornea where, by late December, only 5,500 men out of 
12,000 in total were fit for duty. 19 
Across Europe, in Portugal, command of the British expeditionary army had devolved upon general 
Moore following Cintra. Without his withdrawal from Sweden the British would, therefore, have 
been left without adequate forces to pursue, as Canning told Brinkman on 28 October, the war with all 
possible vigour by supporting the Spaniards. " Only the future could now tell if Canning's decision to 
pull out of Scandinavia and pursue the Iberian option by investing all of Britain's disposable field 
forces there would actually pay off. In early October Moore was ordered to leave 10,000 men behind 
in Portugal, to secure his all important sea communications, and cautiously advance into Spain. 
Canning warned Moore that his army was the only field army that Britain had and he was nofrgamble 
with its safety. Moore was imbued with unusual self confident optimism by his overestimation of 
his 
Spanish ally which contrasted with his gloomy assessment of the Swedes. In fact his optimism was 
widely off the mark. Madrid had capitulated and Napoleon himself had entered the 
Peninsula with a 
huge host of 240,000 troops under his personal command. Napoleon gave orders on 23 
December to 
chase out the British 'invader' from Spain but handed over actual command of the pursuing 
force to 
Soult's 25,000 troopS. 21 
19 Hornborg. 194-197,203-204,225; GP. Mosheim to Gordon, 6,10,14 Oct. 1808; 
Quennerstedt. 1. 
1-6,17-61,89-111,123-130. Granberg. 145-146. Lohtea armistice, 29 
Sept. 1808; ibid. 167. 
Kamensky to Klercker, 20 Oct. 1808. 
20 Anglica. 508. Brinkman to Gustavus IV, 28 Oct. 1808. 
21 Gates. 106-110,115. 
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Although it was true that Napoleon faced, in December 1808, a growing threat from Austria he also 
gave up an opportunity to inflict a crippling defeat upon Britain. Napoleon had the opportunity to 
trap Moore's army against the sea or if he moved with his usual speed, to defeat and force the British 
to surrender in the Spanish hinterland where there would be no Royal Navy ships to rescue them. 
Thus, Britain's only available field army would have been lost, giving the sagging French home front 
a much needed boost, while dealing a blow to Britain's brittle post-Cintra relations with her suspicious 
Iberian allies. The chief benefit of such a Napoleonic victory, however, would have been felt in 
British politics were the opposition would have made good use of a unsuccessful campaign that they 
had opposed from the beginning in the firm belief that it would end in failure, disgracing their 
military idol, Moore. Canning had adamantly refused to listen to Napoleon's post-Erfurt terms. 
Maybe the destruction of Moore's army would make Canning more willing to listen to French peace 
overtures and accept that the Spanish war was over. He admitted, to Brinkman, that the deteriorating 
situation in Spain prevented him from devoting enough attention to Sweden (where the situation was 
no better). A few weeks later Canning told the envoy that the opposition would attack his 
government's failure in Spain. 22 Canning complained that retreat seemed to be uppermost in Moore's 
mind when Canning wanted -degeneral to take the offensive at all costs. But even Moore was as much 
an oppositionist, Canning believed, as his parliamentary colleagues. 23 
Canning was saved from a complete Spanish debacle by Napoleon's fortunate decisionvtaleave Soult to 
finish off Moore. A younger Napoleon would have stayed in Spain whatever the conditions and 
pursued Moore himself to a victorious close and a possible political victory as well. Only Napoleon's 
presence could ensure that the French troops were pushed to the limit to capture the British since 
Soult *as not keen to pursue Moore through the wintry Galician mountains. As it was Moore 
had 
enough problems as his troops retreated across the mountains of Galicia suffering 
from the cold, 
hunger and desertion as much as the Finnish army was. Moore reached Corunna on 
II January but 
Soult, displayed a caution alien to Napoleon, only attacked on 16 January. Moore died defending his 
beleaguered army. His countrymen lamented another continental 'calamity' but a tactical setback 
hid 
22 Anglica. 508. Brinkman to Gustavus IV, 9,23 Dec. 1808.; Hinde. 206. 
23 Harewood. 32. Canning to Portland, 31 Dec. 1808. 
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two major strategic successes. Moore had not onlY saved his 26,000 strong army but Portugal as 
well. 24 
HL Clubs, Conspiracies and Coup-Makers. 
The Guards' Degradation, the Aland Anny's Assassination Plans, the Cederstr6m Club 
Conspiracies and other Revolutionary Coup Plans, September 1808 - February 1809. 
It was not just in Britain that military setbacks led to political tremors. In Britain a recognised 
opposition could at least voice their disapproval but in Sweden, where public disapproval of an 
unpopLdar war was even stronger, there was no such safety valve. Unlike Britain, where the will to 
fight on, whatever the odds or defeats facing the country remained strong, the Swedes grew ever more 
A- 
defeatist and despondent from early October to November. They were not inspired to support the 
kinj;, the British alliance or even to resist the advancing Russian invasion threat (now moving ever 
closer both in the north and south). Swedish apathy contrasted to the fighting spirit of the Finns who 
continued to fight thýir Russian occupiers. The Swedish public was not inspired either by the 
Spaniards or the Finnish example to overcome their defeatism or political disunity both fanned by 
Francophile traitors. Those few Britons who remained in Sweden were the target for strong Swedish 
disapproval. 25 
Since the beginning of the war the most outspoken critics of Gustavus IV were to be found among 
Sweden's army officers but they had remained surprisingly quiet since the Pomeranian campaign. 
New conspiracies were triggered by Gustavus IVs, justified but politically ill-judged decision on 12 
October to demote 3 Guards regiments and their 120 noble officers for cowardice, desertion and 
fraternisation with the enemy during a landing in Finland back in Sqptember. 26 None took more 
I 
violent exception to Gustavus IM high handed decision than major Wrangdl (the same officer sent to 
London earlier in the year on behalf of Armfelt) who was stationed with the 
Aland army at the time. 
Wrangel, who had a hot temper, begun to plan to assassinate Gustavus IV but his would be assassin, 
24 GateS. 111-112,114-115.; Hinde. 206-214. 
25 Gp. Mosheim to Gordon, 3,24 Oct., 8 Nov. 1808. 
26 SCGD. 369,372,381-384,389-390,395; GAR 219; DSH. XI. 85. 
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private BIA refused to go along with Wrangel's plans. Wrangel's wild assassination plans failed to get 
any broad support from his fellow Aland army officers most of whom preferred, after Gustavus IV 
returned to Stockholm unharmed in November, to stage a regular army coup by marching the Aland 
army on Stockholm. These loose coup plots had to be abandoned when Gustavus IV appointed the 
reliable general 136beln to command the Aland army. 27 
The army conspirators, most of whom were young, junior officers, realised that their plans would fail 
as long as they did not have a general to lead them. For some reason they chose to approach Armfelt 
which seemed a strange choice given his reputation for open hearted honesty and conservative 
Gustavian loyalism. But beneath the joie de vivre and 'hail fellow well met' attitude lurked a darker, 
more complex and conspiratorial side to Armfelt's character that was fully capable of conspiring 
against his own Idng. As early as October 1807, following his Pomeranian fiasco and demotion, both 
of which Armfelt indirectly blamed upon Gustavus IV, Armfelt had a strange meeting with duke 
Charles at the latter's palace of Rosersdal outside Stockholm. The two men were lifelong opponents, 
ideologically miles apart and had always affected deep contempt for each other. Yet here they were, 
at a crucial juncture in the war, behaving like long lost friends. But it was not until the failed 
Norwegian campaign that Armfelt, following his unceremonious dismissal from command on 15 
August, could be counted among Gustavus IV deadliest domestic enemies. A month later, on 18 
September, Armfelt revealed his plans to overthrow Gustavus IV by December to his old crony, 
d'Antraigues, who worked for British intefligence and Canning. Armfelt asked for British support or 
at least for recognition for the new Swedish government that would replace Gustavus IV. The sources 
do not reveal if Armfelt got a reply. 28 
Armfelt's request for British aid raised the question how much the British knew about these 
conspiracies and what support, if any, they gave to them. In early 1808 Bathurst, the British chargd 
cfaffaires had definite contacts with captain Bj6mstjema, who, like many Swedish army officers, was 
highly critical of Gustavus IV, an attitude which miffored Bathurst's discontent with his own 
27 GAF. 221,223-224,227,229; SSK. 132. 
28 Gp. Mosheim to Gordon, 21 Oct. 1808; Ramel. 266,270,274; GAF. 213,215,217; SSK. 132; 
Brown 297. 
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government's policies. In April Bathurst made oblique references about certain plans while he urged 
Bj6rnstjerna not to divulge about his contacts with Bathurst to anyone. Nothing came of these 
plans. 29 In June, a British adventurer of dubious reputation, John Brown, purporting to be the 
representative of a 'Constitutional' Party in Sweden, claimed to have had talks with Canning. If such 
talks took place Canning proved most unforthcoming. Nor was Brown more successful with Spencer 
Perceval, whom he claimed took over the talks. Perceval made it clear that the British would not 
countenance any plans that would harm or kill of Gustavus IV. Canning, who had no love for 
meddling in the domestic aMirs of other countries, broke off the talks on II November 1808 to the 
consternation of Brown. He could not understand how Canning could show such ruthless 'disregard 
for civilised behaviour' at Copenhagen yet such disinterest in 'saving' Sweden. Canning had neither 
reason nor inclination to lament the demise of Gustavus IV if the alliance or at least commercial 
relations between Sweden and Britain could be preserved. Gustavus IV had proved an expensive, 
irritating diversion from the main war in Spain and Canning was probably disinterested whether 
Gustavus IV survived or not. But he probably drew the line at supporting revolutionaries and dealing 
with shady characters such as Brown. 30 
Since the Swedish ministers were unlikely to use violent means to put an end to Gustavus Ws reign 
the initiative to do so had to come from somewhere else. It came from a small group of radical young 
officers, who met between November 1808 and March 1809 in captain Jacob Cederstr6m's apartment 
in central Stockholm. Cederstr6m was an oppositionist by inclination and had become embittered by 
the failure of the Norwegian campaign, which left him crippled. The Cederstr6m conspirators 
believed that France and Russia had agreed at the Erfurt congress to divide Sweden between them and 
that Gustavus IV had to be overthrown before the enemy tore the country apart. On Christmas Eve 
one of the Cederstr6m officers called on Armfelt at his estate, NynAs, south of Stockholm. The 
general proved indecisive and a month later proved his unreliability by protesting his loyalty to the 
king! Obviously another leader had to be found. On 18 January general Adlercreutz arrived in 
29 GAF. 210-211,217-218. 
30 GAF. 29,34,210-211,217-218; Brown. 307-309; Hinde. 375-376,380. 
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Stockholm. His contacts in the bureaucratic opposition urged him not to join the younger officers' 
conspiracies. Adlercreutz heeded the advice for the time being. 31 
The Cederstr6m conspirators, disgusted at the lack of initiative among their cautious superiors, 
decided. at a meeting on 25 January to kidnap Gustavus IV when he travelled through Norrtull to his 
residence at Haga. A new meeting on 8 February at the 'Beckens' Inn finalised the plan to Iddnap 
Gustavus IV in Waxholm while Armfelt (having returned to the conspiracies) agreed to act as the 
city's governor. But one of the conspirators, Hans Jdrta, persuaded his colleagues to drop the plan 
which was unfortunate since it might have SUCCeeded. 32 
IV. Uprising. 
The Western Army Uprising and Adlersparre's March on Stockholm, 7-13 March 1809. 
The Cederstr6m conspirators had proved as indecisive as their superiors and yet again someone else 
had to 'save' Sweden from 'disaster. That someone was colonel George Adlersparre, acting 
commander of the Western army. Despite his disreputable political past as a radical, Adlersparre had, 
in April 1808, been made a colonel and acting chief of staff to the Western Army on the 
recommendation of duke Charles. Despite their political differences, Adlersparre and Armfelt were 
qwte similar in many ways and Adlersparre came to support and adopt as his own Armfelt's plans to 
annex Norway. It was only in December that Adlersparre belatedly began to plot Gustavus Ws 
overthrow. What triggered Adlersparre's conversion to conspiracy was his conviction that the Erfurt 
partitidn plan was true and that unless the fatherland (fosterlandet) was to be carved up, the Swedish 
army, the ultimate defender of the Nation, had to remove Gustavus IV from power and open peace 
negotiations with Russia before it was too late. He probably had the tacit support of his Norwegian 
colleague, prince Christian, to removing the northern Don Quixote' and ending a war that was 
against their common intereStS. 33 
31 DSH. XI. 85-87; GAF. 231,233-238,242-243; Ramel. 278; SSK. 131,133. 
32 DSH. XI. 85; GAF. 239; Ramel. 278-279; SSK. 133-135. 
33 GAF. 212-216,218,244-248,253-258,260,279-282; Sidvall. 7-9. 
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His opportunity to overthrow the king and save Sweden from its doom came in early March when he 
became commander of the Western army's VArmland, detachment. After some last minute dithering 
Adlersparre acted and at midnight (5-6 March) 400 of his insuffectionist troops occupied Carlstad. 
Sweden's first and last military uprising was under way. He realised, if he was not be branded a 
traitor, like Cronstedt at Sveaborg, for letting the Norwegians into an undefended Varmland, that he 
had to have prince Christian August's undertaking not to attack. Yet on the other hand time was 
running out, if he was to occupy Stockholm, for marching to the east. On 9th March, without a firm 
Norwegian resolution either way, Adlersparre set out for Stockholm with 1,900 men, leaving barely 
800 to defend the entire length of the Varmland border with Norway. 34 
V. Palace Coup or Civil War? 
Adlercreutz's 'Arrest' of Gustavus IV, 13 March 1809. 
The dramatic revolutionary events in Varmland were a world apart from the capital which remained 
calm and unaware of Adlersparre's insurrection for days. Those few who knew about the insurrection 
kept quiet but someone started a rumour going at the 'Stora, Sallskapet' Club in Stockholm. On 8 
March Gustavus IV ordered an interrogation of one of the rumour mongers. The Stockholm Chief of 
Police, Edelcreutz, was probably in sympathy with the revolutionary conspirators. Not only could the 
Cederstr6m Club remain in 'session' for four months with Edelcreutz's apparent knowledge but he also 
failed to do anything to confirm the rumours. By II March Gustavus IV, relying for too much on the 
loyalty of Edelcreutz, and with no confirmation of the rebellion's e)dstence, came to the disastrous 
conclusion the rumours were untrue. He remained in blissful ignorance of the real facts for another 
day wlien on 12 March a courier arrived in Stockholm having just ,. escaped 
from Orebro which 
was occupied by Adlersparre's troops. Gustavus IV immediately mobilised the capital's regular 
garrison and burgher militia. These troops patrolled the streets and blocked every eýdt or entry point 
35 into Stockholm. 
34 GAF. 283-286; SYk VII. 190-198. 
35 GAF. 307-309,311,313-314,317-324; SSK. 137-139.; FO 73/55. Merry to Canning, 10 Mar. 
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Facing a deadly domestic threat to himself that had been, ultimately, caused by his alliance with 
Britain, Gustavus IV requested British military and pecuniary assistance blaming the insuffection 
upon his financial problems due to the British failure to provide adequate subsidies. On 12 March he 
asked Merry for naval support against the rebels and additional subsidies. His demands were unlikely 
to solicit much sympathy from his ally. Merry believed that Gustavus IV was doomed and that after 
he was gone, the new revolutionary government would be hostile to Britain. Canning was likely to 
agree with Merry's sound analysis of the situation and whatever goodwill Canning still had left for 
Gustavus IV, already lowered by the Moore fiasco, had been totally dissipated by the embargo crisis 
only a month earlier. The two allies were in fact quite alienated from each other well before the 
insuffection, and a change of regime would only accelerate a process that had already begun in 
r%ýý 
December 1808. As a practical politician and statesman Canning would have no problem in a change 
of goverment. Given the trouble that Gustavus IV had been causing Canning during the last year, 
such a change might even be welcome if Britain's basic interests vis-a-vis Sweden could be preserved. 
These were to keep Sweden (if possible) out of the Continental system and if not to preserve, at all 
costs, British access to Swedish ports and transit rights for her trade to the continent. Canning would 
also want to keep Sweden out of the clutches of the Franco-Russian coalition to preserve some of the 
balance of power in the Baltic. Otherwise Canning had no interest in meddling in the domestic 
politics of Sweden. He was not willing to support a revolution against the king but at the same 
Canning was not keen to be embroiled in a futile attempt to prop up Gustavus IV either. The swift 
events in Stockholm between 12-14 March saved the British from having to support Gustavus IV had 
a regular civil war broke out in Sweden and the only offer, of naval support from Keats on 17 March, 
came too late to matter anyway. 36 
Gustavus IV had, therefore, no British support and he was undecided what he should do. Should he 
make a stand north of the city with his 2,700 troops facing by now Adlersparre's 3,100 insurgents, as 
Ehrenheim urged him to do or should he march to Noffk6ping, make a counter attack upon the 
insurgents from there, or march all the way to Scania to get Toll's support. The king agonised most of 
the day (12 March) but resolved by midnight to abandon Stockholm. His attempt to take the gold 
36 GAR 304-306,322-324 ; FO 73/55. Merry to Canning, 12 Mar. 1809. 
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reserves deposited in the central bank met with fierce opposition. At last the various conspiratorial 
groups in Stockholm were willing to act and they turned to the far from committed and decisive 
Adlercreutz to detain the king. If Gustavus IV was allowed to leave Stockholm he would plunge 
Sweden into a civil war when she was just about to be on invaded by Russia. Count Wachtmeister, a 
senior minister and the Lord Chancellor, persuaded Adlercreutz to lead the army coup in Stockholm 
before it was too late. Adlercreutz was torn between the responsibility of stopping a civil war and the 
justified punishment he would suffer if his coup attempt failed. Not surprisingly Adlercreutz spent a 
sleepless night (12-13 March) but at 7.00 the following morning, accompanied by marshal Klingspor 
and a small number of conspiratorial officers Adlercreutz entered the Palace. Klingspor failed to 
persuade an exhausted Gustavus IV ( he had spent the night planning his escape to Noffk6ping ) to 
remain in Stockholm and was politely told to leave. Adlercreutz entered and demanded in a harsher 
tone that the king remain in Stockholm and Gustavus W, who was astonished at Adlercreutz's 
insolence, ordered him out of his study. Gustavus IV only realised , after a few moments, the real 
reason for Adlercreutz's insolent intrusion and shouted for help. He was disarmed but managed to 
grab a sword and escape through a secret passageway to the Palace courtyard. It was only with great 
difficulty the officers apprehended Gustavus IV before he reached the Pomeranian Guards stationed in 
the palace barracks. Both the Gustavian regime and its alliance with Britain had come to an abrupt 
end. 37 
37 GAF. 341-346; SSK. 142-144; DSH. M. 88-89 
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Chapter Nine. 
The Twilight Era. 
The End of the Common Cause and the Shadow alliance between Sweden and Britain, March 1809-October 1810. 
1. Invasion, Insurrection and Incompetence. 
A Divided Sweden caught between Two Fires from East and West, March-April 1809. 
Not even during the darkest days of the Great Northern War from 1719 to 1721 had Sweden's position 
been more precarious than in March 1809 as the new revolutionary regime was beset by foes from all 
sides. Most Swedes remained loyal to Gustavus IV since he was their rightftd king, had scant respect 
for the men (most of whom were members of the previous government that was really responsible for 
the same problems they accused Gustavus IV of committing) who led the 'new' government and might 
support a counter revolution. The government itself (as we shall see) was beset by problems from 
within which did not bode well for its survival as Stockholm faced the prospect of being occupied 
within a matter of days by the Russian enemy or insurrectionist troops under the command of a 
radical and unpredictable officer with grandiose political ambitions. 
The most acute and serious threat came from the east where the Russians launched an almost 
simultaneous and co-ordinated three pronged attack against Sweden's eastern coast and frontier. 
Three widely separate armies attacked towards Stockholm in the south, Umea in the centre and 
Tomea in the far north. In view of the domestic turmoil and incompetence that prevailed in most 
echelons of the Swedish army and goverment, the Swedish response to the Russian invasion was 
feeble. What saved Sweden from sharing Finland's fate was the unwillingness of the Russian army 
high command to thrust deeply across the frozen waste of Sweden and prolong a war that they 
oppos&i once they had secured Finland. (The similarities to the Swedish army's attitude to the war 
was remarkable). Bagration's occupation of Aland (which was only three-four days march away from 
the Swedish coast) was an acute threat to the virtually defenceless and unfortified capital. The 
commander of the Swedish Aland army general D6beln. (one of the very few Swedish generals with 
some abilities) had onlY managed to save his army across the frozen sea of 
Aland to Grisslehamn by 
18 March by tricking Bagration into believing that the new government had opened peace 
negotiations with Russia. Bagration, when 
he discovered the truth, was infuriated with*D6blen's low 
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trick and ordered general Kulnev to occupy Grisslehamn with 400 Cossacks. The only thing that 
stood between Bagration's 17,000 troops and Stockholm was D6beln's 3,5oo exhausted and frozen 
troops. The Swedes now expected the Russians to occupy NorrWIje and Uppsala in preparation for a 
march on Stockholm. In central Sweden Barclay de Tolly had crossed the Gulf of Bothnia by 18 
March and occupied Umea' without resistance on 22 March. Three days later what remained of the 
Fenno-Swedish anny at Tome&, trapped between Barclay's army in the south and general Shuvalov's, 
advancing from the east, capitulated to the Russians. The Finnish phase of the war was over and it 
seemed that Sweden, as seen by its army's dismal performance, would soon be occupied by the 
Russians. Sweden was saved by orders from the new Russian commander in chief on 20 and 29 
March for Kulnev and de Tolly's forces to return to the Finnish coast. Arakchayev's (the Russian 
minister of war) angry counter orders for the advance to continue only arrived when the armies were 
back in Finland. I 
The new government, aptly named Noah's Ark, instead of dealing with the acute Russian threat were 
more worried about a possible British attack upon Carlscrona. The naval base was put on full military 
alert on 18 March yet despite the real Russian threat (rather than imaginary British 'threat') the 
government decided not to send the Stockholm garrison to reinforce 136beln's forces on the Uppland 
coast since they needed to keep an eye on Adlersparre when his army arrived in Stockholm. 2 'Noah's 
Ark' was therefore more concerned to play dangerous games of domestic politics when faced with an 
acute foreign invasion. To them the most dangerous enemy was not the Russians approaching from 
the east but Adlersparre's insurgents from the west. The conservative majority in the government, led 
by Adlercreutz, were most concemed to calm the fears of the Swedish army officers and bureaucrats 
that thEre would be no-revolutionary purge. Adlersparre, in the eyes of Adlercreutz and his fellow 
conservatives, a dangerous radical and egoistic intriguer, had very different ideas. Adlersparre had 
not taken the risk associated with rebellion in order to desist from a full revolution and clean out the 
goverment bureaucracy of those officials who had done Gustavus Ws work. On 22 March 
I Hornborg. 233-243; SKA. VIII. 275-423.; SKA. IX 44-67.; BFK. 282-310; Matz. 29-34; DSH. X1. 
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Adlersparre, dramatically mounted on a white charger, marched into Stockholm with 3,500 troops, 
made the Westman. House on Drottninggatan his HQ (which he ringed with artillery and troops), 
quartered his troops in the adjoining quarters of the city and sent out frequent patrols to instil fear 
among his numerous enemies. To this ambitious, paranoid would-be dictator and warm admirer of 
Napoleon, the enemy was the conservatives led by Adlercreutz. Both Armfelt, now a minor and 
declining member in the revolutionary military-led junta that actually ruled Sweden, and Adlercreutz 
would both have dearly loved to have sent Adlersparre's arrogant soldiery to fight the Russians. But 
Adlersparre held the initiative and had the largest anny against which the government only had 2,900 
troops under Klingspor's command. Adlersparre set up his own police force which dealt roughly and 
summarily with any suspected Gustavian or counter revolutionary. 3 
IL Peace at any Price. 
The Revolutionary Regime's Rush to make Peace with the Common Enemies and Cut links with 
Britain, March-August 1809. 
The new regime's preoccupation with internal squabbles when Sweden was on the edge of extinction 
as a state typified a regime that had no clear policies beyond gaining peace at any cost whatever the 
sacrifices that Sweden had to make. It has been claimed in the new regime's defence that Gustavus IV 
had undermined Sweden's position so much that the country had to accept the bad terms that her 
enemies deigned to present in return for peace. Indeed Gustavus IV may have given the revolutionary 
regime a bad hand of diplomatic cards in which to play against her antagonists but the ministers were 
not good poker players. Ehrenheim. was the only one of them that had a clear and logical approach to 
the peace process which, if it was to succeed, had to be gradual and cautious. This way Sweden would 
manage to play her antagonists off against one another, her terms would be better and the few cards 
she held on her hand would be played out with maximum effect in the negotiations. The main plank 
of Ehrenheimfs sensible policy was to maintain the British alliance as long as possible until a real 
commitment to peace had been discerned from the enemy side. Both Ehrenheim and duke Charles 
assured Merry, therefore, of their unchanged loyalty to the alliance and the friendship with Britain. 
Merry was unconvinced since Adlersparre (at this time on his way to Stockholm) was known as a 
Staf. 313-316; Ramel. 280-282. 
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'dangerous' radical and rabid Francophile of whom only the worst could be expected and Merry was 
convinced, even prior to Adlersparre's occupation of Stockholm, that the new regime was only playing 
for time, in order to make approaches to the enemy and avoid a premature conflict with Britain. As if 
to confirm Merry's worst fears Ehrenheim made the mistake of telling him, on 19 March, that while it 
would impossible to maintain their previously close political relations Ehrenheim hoped that their 
flourishing trade relations would be preserved. 4 
It seems pointless for Sweden to have burnt her bridges with Britain before she had got a firm footing 
in the peace negotiations with her enemies and to admit this to Merry seems even more pointless at 
this stage. Almost as soon as Charles was officially appointed Regent he had made appeals to 
Sweden's enemies to open armistice and peace talks. He hoped that Napoleon would intervene on 
Sweden's behalf in the Swedish peace talks with Derumark and Russia. 5 Nothing could have been 
more baseless or false than the new regime's shortsighted and narrow hero worship of Napoleon 
whom they now viewed, despite much previous evidence to the contrary, as Sweden's protector and 
most viable friend. Napoleon did not view Sweden as a basically friendly power and nor was she 
important enough to warrant an intervention on Sweden's behalf which could only sour relations with 
his allies. Charles and other Swedish Francophiles were to persist in this false premise for years to 
come at the expense of Swedish interests. When Adlersparre occupied Stockholm and gained undue 
influence with the government that misplaced view would became the guiding star of Sweden's 
foreign policy. Unfortunately the cautious and sober Ehrenheim was replaced by Adlersparre's new 
won 'friend Gustav Lagerbjelke, who thus reinforced his well earned reputation for unreliability and 
disloyalty. LagerbJelke became temporary foreign minister and although not without abilities, he 
lacked'character, judgement and basic sound common sense. In Lagerbielke's eyes all of Sweden's 
previous problems stemmed from her 'damaging and unnatural' connection with 
Britain and all 
connections with Britain had to be severed as quickly as possible 
but without causing a rupture with 
Britain. By doing so and putting all possible faith in Napoleon's goodwill and good offices Sweden 
4 FO 73/55. Merry to Canning, 14,15,16,18,19 Mar. 1809; USSUM. 4-6. 
5 Granberg. 11.146. Charles to Alexander 1,18 Mar. 1809; ibid. 147. Charles to Napoleon, 17 
Mar. 1809; ibid. 148. Charles to Frederick VI, 23 Mar. 1809. 
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would improve her bargaining position vis-A-vis Russia. On 29 March Lagerbjelke prevailed on duke 
Charles to send another obsequious letter to Napoleon imploring him to intervene in Sweden's talks 
with Russia and save Finland f6 or Sweden. 
With a foreign minister with such sentiments and prejudices it was small wonder that Canning, at a 
meeting with Brinkman on 29 March, failed completely to respond to Brinkman's comments that he 
hoped that Britain would not do anything premature against Sweden. Brinkman had no further 
meetings with Canning in April and early May while the British government remained silent about 
Sweden's increasingly unfriendly attitude. 7 In the meantime Lagerbjelke's weakly based pro-French 
foreign policy 'systern! had foundered even before it had been allowed to begin since Napoleon 
refilsed, in his reply on 12 April, to intervene in any fashion in Sweden's talks with her enemies. 8 
Lagerbjelke discovered too late that he still needed Britain since that power was Sweden! s only 
support, unreliable or not, but his efforts to rebuild relations with Merry, who both disliked and 
distrusted him, came too late and were viewed, quite rightly, as opportunistic and insincere by the 
British envoy. On 21 April Lagerbjelke met Merry to persuade him not to take his leave of absence 
but to remain in Sweden indefinitely since his departure would weaken the new regime's standing 
both domestically and internationally. His departure was deemed so damaging to Swedish morale that 
duke Charles and Lagerbjelke had kept it secret not only from the general public but even some of the 
Swedish ministers. This state of affairs Lagerbjelke could largely blame upon his own mistakes. The 
time seemed ripe, with British support, to overthrow an increasingly unpopular regime. Two counter 
revolutionary conspirators called at Merry's residence on 21 and 25 April with plans to restore 
Gustavus IV. Merry, however, made it clear that he did not see that such a regime would be feasible 
when Gustavus IV's ptevious period in power had ended in such spectacular 
failure. How would it, 
even with massive British support, be able to survive? Merry turned 
down the conspirators' plans. 9 
Britain may have had no wish to restore the troublesome Gustavus IV to power but that 
did not mean 
that its government was any keener about the new Swedish regime. 
On 18 May Canning told 
6 USSLTM. 10-11,25-26; FO 73/55. Merry to Canning, 28 Mar. 1809. 
7 Anglica. 509. Brinkman to Charles, 28,31 Mar., 4,14,21,28 Apr., 5 May 1809. 
8 Granberg. 11.151-152. Napoleon to Charles, 12 Apr. 1809. 
9 FO 73/55. Merry to Canning, 14,21,25 Apr. 1809; Anglica. 513. Lagerbjelke to Brinkman, 
17 Apr 
I May 1809. 
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Brinkman that Britain would not recognise the new order in Sweden by replacing Merry with a new 
envoy. Canning was not pleased at the growing French influence that Lagerbjelke's appointment had 
signified, but events elsewhere prevented Canning from giving his full, undivided attention to 
Swedish affairs. 10 
Count Lars von Engestr6m's coming to office as foreign secretary in early June boded well for an 
Anglo-Swedish rapprochement and Engestr6m could not believe Canning was as cold as Brinkman 
reported given the naval support Saumarez had given and was continuing to give Sweden. Engestr6m 
claimed that the Anglo-Swedish alliance and its subsidy agreement was still in operation but that 
Canning had to recognise Charles XIII's new dignity as king. 1 I In mid June Engestr6m repeated his 
attempt to revive the moributid alliance through appeals to Foster and Brinkman simultaneously. 
Engestr6m claimed that Canning had to support Sweden to preserve her independence and prevent 
Russia from gaining hegemony over the whole of the eastern part of the Baltic. Even worse would be 
for Russia to conquer Sweden too which would make Russia a very dangerous opponent of Britain. 
That same month the Swedes had finally begun negotiations with the Russians. Stedingk, 
accompanied by general Skj6ldebrand, had reached Fredrikshamn in Russian Finland where they 
were to hold talks for the following three months with Rumyantsev and the former Russian envoy in 
Stockholm, David Alopeus. 12 
Canning left Engestr6m's belated overtures unanswered for over two months since he had no meeting 
with Brinkman at all from May to August. 13 He only informed Brinkman by letter that he was not 
hostile to Charles )Ull or the Swedish government but Britain would not acknowledge Brinkman's 
appoiniment as envoy 6f that government. But Canning hoped that Brinkman would remain in 
London to continue informal diplomatic relations. 14 Unofficially Brinkman was told that Britain did 
not want to be the first European power to recognise the change of ruler in 
Sweden but that this was 
10 Anglica. 509. Brinkman to Charles X111,15,18,26,28 May 1809. 
11 BLA. 66. Engestr6m to Brinkman, 7 June 1809. 
12 BLA. 66. Engestr6m to Brinkman, 13 June 1809; FO 73/56. Foster to Canning, 13 June 1809. 
13 KUB: 395. Brinkman to Charles X111,15,16,20,23,27,30 June, 7,8,11,14,18,21,25,29 July 
1809. 
14 BLA. 66. Canning to Brinkman, 10 July 1809. 
189 
not a sign that Britain did not support the preservation of Sweden's independence or the peace 
process. 15 On 16 August Brinkman finally met with Canning who assured him officially this time 
that Britain supported Sweden's independence and that the non-recognition of Charles XIII was only a 
delay, not an outright refusal. Canning declined however to tell Brinkman when Britain would 
recognise Charles X111. In the meantime Canning pledged Saumarez's ftill naval support for 
combined operations against Russia when Brinkman explained that Russian demands for the border 
revision in the north of Sweden and for retaining Aland was unacceptable and would have to be 
reduced by the resort to anns against her aMy. 16 
M. Wagram, Walcheren and Wellington. 
The Anglo-Austrian War against Napoleon, April-October 1809. 
Canning had preserved a minimum of support for Sweden which did not however restore the old 
alliance with that country. The main reason was his pre-occupation with the conduct of the war in 
general, which did not leave much time or money to spare for Sweden. Canning was most interested 
in Austria's growing belligerence against Napoleon. 11aving made an impressive recovery since 
Austerlitz, Austria now hoped to exploit Napoleon's pre-occupation with Spain to strike a powerfid 
blow at his German possessions and transform former humiliations into victory. The question in 
Vienna, from December 1808, was not if but only when Austria would plunge into war with 
Napoleon. By the spring of 1809 200,000 Austrian troops were amassed along the German border 
and 140,000 faced Italy and Poland. Alexander 1, far from being the pillar of support Napoleon had 
hoped he would be, had encouraged Austria's belligerence by assuring Vienna that his support of 
Napoleon would only be of a token nature. The French were taken by surprise by the Austrian 
offensive across the Bavarian frontier in April and it was only with the greatest effort that Napoleon 
managed to stem their offensive. His recovery came to a premature end when the Austrians defeated 
him at Aspern-Essling on 22 Wy. 17 
15 KUB. 3 95. Brinkman to Charles X111,4 Aug. 1809. 
16 KUB. 395. Brinkman to Charles XIII, 18 Aug. 1809. 
17 Bond. 6; Chandler. 663-664,666-669,671-673,676-707; Rothenberg. 159-161,168-180,188-199; 
Gill. 22-33,39-43. 
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Austria hoped that this victory would spark a German insurrection on the Spanish scale but Prussian 
neutrality ensured that it never materialised. One Prussian, Major Schill, did not accept neutrality 
and left Berlin with a small force on 28 April. His foray into Westphalia did not ignite the 
insuffection he had hoped and he was forced to flee to the dubious sanctuary of Stralsund where he 
was killed on 31 May. (Had not Sweden and Britain both been pre-occupied with their own troubles 
they might have been able to intervene with some effect at Schill's side). Only Tyrol fought the 
French (and Bavarian) occupation forces with Spanish style ferocity between April and October 1809. 
The Spanish example had therefore set a precedent for the escalation of the war and by 1809 it was 
not just mere armies but entire nations that were fighting ffill scale wars with each other. 18 
Napoleon was therefore fortunate that he did not face a full scale rebellion in Germany when his 
armies were stretched to the limit by fighting simultaneously in Spain and Austria. Had the allies 
united against him while Germany exploded into bloody insurrection, then Napoleon would have 
faced the same kind of disaster that overwhelmed him four years later. As it was, the disunity of the 
European powers ensured that he could defeat them, one by one, year after year. His victory over 
Austria at Wagram (5-6 July) was dearly bought enough and he was hard pressed to force Francis 11 to 
agree to the draconian peace he imposed and this peace did not end of his troubles. For underneath 
the surfeit of collaborators, Germany remained restless and on 23 October a fanatical German 
nationalist tried to kill Napoleon, giving him a forceful reminder that Europe chafed under his 
increasingly tyrannical rule. 19 
Austria had hoped that Britain would be able to intervene early and forcefully on the continent against 
Franceto divert Napoleon's attention away from central Europe but Britain's pre-occupation with 
Spain prevented Britain from giving Austria immediate financial and military succour. Nevertheless 
by late July 40,000 troops landed on the Dutch coast in the largest British landing on the continent 
(outside Iberia) during the war. Castlereagh hoped to capture Antwerp (thus removing the French 
fleet there and a potential invasion threat) while giving Austria much needed relief But the 
18 Gill. 24,33-34,44,46,35,45; BLA. 66. Wetterstedt to Brinkman, 7 June 1809. 
19 Chandler. 707-735; Rothenberg. 168-218; Gill. 34-43,44-45,47-58,60-61, 
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expedition came too late (after Wagram) and the commander of the expedition, general Lord 
Chatham, was too old and lethargic to make a good leader of an operation that required speed and 
force to succeed. The British, nevertheless, made rapid progress up the Scheldt but paused long 
enough for general Bernadotte to counterattack with 30,000 and on 14 September, having lost 4,000 
men to disease, Chatham was forced to withdraw from the Dutch coast (they stayed on Walcheren 
until December). Neither the British public or Parliament were willing to tolerate another 
Continental fiasco and as four years earlier a Tory administration had lost the confidence of the nation 
due to military failure on the continent. To add to the cabinet's increasing problems, Canning and 
Castlereagh came to blows about the responsibility for this latest military fiasco. On 21 September the 
two ministers had a pistol duel on Putney Heath where Canning was wounded. Five days later the 
entire cabinet resigned as Britain was plunged into political turmoil which enabled Howick and 
Grenville to plan their return to office (as the Whigs and Grenvillites had done when Pitt fell from 
power). 20 
Castlereagh's failure at Walcheren overshadowed his sounder decision to reactivate the Peninsular 
war by sending Wellesley back to Portugal where his arrival, in Lisbon on 22 April, was greeted by 
large crowds carrying banners exhorting their ally to conquer or die. The memory of Cintra faded as 
Wellesley won the battles of Oporto (12 May) and Talavera, (27-28 July). The arrival of news of these 
victories softened the blow to British morale from allied setbacks in western and central Europe. 21 
Following the failure of the Buenos Aires operation two years earlier, the British had quite sensibly 
avoided large scale operations outside Europe but Castlereagh's expansion of the army allowed Britain 
to act not only in Holland and Iberia but also take the offensive worldwide. In January and July, 
respectively, the British occupations of Santo Domingo and French Guyana crippled French power 
and privateering operations in the West Indies. The occupation of French Senegal on the west coast 
of Affica and the Indian ocean island of Rdunion reduced French power and influence in both regions. 
In September the British occupied the Ionian islands (except for Corfu) which lessened the French 
20 Bond. 7-10,12-16,20-21,37-141,144; Palmer. 153-157; Schama. 595-598.; KUB. 395. Brinkman 
to Charles X111,18,21,25,29 July, 8 Aug., 5 Sept. 1809. 
21 Gates. 138-143,147-152,173-18-", 187-188,191-206; Longlorcl. 106-114,117-135. 
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threat to the Balkans. 22 Only an unauthorised occupation of Iceland (June-22 August) by the Danish 
renegade Jorgensen failed to lead to a permanent increase in British power. 23 Otherwise the successes 
in the Peninsula and overseas compensated for British and allied setbacks on the continent. 
Sweden, pre-occupied with her own problems, only showed passing interest in these dramatic events. 
Charles )Ull, like his myopic ministers, were only interested in these events in so far as they affected 
Sweden directly. They feared their naive plans for Swedish neutrality would be jeopardised by 
increased British hostility against Napoleon following the Walcheren fiasco. It did not occur to them 
that it was Napoleon rather than Britain that was the greatest threat to their plans. 24 
IV. The Real Price of Peace. 
The Failure of the Westerbotten Expedition, the Loss of Finland to Russia at Fredrikshamn and 
the Peace Treaties with Denmark and France, August 1809 - January 1810. 
It was not only Austria and Britain that trusted military operations to improve their political fortunes 
and diplomatic positions that summer but Sweden as well. By landing behind the Russian army in 
Westerbotten the Swedes hoped to trap and defeat it, which would strengthen Sweden's bargaining 
position at the Fredrikshamn peace talks. A successful expedition could save Aland and all the land 
up to the Kemi river which would give Sweden some security following the fall of Finland to Russia. 
More hinged upon the Westerbotten expedition for Sweden than the Walcheren one for Britain but the 
Swedes repeated Castlereagh's mistake by appointing an old, unenterprising general to command the 
expedition, which ensured its eventual failure. As the expedition set sail from NorrwIje expectations 
for success were high but both Charles XIII and Engestr6m were not optimistic. On 16 August some 
8,000 troops landed on the coast but they failed to capture Umed and encircle the Russian army which 
managed to escape northwards. On 2 September the Swedes were forced to sign an indefinite military 
truce with the Russians which marked the de-facto end of the Russo-Swedish war and despite putting 
22 Fregosi. 293,295-302,306-307. 
23 SRE. 298-299; James F. Hoan, The Convict King. Being the Life and Adventures of jdrgen 
Mrgensen. (London, 1891). 67-8 1; Esbj6rn Rosenblad. From Past to Present. (Reykjavik, 1993). 44- 
45. 
24 EnSO. XIII. Charles XIII to Engestr6m, 30 July, 13 Aug., 23,30 Sept. 1809; Grade 426. 
Lagerbjelke to Engestr6m, 24 Aug. 1809. 
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a brave face on the defeat, the Swedish goverrunent realised that Aland and northern Sweden up to 
Kemi were iffetfievably lost forever. 25 
Sweden's former ally, Britain, had a vital role to play in these operations since it was only Saumarez's 
naval co-operation that enabled the Swedes to take the initiative against Russia since she was not 
obliged to disperse her naval forces to guard the coastline against Danish and Russian ships. When, 
in May 1809, Saumarez returned to the Baltic he continued his full naval collaboration with Sweden 
as if no revolution had taken place at all. On 18 May Saumarez pledged his full support for Sweden. 
Sweden could, therefore, with Saumarez keeping an eye on Denmark transfer their gunboats from the 
Sound to Stockholm to deter a seaborne Russian invasion. Saumarez's support also enabled them to 
send the expedition to Westerbotten and had it succeeded Saumarez had pledged his support for a 
landing and occupation of Aland. When it failed, Saumarez was almost as bitterly disappointed as the 
Swedes. 26 
As the Swedes had failed to improve their bargaining position by the sword and Saumarez could not 
compensate this failure with an attack on the Russian fleet bases, the Swedes were forced, reluctantly, 
to restart negotiations with the Russians. Sweden's bargaining position had been seriously weakened 
by the Westerbotten fiasco making the loss of Finland more certain. 27 Once minor diplomatic matters 
had been cleared U1328, the serious diplomatic business of hard bargaining could begin about the 
Russian demands for Aland and the Kahx river border. At Fredrikshamn Stedingk returned to the 
diplomatic fray and demanded, on 5 September, that Sweden retain Aland and all the land up to the 
25 KB. Autografsamlingen. Engestr6m to L6wenhjelm, 9 Aug. 1809; EnSO. X111. Charles X111 
Engesýr6m, 22 July 19-09.; SKA IX 330-342; DSH. XI. 108; Hornborg. 250-258; DSH. Ix. 18; 
Bj6rlin. FK. 320-335; SKA. IX 330-416; Quennerstedt. 11.177-247; SPBC. 96-97. Puke to 
Saumarez, 2 Aug. 1809; SPBC. 98,100-102. Platen to Saumarez, 4,23 Aug. 1809; SPBC. 103. Foster 
to Saumarez, 7 Sept. 1809; SPBC. 105-106. Hahn to Saumarez, 14 Sept. 1809; FO 73/57. Foster to 
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Kemi river. Rurnyantsev believed the Swedes were stalling for time in order to prepare another 
expedition. Caulaincourt agreed and told that him Russia had to keep Aland since to acquire Finland 
without the archipelago was like buying a trunk without the keysý9 Caulaincourt's deft analogy was 
quite accurate since Aland was the key to Finland but the archipelago was also the keyhole that peered 
straight into the heart of Sweden and had to be plugged if Sweden was to have any security from what 
was seen as a constant Russian threat to the country's precarious independence. Rumyantsev's 
solution to the diplomatic impasse, whatever his Francophile reputation, was to make a deal with the 
Swedes at the expense of the French. He proposed to the Swedes that if Russia retained Aland then 
Sweden could forego the dubious honour of membership to the Continental system. Both Stedingk 
and Skj6ldebrand were suitably unimpressed with Rumyantsev's generosity since he refused to 
guarantee Finland's autonomy or for the new'state'to take its share of Swedens huge war debts. Both 
Stedingk, the essence of polished diplomacy, and Skj6ldebrand, a temperamental Swedish officer, lost 
their patience and a ftirious, argument about the border lines ensued. 30 Skj6ldebrand, who was an 
Arctic expert and explorer, suggested that the new border be drawn along the Tome river, between the 
Kemi and Kalix river. Unless the Tome river became Sweden's new northern land border with Russia 
he would rather be tortured on the rack than sign a treaty that in addition to Aland left Russia to gain 
all of Finnish Lapland up to the Kalix river. 31 Under pressure to end a long and fruitless war which 
weakened Russia's ability to stand up to Napoleon in Europe, Rumyantsev finally relented on 12 
September and accepted Skj6ldebrands Tome river border. Five days later the treaty of Fredrikshamn 
was signed, a month later it was ratified and Stedingk returned to St. Petersburg to pick up the pieces 
of Russo-Swedish relations. 32 
Peace had returned to the north after eighteen months of the most disastrous war in Sweden's history 
and one of more successful that Russia had fought. But even for the Russians the war and the 
subsequent victory was unsatisfactory and left a sour taste in the mouth. Only the emperor, 
Rurnyantsev and fellow Francophile admiral Chichagov saw any reason to rejoice at the acquisition of 
29 Hamnstr6m. 97. 
30 TSLUB. C. Wetterstedt to Toll, 3 Oct. 1809.; Hamnstr6m. 97-100. 
31 Schiick. 24 1. Skj6ldebrand to his sister, 10 Sept. 1809; Hamnstr6m. 103 -104. 
32 Hamnstr6m. 101-105,107; Grade. 414416; SUPH. 111.129-130. 
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Finland. 33 Their jubilation was not shared by the emperor's subjects or even immediate family 
(including his influential sister Duchess Catherine). A war that Alexander I had proclaimed 
prematurely to be at an end in May 1808 had in fact dragged on for another year and a half. This 
war, that was seen by a majority of Russians as both unnecessary and unfairly waged against a weak 
neighbour, contributed not only to undermining Russia's foreign trade but also, by diverting precious 
troops, contributed to the stalemate in the war in the Balkans against the Turks, which most Russians 
believed was a more important front. Finland was thus the meagre fruit of the unpopular Tilsit pact 
with Napoleon, instead of the rich Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia that the 
Russians had hoped to gain from it. 34 Russian disillusionment with the Tilsit pact's meagre results 
were fully matched by the French, who were angered with Rumyantsev's failure to force the 
recalcitrant Swedes into the Continental system and Caulaincourt's sarcastic comments unnerved 
RUMyantSeV. 35 
The peace of Fredrikshamn was therefore yet another nail in the coffin for the ailing Franco-Russian 
alliance. Nor did it resolve Russia's strategic awdeties about St. Petersburg's security or the stability 
of her vulnerable north western flank. The Swedes were not reconciled to the permanent loss of 
Finland and as seen earlier, were resolved with French help, to regain it. Unless Russia found 
Sweden a territorial compensation for the loss of Finland she would face a vengeful Sweden hovering 
like a storm cloud about to burst on her new Finnish border. 36 This was to remain a strategic 
nightmare for the Russians right up to 1812 as the Franco-Russian alliance gradually transformed 
itself into open enmity. The Russians therefore faced the unpalatable prospect of a two front war 
should Napoleon offer enough incentives, such as Norway and Finland, for Sweden to join his alliance 
and a pbssible invasion of Russia. Many Swedes, including Wetterstedt, relished such a prospect and 
had pre-empted Napoleon's 1812 plans by wishing for such an invasion of Russia already in late 
37 1809. 
33 Grade. 417; Hartley. 96-98. 
34 Grade. 417; Hartley. 96. 
35 Grade. 418,421. 
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Once peace had been restored with Russia it was only a question of time and patient negotiations 
before peace was restored with Derunark and France too. After all there had hardly been any fighting 
with Denmark since 1808 and none with France at all, except at sea, against French privateers 
operating from Stettin and Danzig. Peace with Denmark was delayed by the Danish demand that the 
Swedes shut their ports to British privateers which the Swedes refused since it might complicate 
relations with Britain and had not been matched by any Danish undertaking to do the same with the 
French ones which preyed on Swedish shipping. It was only by 14 November, therefore, that the 
Danish and Swedish peace delegates met in J6nk6ping in central Sweden. Adlerberg, the former 
envoy to London who headed the Swedish delegation, was astounded when the Danes failed even to 
mention Swedish membership of the Continental system. The Danes had shown themselves even 
more lukewarm adherents of Napoleon's economic blockade than the Russians and on 10 December 
therefore without a major hitch peace was signed with Denmark on the basis of 'status quo ante 
bellum '. 38 Most politically conscious Swedes outside the government realised that Napoleon would 
not be so easy to make peace with as the Danes. 39 Unfortunately that common sense view did not 
extend to the Swedish government and it was in vain that Brinkman tried to get his superiors, 
especially Lagcrbjelke and Engestr6m, to stop looking through their rose tinted glasses and stare 
reality in the face. He urged them to be more positive about the British, make use of the former 
40 
alliance to rebuild Anglo-Swedish relations and not place all their diplomatic cards on Napoleon. 
It came as no surprise that the Swedish government, which formed reality to fit its ideological 
perceptions just as Gustavus IV had done, did not heed his sensible advice. In August LagerbJelke set 
out for Paris brimming with misplaced optimism and in the mistaken belief that Napoleon would 
intervene in the Fredrikshamn talks in Sweden's favour. As if that was not enough, he seriously 
thought that Napoleon would accept that Sweden stayed a real neutral in the Anglo-French war and 
was allowed to carry on her lucrative trade with Britain. It staggers the imagination where such 
illusions could have originated but must be a sign that the post revolutionary euphoria lingered on in 
38 HSh. 111.138-139. Adlerberg to Adlersparre, 28 Nov. 1809; ibid. Adlerberg to Engestr6m, 14 
Nov. 1809; KB. Autografsamlingen. (Engestr6m). Engestr6m to Lagerbring, 12 Dec. 1809; Grade. 
444-445; SUPH. Ill. 131-132. 
39 Borelius. 253-256. Brinkman to Essen, 3 Oct, 1809. 
40 Borelius. 257-258.257-283. Brinkman to Wetterstedt, 18 Oct. 1809. 
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the government's ranks. Lagerbjelke was in for a rude shock. When he arrived in Paris in September 
his neutrality proposals, presented on 9 November, were completely ignored. As if to serve to 
increase French arrogance towards and contempt for the new Swedish government, Charles XIII had 
agreed to send a private mission under Tibell, who outdid even Lagerbjelke in fawning admiration of 
Napoleon and obsequious Francophilia. The sending of a private mission led by an amateur diplomat 
served not only to undermine Lagerbjelke's official mission but showed to the whole world how 
disunited, disorganised and all too eager the Swedes were to gain peace with France at almost any 
terms and which the French exploited ruthlessly for their own benefit. Napoleon was not, however, 
prone to negotiate terms with small powers lacking bargaining power. He simply dictated irrevocable 
preconditions that had to be fulfilled by the other, weaker part under threat of military force. But the 
reach of Napoleon's writ and threats only stretched as far as his armies could march and unless his 
armies could use Denmark for a winter invasion Sweden was beyond his reach. Nor was Russia 
likely, yet again, to scrape the Swedish chestnuts out of the fire for Napoleon by threatening Sweden 
so shortly after Fredrikshamn. In fact the Russian envoy in Paris urged the Swedes to resist the 
French demands (no doubt to use Sweden as a conduit for trade with Britain) and intervened to keep 
Sweden out of the Continental system. Some Swedes, like the new finance minister Jdrta, the former 
member of the Cederstr6m club, believed the Russians were right. With British naval protection, 
Russian diplomatic support and Danish indifference to Napoleon's northem aims, Sweden might have 
I--- been able to resist Napoleon's demands. Most of Sweden's new rulers did not care that Pomerania 
would have remained under French occupation preferring to save her neutrality and British trade 
instead- Nevertheless, blinded by their fear of Napoleon's exaggerated military power and 
Russophobia, which prevented them from exploiting Franco-Russian differences for Sweden's benefit, 
41 in Jandary 18 10 the Swedes signed a peace with France dictated by Napoleon. 
During her talks with the continental powers Sweden had to throw worried side glances at London to 
monitor possible negative British reactions to these negotiations. The collapse of the Portland 
administration left Britain without a proper government for a considerablc time since it was not until 
41 4 Ivj6. XIV. Engestr6m to Lagerbjelke, 14 Dec. 1809,3 Feb. 18 10; HBATL. 226-227. Wetterstedt q 
to Essen, 23 Sept. 1809,4 Feb. 18 10; SUPH. 111.132-133; Grade. 446-489; Tegner. Engestr6m. 322- 
327; BLA. 67. Engestr6m to Brinkman, 29 Jan 1810. 
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3 October that Spencer Perceval was nominated as Prime minister. But no politician of calibre could 
be found to replace Canning who remained as temporary foreign secretary. 42 Canning's fall from 
power was genuinely regretted by Engestr6m since he would have wished that such a sharp and cool 
headed minister would have remained to guide British foreign policy when Anglo-Swedish relations 
were facing turbulent change. 43 The Swedish government's first worry was how the British would 
react to the news of the Russo-Swedish peace Wks. On 15 September Engestr6m told Foster that 
peace with Russia, on Russian terms, was about to be signed which meant Saumarez could still use 
Swedish ports but that British depots at Gothenburg and Carlshamn had to be emptied as fast as 
possible. On 24 September Engestr6m informed August Foster, the British chargd d! affaires, that an 
embargo would be placed on British ships and goods in Swedish ports on I November and that the 
British trade depots in Swedish ports had to be shut. Foster told them that he had hoped they would 
have extended the deadline until I January and Hierta, who as finance minister was most keen to 
continue trade with Britain, extend deadline to 12 November which Wetterstedt claimed gave the 
British plenty of time to escape the imposition of the reluctant Swedish blockade. 44 
On 6 October Charles Bagot, the under-secretary at the Foreign Office, assured Brinkman that the 
British would not break off trading relations with Sweden just because of the trade embargo. Both 
regretted that Canning was leaving office when his services were needed more than ever to avert an 
Anglo-Swedish crisis. 45 That very same day Canning sent Brinkman a letter where he stated his 
regret at the losses Sweden had made in the peace with Russia but supported Sweden's peace 
endeavours. 46 Brinkman was in fact relieved and satisfied that the British reaction to the terms of 
Fredrikshamn had been muted. Brinkman believed that Britain would only announce her trade policy 
toward Sweden after the signing of Sweden's peace with France and Canning assured Brinkman that 
Britain would not react with haste. 
47 Bathurst became temporary foreign secretary on 13 October. His 
response to the Fredrikshamn treaty was very moderate and 
he claimed in talks with Brinkman that 
42 KUB. 3 95. Brinkman to Charles Mll, 29 Sept., 3,6 Oct. 1809. 
43 BLA. 66. Engestr6m to Brinkman, 5 Oct. 1809. 
44 FO 73/57. Foster to Canning, 15,22,24 Sept. 1809. 
45 KUB. 395. Brinkman to Charles M11,6 Oct. 1809. 
46 KUB. 3 95. Canning to Brinkman, 6 Oct. 1809. 
47 KUB. 395. Brinkman to Charles X111,10 Oct. 1809. 
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the British government did not intend to prevent convoys to sail for Sweden or retaliate against the 
imposition of the Swedish blockade (forced upon her by the Fredrikshamn treaty with Russia). But 
Adlersparre's presence in Gothenburg, to oversee the imposition of the blockade, aroused British 
merchants fears that the Swedes would confiscate cargoes and their ships in Swedish ports. If this 
was carried out then one of the very last links with the continent would be cut and many merchants 
wanted all out war on all continental shipping in retaliation. The Swedes in their turn feared that the 
British would attack Carlscrona. Fortunately neither the Swedish or British governments shared these 
alarmist views and Brinkman did everything to propagate against them and the view among many 
British merchants that the loss of Aland had made Sweden unable to defend British trading interests 
against Russian influence. 48 
These exaggerated and unsubstantiated fears were not shared by the British government which was 
quite pleased with the very moderate terms of the peace with Denmark at J6nk6ping. It was now the 
Swedish merchants turn to get worried about British policies since the British squadron on Sweden's 
west coast had seized a Swedish vessel in Marstrand and now refused to release it. Swedish ship 
owners and merchants feared that this heralded a return to British policies in the 1790's prior to the 
treaty of London. It did not seem to, and the British assured the Swedes this was only an individual 
case that in no way heralded a general assault upon neutral or Swedish shipping in general. 
Engestr6m on his part assured the British that if they refrained from retaliation then Anglo-Swedish 
trade, which could not be continued openly with the peace with France, could be carried on by 
smuggling under American or other neutral flagý9 
V. Swdden Between Scylla and Charbydis 
The Covert Common Cause, the Anglo-Swedish Circumvention of the Continental System and 
the Second Swedish 'Revolution', January-November 1810. 
Sweden's peace negotiations had naturally completely overshadowed Anglo-Swedish relations and 
once Sweden had made peace with her former enemies this would obviously affect these relations. 
48 KUB. 3 95. Brinkman to Charles X111,17,24,27,3 1 Oct., 7,10,14,17,21 Nov. 1809. 
49 KUB. 395. Brinkman to Engestr6m, 1,2,5,8,12,22,31 Dec. 1809; BLA. 66. Engestr6m to 
Brinkman, 14 Nov., 4,21 Dec. 1809.; ibid. Wellesley to Brinkman, 11,12,20 Dec. 1809. 
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Because neither Russia, Denmark or even France had been too insistent upon forcing Sweden to join 
the Continental system the Swedish government hoped to avoid a total cessation of diplomatic 
relations or an open conflict with her former ally. (It was never to be realised nor was it an realistic 
ambition). Brinkman therefore told Wellesley, when he saw the new foreign secretary on 14 January, 
about Sweden's reluctant adherence to the Continental system. Both agreed that it would serve 
neither side's interests if the British retaliated against the blockade by adopting 'search and seize' style 
of inspecting Swedish shipping as in the past. Wellesley claimed that he was satisfied that the more 
odious French measures against British trade had not been inserted in the Franco-Swedish peace 
treaty and that his government was determined to give all possible protection to Swedish shipping 
which after all carried mainly British goods. But he refused to give a firm answer to Brinkman's 
request that his government recognise Charles X111 which prompted Brinkman to state clearly that his 
continued residence in London under those circumstances was impossible since Napoleon could use 
50 this as an excuse to provoke a conflict with Sweden. 
On 29 January Engestr6m met Foster to reveal the terms of the Paris peace treaty which revealed the 
true state of Sweden's adherence. The few concessions that Sweden had gained at Fredrikshamn and 
MnUping had in fact been signed away by the supine Swedes (as Foster saw it) since the initial 
French leniency, to allow a limited amount of licensed Anglo-Swedish trade, had only been a tactical 
feint to get the Swedes to sign the treaty. Napoleon insisted upon Sweden's strict adherence to the 
Continental system but Engestr6m tried to soften the blow to Foster by pointing out that their mutual 
trade could be carried on through an elaborate system of smuggling. 51 Engestr6m was mistakenly 
and inordinately pleased with the Paris agreement which in his mind had secured Anglo-Swedish 
trade and he hoped that the British would keep to their promise not to harm Swedish trade or shipping 
interests in return for France's moderation and Sweden's honourable disengagement from Britain. 52 
50 KUB. 3 96. Brinkman to Charles XIII, 14 Jan. 18 10. 
51 FO 73/60.29,30 Jan., 2 Feb. 1810. 
52 BLA. 67. Engestr6m. to Brinkman, 29 Jan. 1810; FO 73/60. Foster to Wellesley, 9 Feb. 1810. 
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Engestr6m was afraid that ftill diplomatic relations with Britain could complicate relations with 
Napoleon and he used Britain's refusal to recognise Charles X111 as an excuse to end Brinkman's 
mission to London. 53 On 12 February Brinkman was privately informed that he was being recalled 
but that he was excuse his return to Sweden for private, not official, reasons since the Swedes had no 
interest in jeopardising Anglo-Swedish relations even if full diplomatic relations were ended. 54 
Brinkman admitted privately that he was glad to end his stay in London but not because of the British 
government's attitude towards his status but because of his political misgivings about the new Swedish 
regime. Many viewed his personal loyalty to Gustavus IV as disloyal to the present regime and some 
even branded him counter revolutionary. He was especially irritated with the self-congratulatory and 
arrogant attitude of the new ministers. 55 The goverment he represented was rocked by dissension 
within when Adlersparre, 'Our volatile Achilles', threatened to resign56 while outside it was beset by 
its conservative enemies. 57 Prince Christian August who had been chosen as Swedish Crown prince 
and changed his name to Charles Augustus, might be able to impose some sort of unity and direction 
on a divided and quarrelsome group of ministers. He had plans to end the endemic corruption and 
incompetence that flourished in the government but Foster predicted that he would meet stiff 
resistance. 58 At least the eýdle of Gustavus IV, who left Sweden when Charles Augustus arrived, 
reduced the risk for a counter-revolution. 59 Prince Charles's arrival and the former king's eNile was 
very timely since Charles MH suffered a minor stroke in late 1809 60 which it took the king some 
time to recover fTOM. 
61 
In London the final meeting with Wellesley was interminably delayed from January to February. 
62 
On 6 March WellesIc3f told Brinkman at a very brief meeting that he had to consult with his 
53 KUB. 3 96. Brinkman to Charles XIII, 2 Jan. 18 10. 
54 BLA- 67. Engestr6m to Brinkman, 8,12,15 Feb. 18 10. 
55 KB. Munck MSS. Ep. M. 9. Brinkman to Munck, 24 Feb. 18 10. 
56 HBATL. 3 16-3 18. dAbedyhl to unknown, 2 Jan. 18 10. 
57 HBATL. 308. Engestr6m to Essen, 2 Jan. 18 10. 
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ministerial colleagues before he gave Brinkman the final British answer in response to the Franco- 
Swedish peace treaty. Wellesley had simply agreed to Brinkman leaving the Swedish mission in 
London in the hands of a chargd d'affaires similarly to Foster had in Stockholm. Brinkman had 
expressed the hope that the British would not use force against Swedish shipping. Wellesley did not 
respond. 63 This continued silence on the part of the British with no interview or even hint of a 
meeting for another month coming from WelleSley64 worried both the British and Swedes who 
convinced themselves that this silence was very ominous and heralded, judging by the massive build- 
up of naval shipping in British ports, of an attack upon Sweden. Brinkman did not share this view 
and assured all those concerned that the naval armament was not aimed at Sweden65 but he admitted 
privately that he could be wrong and if he was then Britain was assured as devastating and 
overwhelming victory over her weakened former ally. 66 The Swedes believed that if Britain was shut 
out of Sweden that she would be in need of a safe and conveniently placed base in the Baltic. Gotland 
seemed to fit the bill well and aroused unfounded Swedish fears that the British would occupy it. 67 
If Swedish paranoia about a British attack upon them had been aroused by Wellesley's studied silence 
then the arrival of the French chargd d'affaires Desaugiers on 8 ApriI68 and the almost simultaneous 
announcement of the full, unfettered Swedish blockade against Britain aroused British fears for her 
Baltic trade and of a possible war with Sweden. 69 Desaugiers's initial moderation rapidly gave way to 
arrogant demands that Foster be thrown out of Sweden. Most Swedish ministers, unused to be treated 
with such arrogance by a junior diplomat, took strong offence to Desaugiers. Their dismay had to be 
tempered by the fact that arrogant and unpleasant though he was, Desaugiers had the ftdl power of 
Napoleon behind him. They had to be circumspect without being seen to capitulate too fast to French 
demands. Foster believed the French diplomat had been sent to Stockholm to bully the Swedes into 
total submission. Foster was shocked at the weakness of the Swedish government which gave way to 
everything Napoleon demanded. in his view (which Jarta. had voiced earlier) Sweden's insularity with 
63 KUB. 3 96. Brinkman to Charles XIII, 6 Mar., 6 Apr. 18 10. 
64 KUB. 3 96. Brinkman to Charles XIII, 13,16,20,23,27,3 0 Mar. 18 10. 
65 KUB. 396. Brinkman to Charles XIII, 3 Apr. 1810. 
66 KB. Munck MSS. Ep. M. 9. Brinkman to Munck, II Mar. 1810. 
67 BLA. 67. Engestr6m to Brinkman, 23 Mar. 1810; FO 73/60. Foster to Wellesley, 27 Apr. 1810. 
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respect to the continent gave her a stronger base than either Russia or Denmark to resist French 
demands and her economic dependence upon trade with Britain should have provided yet ffirther 
incentive to resist Napoleon's orders. But this kind of risky and hardline stance against Napoleon was 
quite alien to the weak, indecisive and divided Swedish government. Engestr6m therefore informed a 
dismayed and disappointed Foster that on 20 April that he would have to leave Sweden. 70 
The Swedish government however was very keen that a diplomatic break with Britain did not lead to 
an end to the trade between their two countries or aroused British suspicions that there were any 
secret clauses in the Paris treaty. 71 Since Brinkman had been recalled officially months earlier 
Engestr6m wanted the Baron Rehausen to act as 'special agent' after official relations with Britain 
were broken. 72 Brinkman finally had his last meeting with Wellesley on 14 May where they gave 
assurances of goodwill and co-operation on both sides but little concrete was decided. 73 Meanwhile 
dramatic events had been set off in Sweden by a most untimely death. Not that of the decrepit old 
king but of his seemingly healthy heir no less. The continued rumours of a possible war with Britain 
in late April and early May had (as in 1809) aroused Swedish fears for the security Carlscrona. (There 
had been similar fears in 1801 and 1809 when relations with Britain were uncertain). Prince Charles 
set off, in early May, therefore, on an arduous inspection tour of Carlscrona and Scania. 74 While 
admirals Puke and Cederstr6m disagreed about the best plans for defence the prince seemed to be in 
the best of health and very cheerftd. 75 During his journey to Scania where the southern army 
manoeuvres were to be held the prince overcame a slight feverish spell. 76 Or that was what the 
bulletins claimed. In fact the prince had a weak heart, the fever was not cured and he continued to be 
ill during the entire journey. 77 On 28 May, during a troop inspection in Scania the prince, already ill 
and exhausted, died of a stroke. 78 
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Brinkman arrived, therefore, in early June to a demoralised and defeated country, that had already 
been through the most turbulent phase in its history so far. Brinkman stayed in Gothenburg to 
conduct private but crucial talks with Saumarez on his flag ship the 'Victory' on 4 June. Saumarez 
assured Brinkman that he would order his fleet not to molest Swedish shipping but he would retaliate 
should the Swedes deny him supplies, water and safe (but secret) anchorage on the coast or if the 
Swedes aided enemy privateers. Brinkman was sure that his government would follow Saumarez 
proposals and not aid enemy privateers. 7' The same assurances were given to the departing Swedish 
chargd d'aftires on II June by Wellesley. 80 This gentlemens agreement for covert collaboration to 
maintain their trade and combat the effectiveness of enemy privateers was the basis for Anglo- 
Swedish collaboration for the next two years. 
These assurances could only have provided the troubled Swedish government with crumbs of comfort 
since they now faced the most serious domestic crisis since taking power. The news of prince 
Charles's death was known in Stockholm by 31 May8l and the city's population was shocked by the 
news. Had Charles XIIII died there would have been no surprise but when the relatively young prince 
died instead, rumours began immediately to spread. Even before the prince had died, rumours of 
Gustavian poisoning attempts had circulated around Stockholm. The finger of accusation was 
levelled at count Fersen, his family and political friends. 82 These rumours were spread with stories of 
general Vegesack planning to overthrow Charles XIII and place Gustavus Ws son prince Gustavus on 
the throne instead. The nobility was supposed to be collaborating with the Russians to affect this 
coup. These rurnours were spread by the radical and violent anti-Gustavian political intriguer Charles 
Grevesm6hlen whose activities were sponsored by Engestr6m who, in addition to being foreign 
ministdr, was also mirrister of the interior. Grevesm6hlen had set up his own secret police which 
primary task was to crush the Gustavian opposition to the 'new order'. 
83 The Swedish government 
was badly shaken by the prince's death since they had such high hopes for a change in 
Sweden's 
fortunes under his rule. Now it was not to be and Sweden had to go through another succession crisis 
79 KUB. 396. Brinkman to Charles )CIII, 4 June 1810. 
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at a time when the country was already badly divided.. Before he left Stockholm Foster noted the ugly 
atmosphere in the capital and the pamphlets and placards that accused the nobility, especially the 
Fersen family, of poisoning the Prince. Foster left in the nick of time since by the time he reached 
Gothenburg, 15 June, Stockholm was on the brink of revolution. 84 Desaugiers too complained about 
being surrounded by low intrigue and the unsettling calm before a storm. 85 
That storm broke on 20 June, when in an act of arrogant complacency or a mistaken sense of duty, 
Fersen, travelling in his luxurious gilded carriage accompanied the prince's funeral procession. His 
carriage was stoned by a mob amply plied with drink and money by Grevesm6hlen's 'police' agents. 
Fersen first sought refuge in an inn and then the guards barracks near the royal palace but a hundreds 
strong mob pulled him out and proceeded to kick and beat the count to death. What Engestr6m, 
Charles X111 and Grevesm6hlen had hoped would only have served as a lesson to the Gustavian 
nobility turned into a murder by a furious mob. The three conspirators had bungled badly as they had 
unleashed a bloodthirsty and uncontrolled mob into the streets of the capital and only a block away 
from the royal palace. Displaying their incompetence yet again, Adlercreutz and Klingspor, the city's 
military commanders, failed to control the situation and the mob, shouting abuse at an army that they 
believed had lost them the Russian war and Finland, stoned the troops. These fired back but the mob 
just reformed elsewhere. Charles XIII terrified at the prospect of a real, French style revolution 
showed real leadership for once by firing Klingspor and replacing him with general Skj6ldebrand. 
Skj6ldebrand believed in the efficiency in a whiff of grapeshot to crush a revolutionary mob. He 
ordered his cavalry units to charge the mobs with drawn sabres and finally by the evening, infantry 
bayonets and cavalry charges had restored order in the streets. Some 65 civilians and troops were 
dead, 200 had been wounded, 20 were arrested and 900 were interrogated. The real culprits, not even 
Grevesm6hlen, were arrested or interrogated while sporadic street fights and arson attacks were to 
86 
continue for another month in Stockholm. 
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Europe as a whole was repulsed and horrified by the gruesome murder in Stockholm and the 
subsequent violent street battles. Only the events in Madrid a year earlier and in France in 1792 could 
in any way compare with the bloody turmoil in Stockholm. Most Europeans therefore expected that 
Sweden would go the way of France. 87 The prospect of a militant, revolutionary regime possibly 
backed by a new invigorated army, such as France had got after its revolution, was not pleasant for 
Russia which feared the tunnoil could spread to Finland. It was rumoured that Alexander I was 
prepared to invade Sweden with 40,000 troops and put a Russian prince on the throne. Other 
rumours circulated that Adlersparre planned to march on Stockholm with 10,000 troops to quash a 
full scale revolution. In other words the same situation as prevailed in Sweden a year earlier with 
domestic civil war and a threatened Russian invasion. Napoleon made his displeasure at events in 
Sweden known to Lagerbjelke, with accompanying threats to intervene with troops to prevent the 
Jacobins from taking power in a country that now, at least according to himself, belonged to the 
Napoleonic sphere of influence in Europe. (Had the situation worsened in Sweden, the French and 
Russian might have intervened simultaneously with an interesting confrontation arising between the 
two by now antagonistic Emperors). Both Swedes and foreigners expected and hoped that a'strong' 
man could take over to restore Sweden to some kind of stability. 88 
The death of prince Charles necessitated that a new Diet was called to select a new heir to the throne 
to prevent new turmoil and government paralysis induced by Charles XIII's frailty. The predominant 
Francophile party favoured giving the throne to one of Napoleon's marshals who could pull Sweden 
out of her political quagmire. None favoured the candidature of such a strongman more than the 
junior officer corp of the Swedish army. On e of these young officer, the 24 year old lieutenant count 
Carl Otto M6mer, used a courier delivery to Paris to find a likely candidate among the French 
Marshalate and through a friend, as well as the recommendations of the Swedish General Consul in 
Paris, M6mer was directed to marshal Bernadotte, who has figured several times in this story. The 
Marshal was in semi-retirement since his Walcheren escapades had earned him Napoleon's 
disfavour 
and he was surprised, if somewhat suspicious, at 
being confronted at his home on 25 June by an 
87 Ramel. 293; Barton. 394. 
88 Barton. 394-396. 
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young Swedish officer's offering him the crown of Sweden. M6rner not only overcame Lagerbjelke's 
opposition to this schemes but Bernadotte got, after some delay, Napoleon's approval to take the 
Swedish crown. Back in Sweden the Diet had assembled at Orebro safely distant from the turbulent 
capital and it was excited to learn, when M6mer returned home on 12 July, that Napoleon had 
endorsed Bernadotte's candidature. Bernadotte seemed to be the answer to Sweden's prayers and the 
man that could restore Sweden's much reduced international standing and domestic tranquility. On 
21 August Bernadotte was elected Crown prince of Sweden and on 3 September Paris had received the 
news. News that left Napoleon in two minds. On the one hand he was glad to extend his influence by 
having a French marshal as eventual king of Sweden but Bernadotte was hardly his first or most ideal 
choice of candidate. To Alexander I this was yet another extension of French power that threatened 
89 Russia's western border. 
Britain, like Russia could only stand aside and observe events. By this time Britain had no way of 
influencing events in Sweden at all and the British government could only register how, step by step, 
Sweden inexorably slid into Napoleon's clutches. British influence was virtually non-existent with the 
departure of Foster from Sweden in late June. The Swedish authorities did not want to provoke 
Napoleon more than necessary by having Foster lingering in Gothenburg-90 Swedish arrangements 
was very similar. In place of the regular chargd d! affaires the former London envoy, Rehausen, was 
appointed as unofficial special agent for Swedish affairs in London. 91 After the Swedish chargd 
d! affaires departure Rehausen reminded the British government about the trade and shipping 
concessions they agreed to grant to Sweden. But despite, as the Swedes claimed, previous promises of 
leniency and co-operation the British refused to give Swedish ships, carrying British goods, 
unrestrIcted entry to British blockaded ports on the continent. 
92 The news of Bernadotte's election at 
Orebro, which reached London, by mid September probably convinced the British their 
former ally 
was sliding ever deeper into Napoleon's orbit of control and made them even 
less willing to show 
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Sweden any leniency. 93 Rehausen's suspicions about a hardening British attitude towards Sweden 
seemed have been confirmed by their government's refusal to release the Swedish ships seized during 
inspections by the royal navy. 94 
It seemed like Sweden had returned to the 'bad, old' days a decade earlier when the British seized 
Swedish merchant ships at their own whim. If Britain carried on like this then it would menace 
Sweden's flourishing commercial life. Sweden's exports rose from some 7.9 million riksdaler in 1807 
to 11.9 million in 1810 while her imports rose even more dramatically in the same years from 5.1 
million riksdaler to 16.1 million. Most of this trade was with Britain and constituted two thirds in 
1808 falling to 40% on average between 1808 to 1812.95 These figures do not give justice to the true 
state of Anglo-Swedish trade and its importance to the general conduct of the war. After 1807 Britain 
was effectively shut out of western Europe by Napoleon's Continental system which was strengthened 
by Napoleon's occupation of Holland, East Friesland, Hamburg and Oldenburg in 1810.96 
The annexations of 1810 showed clearly that Napoleon ignored all the political consequences of his 
self-defeating economic war with Britain and only diverted Britain's trade and when it began to effect 
the British economy (1810-1811) the effects of the British, then European recession, were most 
devastating to France's economy. But even more worrying was that the occupation of Oldenburg 
increased Russian disillusionment with Napoleon and provoked Alexander I to end his membership of 
the Continental system. Thus by closing a small hole in his vast European coastal rampart against 
Britain, Napoleon had opened up an even vaster one. The restoration of peace with Sweden opened 
up yet another hole in the continental wall that undermined Napoleon's 'System'. 
Sweden could help 
Britain pour their exports into Europe through the backdoor right under the noses of the 
French and 
PomerAnia had now, in a new commercial guise, shown its worth again as a strategic allied 
bridgehead. The Baltic region was the weakest section of the rampart not least because of the 
corruption of French agents there and proved the undoing of 
Napoleon's empire and commercial war 
93 KUB. 3 97. Rehausen to Engestr6m, II Sept., 26 Oct. 18 10. 
94 KUB. 3 97. Culling-Smith to Rehausen, 25 July, 30 Oct. 18 10. 
95 Erik Gr6nberg, BankosedelfrAgan under inflationstiden 1808-1812. (Lund, 1936). 14,47. 
96 Schama. 600-622. 
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with Britain for two years later, as we shall see, Napoleon chose to invade Russia and occupy 
Pomerania, in his quest to destroy Britain and ended up destroying himself 97 
Two Swedish ports played a vital but overlooked role in Britain's circumvention and sabotage of 
Napoleon's blockade strategy. Gothenburg, on Sweden's west coast, was the port of entry for Britain's 
contraband smuggling with the continent, either overland, or direct into the Baltic. Not only had the 
port to handle Sweden's own genuine exports which expanded during 1809-1810 but also handle 
British exports to Europe under neutral flag or ownership. British merchant houses handled much of 
that smuggling and made handsome profits. As fortunes were made and lost this period acquired 
notoriety as the golden 'Continental era' (180 8 to 18 14) and earned Gothenburg the title of 'Little 
London'. But not all goods were shipped from Gothenburg directly with licences that proved their 
'neutral' origins but much was hauled overland to Sweden's Baltic coast. 98 The small Swedish port of 
Carlshamn on the Blekinge coast played a vital role too as the depot for smuggled goods coming from 
Gothenburg and for their shipment to Pomerania where they were smuggled into Germany by various 
routes. But Carlshamn played also an important role as supply base for the British squadron stationed 
outside the Blekinge coast and in nearby secluded bays British warships found safe anchorage (in 
contravention Napoleon's ultimatum). The British and Swedish naval officers, the latter stationed in 
nearby CarIscrona, fraternised and collaborated quite openly having been comrades in arms earlier. 99 
If the flourishing contraband tradc was to continuc it was not only the military on both sidcs that had 
to co-operate but the Swedish civilian authorities that had to collaborate with the British as smoothly 
as their military counterparts. A key official was the governor of Gothenburg, where not only another 
British -squadron was stationed off the coast, but where most shipping and goods were dealt with. For 
once the Swedish government had picked the right man in the young, shrewd and diplomatic Axel 
von Rosen who built up an excellent rapport with the equally diplomatic Saumarez whom he 
entertained to dinner almost on a daily basis at his residence. Rosen and Saumarez's personal 
97 A. N. Ryan, The Defence of British Trade with the Baltic 1808-1813. Economic History Review, 74, 
(1954). 443-445.; KUB. 395. Brinkman to Charles XIII, 17 Nov. 1809. 
98 Ramin. 2-15.; FO 73/60 Foster to Wellesley, 29 Jan., 2 Feb., 27 Apr., 15 June 18 10. 
99 Hilding Roscngren, Karlshamns historia. III: (Karlshamn, 1949). 12-16.; FO 73/57. Foster to 
Bathurst, 24 Sept. 1809. 
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friendship and close collaboration prevented any major problems in Anglo-Swedish relations on the 
ground from jeopardising their mutually beneficial and profitable 'trade,. It also ensured that the 
French consul in Gothenburg was kept in the dark when he wasn't bribed to look the other way. 100 
That the official British attitude may have, according to Rehausen's reports, become less 
accommodating to Sweden but that mattered less since Saumarez was in charge of actual naval policy 
on the ground. Despite some Swedish officials going by the book in implementing the Swedish 
'blockade' against British warshipsI01 Saumarez allowed in September-October 1810 Swedish 
merchant vessels to proceed to Pomerania without his ships interference. 102 in return the Swedes 
were more than glad to allow Saumarez to use Blekinge 103 and Gotland 104 for anchorage and 
supplies. 
Just as Anglo-Swedish relations seemed to be reaching a plateau of stability and a working system of 
collaboration that could help undermine their common enemy Napoleon, Gustavus IV made an 
unwelcome re-appearance on the political stage. Having left Sweden in December 1809 his original 
intention had been to settle in Switzerland with his family 105 but he then spent several months 
travelling through Germany. General Skj6ldebrand, who accompanied the former royal family, was 
shocked as a anti-Gustavian revolutionary at the warm reception that Gustavus IV got from thousands 
of Pomeranians when he arrived there in December 1809 and continued German appreciation for a 
man that symbolised the anti-Napoleonic cause. This pleasant part of the trip was only marred by the 
permanent rift between Gustavus IV and the queen. Gustavus IV, never to see his wife again, 
travelled to Prussia and Russia where his presence, as a staunch enemy of Napoleon, proved a 
political burden and embarrassment. Not only could Napoleon take offence at his most vocal enemy 
being ýresent on Russian soil, which would lead to a finther deterioration of the increasingly tense 
Franco-Russian relations, but the Swedish government, suspicious about Russian support for a 
100 Rosengren. ibid. 
10, RA. militarica. (M. 1677). Lindman to Commandant of Ystad, 
102 RA. Militarica. (M. 1677). Saumarez to Swedish authorities, 23 
103 RA. Militarica. (M. 1677). Swedish Admiralty to Saumarez, 19 
104 FO 73/60 Foster to Wellesley, 29 May 18 10. 
105 FO 73/59. Foster to Bathurst, 31 Dec. 1809; FO 73/60. Foster t, 
9 May 1810. 
Sept., 2 Oct. 18 10. 
Aug. 1811. 
Wellesley, 9 Jan. 1810. 
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Gustavian. restoration, would also probably be hostile to Gustavus IVs continued presence in 
Russia. 106 
It was therefore with some relief the Russians saw Gustavus IV depart on 4 British warship on 22 
October which removed a potential storm cloud from their shores only to land in the lap of the British. 
He was given a genuinely warm and respectftd welcome from Saumarez when he arrived at the 
British naval station off the Swedish coast. Rosen was worried that the British would allow Gustavus 
IV to land or cause other political mischief for the Swedish authorities but Saurnarez assured him that 
Gustavus IV would be sent on to England. Gustavus IV landed at Yarmouth on 12 November form 
HMS 'Tartarus' to the wild cheer of thousands of common British people who, like their German 
counterparts, saw him as a champion against Napoleon and a loyal British ally. When he got into his 
carriage, the masses detached his horses and pulled it to the house where he resided for a couple of 
days and he was called upon to make several appearances at the window to the wild cheers of the 
royalist crowds. Pierrepoint went up to Colchester to find out if Gustavus IV had any political 
motives behind his trip to Britain. 107 
No doubt to Pierrepoint's relief and that of his government Gustavus IV claimed that he did not have 
any political motives or plans behind his arrival in Britain. He only wanted a place of exile where he 
could be safe from the influence of Napoleon. As usual, however, Gustavus, who had adopted the 
name of count of Gottorp flaunted convention and ignored his host's wishes by coming to London on 
21 November. Nevertheless Marquess Wellesley gave him a warm reception at a dinner which 
aroused Rehausen's fears that the British were giving the 'count' too much of their flattering 
attentions, which could only mean trouble for the Swedish government. These fears were heightened 
when R7ehausen called on Gustavus IV on 24 November, only to be politely turned away. A by now 
worried Rehausen called on Culling Smith the under secretary at the Foreign Office to find out what 
the British were up to. While he did not believe that the British were conspiring against Sweden he 
wanted, on his government's behalf, assurances that there was no plans to restore Gustavus IV to his 
106 Carlsson. 223-235. 
107 KUB. 396. Rehausen to Engestr6m, 16 Nov. 18 lo; Carlsson. 234-235. 
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throne. Culling Smith calmed Rehausen's fears that the 'count' had no political plans and the British 
were motive purely by spirit of generosity. 101 
Given the atmosphere of intrigue and tension that prevailed in Sweden during the summer and 
autumn 1810 the Swedes did not ftilly trust British assurances. But these were totally honest since the 
British had not wish to restore Gustavus IV to power given their experience of having been his ally for 
four long, hard years. Beyond showing a modicum of civility and generosity to a loyal ally that had 
fought by their side during the darkest days of the war, the British had no desire to jeopardise the 
goodwill or security of Sweden, which was a vital cog in their economic machinery of war against 
Napoleon and one day could become a vital ally. With his volatile temper and his popularity with the 
masses, Gustavus IV could also be used by the opposition to cause trouble for the British government. 
It was therefore for both domestic and foreign policy reasons that both governments, equally 
embarrassed at Gustavus IV's presence in London, with relief saw Gustavus IV depart for the 
continent in March 1811. While Gustavus IV passed into oblivion and exile in Switzerland his ally 
and former countrymen were officially at war. Gustavus IV was never again to play a serious political 
role on the European stage and with his departure the 'Common Cause' was at an end once and 
for 
all - 
109 
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Conclusion. 
One has to ask what sort of legacy the alliance left behind and how effective an alliance it had actually 
been. The historical roots for an Anglo-Swedish alliance seemed to be quite feeble since during the 
preceding century Britain and Sweden had never been close allies. Their relations were built upon 
mutually beneficial trading links and economic self-interest. Britain provided Sweden with working 
capital, investments, technical expertise and its emigrant entrepreneurs revitalised the economy after 
the Great Northern War which had devastated Sweden's economy. Sweden on the other hand was a 
supplier of raw materials, such as naval stores, forestry and fish products, and the all important pig- 
iron from her numerous iron foundries. But Sweden was jealous of British economic and military 
power which made that power able to determine the terms of trade in her own favour at the expense of 
Sweden. Unable to match Britain's vigorous economic expansion during the century the Swedes 
dismissed Britain as a mere nation of shopkeepers who had no business to meddle in either Nordic or 
European affairs. The British, if they devoted any attention to Sweden, dismissed that country as a 
Francophile state outside the pale of British foreign policy not worth bothering about. Economic 
factors and business did not therefore make Sweden and Britain natural allies. In fact Sweden's 
exports of pig-iron and naval stores to Britain were being replaced by cheaper Russian supplies. 
Overseas trade was in fact a cause of much conflict between Russia and Britain which led to several 
conflicts over maritime rights. If trading factors did not account for friendship between Britain and 
Sweden then one might have expected that they had common political aims. Gustavus III had even 
before the French revolution began to re-direct Sweden's foreign policy towards Britain. The British 
remained sceptical and suspicious about Gustavus III's motives and ambitious plans. They did not, 
like France, share the king's wish to contain or even roll back Russia (a friendly power that Britain 
depended upon for her vital supplies of naval stores). Nor were the British willing to provide large 
subsidies to provide Gustavus 1H for his highly dubious political schemes. 
The French revolution turned Sweden's entire strategic and foreign policy on its head. Gustavus III 
bequeathed to his son and heir an abiding ideological aversion to the new republican France and an 
equally ideological commitment to restoring the Bourbons if possible by the time he died 
in 1792. 
The British shared Sweden's hardline approach to containing the revolutionary contagion but they 
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never met eye to eye with Gustavus Ws plans for a full, legitimist restoration of Bourbon France. 
The question of the post-revolutionary regime to be imposed upon France divided Britain and Sweden 
throughout the alliance. Nor did they, until the treaty of London of 1803, see eye to eye on matters of 
maritime rights and obligations. Gustavus IV, who took power in 1796, proved as staunch a 
champion of neutral rights as he did that of Louis XVIII (the exiled Bourbon pretender) and he was 
an implacable foe of Britain's maritime pretensions. Had revolutionary France not existed then 
Gustavus IV might have gone down in history as the most stubborn of Britain's many enemies. In fact 
there were only three strong reasons for Britain and Sweden being allies in spite of their less than 
cordial and close relations in the past. Firstly, while the two countries perceived themselves as 
separate from the continent their sovereigns had strong links with Germany(the key to the balance of 
power on the continent) and as nations, despite their natural barriers of water to Protect themselves 
from continental turmoil, they were dependent upon the balance of power on the continent being 
maintained to preserve their independence. Secondly, the conservative British government, led by 
William Pitt (and later on George Canning), shared Gustavus Ws ideological aversion to the French 
revolutionary and later Napoleonic regimes in France. In the British case this only added to a 
national aversion to their hereditary foe across the Channel which the Swedes, for historical and 
cultural reasons, did not share. (Nor did the British share Sweden's paranoid Russophobia for 
historical, political and economic reasons). Finally, Britain, facing an ever more eNtensive and 
effective French blockade, wanted to develop her trade with Sweden and the Baltic region yet 
further 
in order to maintain her trade with the continent through Swedish ports and intermediaries. 
Despite their shared interests the alliance between Britain and Sweden did not prove an outstanding 
succesS during the first few years of its existence. One major reason 
for its relative failure was that 
neither the alliance or the war that Sweden subsequently had to 
join failed to gain the support the 
country's nobility, officer class and merchants. The alliance could therefore never 
be My effective 
without their wholehearted support and they proved unsympathetic 
to Gustavus Ws struggle against 
France from the beginning. Their aversion to a war and an ideological crusade that was quite alien 
to 
their political ftame of mind only 
deepened as the allies suffered one defeat after another. Hence 
domestic political divisions, which had festered ever since the 
Gustavian autocracy was -established 
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back in 1772, only deepened as Gustavus IV made war on France for reasons that most Swedish 
nobles believed were quite alien to Sweden's intrinsic and true interests. They wanted as fast a return 
to neutrality as circumstances permitted even if that meant breaking off relations with Britain and 
leaving Napoleon to dominate the continent. Some, luckily belonging to a minority of noble and 
upper class opinion, wanted to go one step further by siding with France against Britain and Russia. 
These sentiments were most strongly represented among many Swedish officers who admired 
Napoleon's military genius and resented fighting on the side of the so-called selfish British and the 
Russians, who in their opinion remained the natural enemy. The British government aware of the 
true sentiments of their ally's upper classes could never feel confident of Sweden's wholehearted 
support for the allied cause. 
In fact Britain's only Swedish ally was Gustavus IV himself but his motivation for his loyal support of 
the allied cause and the alliance with Britain was less due to him being an Anglophile than his 
implacable opposition to Napoleon. If a single individual could be called the architect and champion 
of the 'Common Cause' it was Gustavus IV who put his idiosyncratic stamp on the alliance. Without 
his single-minded and fanatical opposition to Napoleon the historical barriers to an Anglo-Swedish 
alliance may not have been overcome. On the other Gustavus IV contributed greatly to the alliance 
not being as effective as it could have been and its eventual downfall. On more than one occasion his 
decisions led to allied quarrels and conflicts due to his unbending sense of honour and his principles 
which were, at least outsiders, only known to himself. Britain's long serving envoy to Sweden, Henry 
Pierrepoint, had more than one occasion to lament Gustavus Ws infleNibility and how this led to 
unnecessary conflicts between the allies. (His gratuitous return of Russian and Prussian medals which 
had bedn given to Napoleon comes to mind as symbolic of that principled but impractical frame of 
mind that was at odds with maintaining civil relations with Sweden's most predatory neighbours). On 
his part Gustavus IV was constantly dissatisfied with the slowness of British decision making and the 
inadequate levels of subsidies that Sweden was paid by her ally. The question of money was a 
constant cause of contention between the allies. The British felt that they paid far too much 
for the 
services and facilities that Sweden provided while the Swedes felt the British were not only miserly 
with their money but tardy 
in paying. The Russians had similar complaints and they came to a head 
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in early 1807. The Talents, by sending expeditions across the world instead of supporting their 
European allies, had managed to alienate not only Sweden and Russia. 
A change of ministry in March 1807 came too late to save the Anglo-Russian alliance which was the 
backbone of the allied coalition. For the Russians the last straw came at Friedland when they were 
defeated by the French without any British or Swedish succour in sight. In the most dramatic change 
of foreign policy during the entire Napoleonic War Alexander I switched sides. Sweden and Britain 
were therefore from the summer of 1807 standing alone in the struggle against Napoleon. It seemed 
obvious to most observers, including Canning and the British goverment, that Sweden would be 
forced to change sides too. After all in the past Sweden had to trim her diplomatic sails according to 
the prevailing wind from the east. Gustavus W chose not to abandon the British alliance. His 
decision could not have proven more unpopular with his domestic detractors whose opposition to his 
rule and foreign orientation escalated yet further. It also gave Russia an excuse to invade Finland 
since Alexander I was obliged to browbeat Sweden into the Continental system by force of arms if 
necessary. In hindsight Gustavus IV should probably have changed sides in the war during the early 
autumn months of 1807 before it was too late. His advisers wanted Sweden to adopt neutrality which 
in the escalating struggle between Napoleon and Britain was not a viable option. Nor was the 
Swedish ministers advice that Gustavus IV appease Russia by not preparing Finland's defences 
properly particularly well thought out either. 
Poor leadership, inadequate material and defeatism in the upper echelons of the armed forces 
characterised the Swedish army during the campaign in Finland. The beginning of the end for the 
GustaAan regime, Swedish Finland and the Anglo-Swedish alliance may have been Tilsit but the 
ignominious fall of Sveaborg was just as important. It not only exposed the poor leadership of the 
armed forces but the undercurrent of defeatism and even treason that seemed to permeate the 
Swedish 
nobility and officer corps. If this could not be stemmed then Sweden would suffer the same fate as 
Prussia but again Gustavus IVs own character flaws (his despondency, wishful thinking and failure to 
provide leadership) undermined the defence effort. The British chose therefore 
in the summer of 
1808 to divert general Moore's army from Sweden which would embroil them in war with a sought 
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after possible ally (Russia) to Spain where the Spaniards proved enthusiastic allies in the war against 
Napoleon. For Sweden the outbreak of the Spanish revolt and then war of national liberation was yet 
another nail in the coffin to the Gustavian regime and the survival of the alliance. The harsh fact was 
that Canning had written off Sweden in late 1808 and now only wished to distance himself from the 
Swedish distraction without causing too much umbrage with Gustavus IV. In a world war on the 
scale of that Canning was conducting the Spanish front seemed a better choice of arena to challenge 
Napoleon on the continent than Sweden whose struggle with Russia was of secondary importance to 
Britain. Gustavus IV took deep offence at British indifference and by March 1809 he almost came to 
blows with his British ally over the perennial problem of the subsidies. 
By that time domestic discontent in Sweden boiled over into outright rebellion and that same month 
the king was overthrown. Like their opposition counterparts in Britain (the Whigs) the new regime 
sought to reverse Gustavus Ws policies. This did not work. They were forced to continue not only 
the war against Russia but in a clandestine form, the alliance with Britain, which provided Sweden 
with the naval protection her long exposed coast needed. Peace was only bought at the high price of 
losing Finland and Aland while domestic discontent exploded into a near revolution in 18 10. The 
problems of the past continued to haunt the new Sweden that had been created in 1809 and the 
country craved law, order and stability after such a long period of near chaos. In October 18 10 
marshal Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte was elected Prince Royal of Sweden. The men of 1809 who had led 
the revolution and their Francophile supporters hoped that this Napoleonic strong man would not only 
provide the country with much needed leadership but also align Sweden close to Napoleonic France. 
Within two years Bernadotte had in fact restored the foreign policy of Gustavus IV. He established a 
close alliance with Britain and Russia in order to defeat Napoleon and acquire Norway. Both 
objectives (firom a Swedish point of view) had been achieved by 1814 vindicating Gustavus lVs 
foreign policy orientation after all. 
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The Huskisson Papers. General Correspondence, 1782-183 1. Add. mSS 38734,38759,39948. 
221 
Sir Samuel Hood. Correspondence with Sir T. B. Martin. 1808-14. Add. MSS 41365-67. 
General Hope. Letters to Brigadier General J. R. Mackenzie, 1806-08. AddMSS 39198. ff-, Letters to 
Sir John Moore, 1808. Add. MSS 57541. 
Lord Liverpool. A letter proposing a commercial treaty with Sweden. Add-MSS 38236; General 
correspondence, 1801-1804. Add. MSS 38238-38240. 
Sir John Moore's Papers. Add. MSS 57320-57332,57539; Vol. 1. Correspondence with Castlereagh, 
1808. Add. MSS 57540-41; Vol. 2-3. Spain, 1808. Add. MSS 57542; Vol. 4. Letters from Romana, 
1808. Add. MSS 57543; Vol. 5. Correspondence and Letters relating to the Swedish Expedition. 
Add_MSS 57545; Vol. 7. Correspondence of members of the Moore family. Military papers, 1804- 
1809. General Order books. Add. MSS 57546-5 1; Vol. 8-13.1796-1808. Add. MSS 57552; Vol. 14. 
May-June 1808. Add. MSS 57553-54; Vol. 15-16. Oct. 1808-Jan. 1809. Letters to Sir. H. Lowe (1801- 
08) Add. MSS 20107-20240. 
Paget Papers. Pierrepoint to Paget, 1803-1807. Add. MSS 48393; Letters to Paget, 1805-33. Add. MSS 
48405; Correspondence with Alexander Straton, 1794-1805. 
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Spencer Perceval. Papers. Add. MSS 49173-86,49188-95. 
William PiU. Correspondence with Lord Auckland, 1784-1804. Add. MSS 34420- 61,46491,46519; 
Earl of Hardwicke, 1784-1805. Add. MSS 35424-762; Earl of Liverpool, 1804; Earl of Spencer, 1783- 
1804; Lord Melville, 1798,1806; Lord Grenville, 1806. Add. MSS 58906-09; Lord Wellesley, 1798, 
1806. Add-MSS 12564,13915,37274-318; George Rose. Add. MSS 42772; William Windham, 1792- 
1805. Add-MSS 37844. 
Alexander Straton. Correspondence with Lord Wellesley, 1798-1804. Add. MSS 13791-2. 
Sweden- Gustavus Adolphus: Proposed commercial treaty with Great Britain, 1802. Add. MSS 
38236. f. 139; Letters to Hood, Silverhielm to his mother and to Frederick Wilhelm HI; Letter to Otto 
Henrik von Fiandt, 1803. AddMSS 15939; Carl Gustaf von Brinkman to Lockington and Co., 16 
Jan. -21 Feb. 1809. Add-MSS 15945. 
Brook Taylor. Papers. AdcLMSS 62953-4. 
U'M Henry John Temple. Letters as Secretary of 
State for War, 1809-28.4 vols. Add. MSS 48417-586, 
49963-9. 
Richard Wellesley. General Correspondence. Add. MSS 12564-13915; Royal Correspondence, 1797- 
1841. Add-MSS 37274-318,37414-6; Correspondence and Papers relative to Foreign Affairs, 1793- 
1840; General Papers, 1809-1812. Add. MSS 37285-96; Letter Books of Correspondence. British 
Diplomats in Spain, 1809-12. Add-MSS 49979-92. 
Robert Wilson. Papers as Nfinister to Prussia, 1806-07. Add. MSS 30095-144,31147-8. 
Windham Papers. Add-MSS 37842-6,37877-8,37897-9,37903. 
Henry Wynn. Despatches from Saxony, 1804-06 (copies). Add. MSS 43353-4. 
Arthur Young. Letter to Edelcrantz, 1803 and Stjemsvtird, 1807. Add. MSS 35126-35133. 
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RIKSARKIVET (RA): STOCKHOLM 
LDEPLONIATICA. 
ANGLICA. [Britain]. 
Wan Silverhjelm, 1799-1800. Vol. 468470. 
Johan Isak Netzel, 1800-1801. Vol. 471-472. 
Carl Ehrensvard, 1800-1801. Vol. 473-475. 
Gustaf Nolcken, 1801. Vol. 476-477. 
Wan Silverhielm, 1801-1805. Vol. 478-482; Private Letters, 1801-05. Vol. 483; Letters from 
Swedish Govemment, 1801-1805. Vol. 484-5; Lettters from other authorities and individuals, 1801- 
05. Vol. 486; Legation Secretary Casstr6m's notes (commercial treaty), 1803. Vol. 487. 
Gotthard Rehausen, 1805-07. Vol. 488-491; Letters from Swedish Government, 1805-07. 
Vol. 492-494. 
Carl Adlerberg, 1807-08. Vol. 495-502; Letters from Swedish Government, 1807-08. Vol. 503-04; 
Letters from British Government, 1807-08. Vol. 505; Letters from authorities in Britain and Sweden, 
1808. Vol. 506; Letters from others, 1808. Vol. 507. 
Carl Brinkman, 1808-9. Vol. 508-511; Letters from Swedish government and others, 1808-9. Vol. 
512-3. 
British legations letters and memoranda, 1808-09. Vol. 526. 
Kabinettet fdr Utrikes brewAxIingens arkiv. Vol. 395,1809; Vol. 396,1810 (Jan- June); Vol. 397, 
1811 (June-Dec). 
Beskickningen i Londons Arkiv. Ankomna Skrivelser. Vol . 66,1809; Vol. 67,18 10; Vol. 68,18 10- 
12. 
BRANDENBURGICO-BORUSSICA [Prussia] 
Lars von Engestr6m, 1798-1803. Vol. 148-153; Carl Bonde, 1801. Vol. 154; Brinkman, 1804-08. 
Vol. 155-160; Engelbrechten, 1807. Vol. 161; Consuls: Danzig, K6ningsberg, Memel and Stettin, 
1792-1808. Vol. 162. 
DANICA [Denmark]- 
Oxenstierna, 1799-1807. Vol. 356-36 1; Taube, 1807-08. Vol. 362; Legation Documents, 1789-1807. 
Vol. 363; Borgenstierna, 1808. Vol. 364-65; Adlerberg, 1809. Vol. 366; Documents from peace 
negotations, 1809. Vol. 367; Gl6erfelt, 1786-1807. Vol. 445; Gustmeier/Gram, 1790-1809. Vol. 446; 
Letters from King Christian and King Frederick, 1766-1807. Vol. 452. 
GALLiCA [France] 
Holstein, 1787-1800. Vol. 484; Brinkman, 1799-1800. Vol. 489; EhrensvArd, 1801-1804. Vol. 490-6; 
Akerblad, 1804. Vol. 497; Bonde, 1801-02. Vol. 502; Signeul, General Consul, 1792-1809. Vol. 504- 
6; Letters, 1792-1809. Vol. 507-8; F61sch, Consul in Marseille, 1787-1807. Vol. 512; Chauvel and 
Reinecke, Consuls in Le Havre, 1780-1807. Vol. 514; Other Consulates: Bayonne, Croisie, Dunkirk, 
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Rouen, 1731-1805. Vol. 515-6; Letters from dignitaries of the French Republic and Imperial Family, 
1794-1809. Vol. 523; French statement's letters to Swedish monarchs, 1562-1808. Vol. 524; 
Documents concerning French privateering, 1563-1806. Vol. 56 1. 
GERMANICA [Imperial Austria] 
De La Gardie, 1799-1802. Vol. 575-580; Silfverstolpe, 1801-1802. Vol. 581-2; Armfelt, 1802-1805. 
Vol. 583-584; Duben, 1805-1809. Vol. 585-588; Consul in Trieste, 1781-1806. Vol. 589; Letters from 
Austrian Monarchs, 1792-1805. Vol. 595; Letters from Austrian Statesmen, 1804-1805. Vol. 596; 
Austrian Mission. Notes and memoranda, 1795-1809. Vol. 600. 
HISPANICA [Spain] 
Adlerberg, 1799-1809. Vol. 41-49; Consuls, 1739-1807. Vol. 52. (Alicante, Barcelona, Malaga. ); 
Consul in Cadiz, 1696-1808. Vol. 53; Letters from Spanish monarchs, 1788-1807. Vol. 56; Spanish 
Legations Notes and Memoranda, 1742-1809. Vol. 57; Collected documents. Spain and Sweden, 
1572-1808. Vol. 58. 
MUSCOVITA [Impedal Russia] 
Curt von Stedingk, 1790-1808. Vol. 451-487; Letters from King in Council, 1790-1808. Vol. 489- 
508; Notes ftom Russian Government, 1790-1808. Vol. 514-5 1; Letters from Swedish Government, 
1790-1808. Vol. 517; Letters from Swedish Missions: Berlin, Vienna, Hamburg and Swedish consuls 
in Russia, 1790-1808. Vol. 518-523; Letters from Post-commissioner in Abofffors, 1791-1808. Vol. 
524-27; Documents concerning treaty of commerce and navigation, 1801. Vol. 530; Legation 
documents, 1790-1806. Vol. 537; Letters from Consul in St. Petersburg, 1761-1808. Vol. 606; Letters 
from von Schenbom, 1791-1808. Vol. 606; Libau, Moscow, Riga and Viborg, 1778-1808. Vol. 608; 
Letters from Russian princely houses, 1560-1808. Vol. 626; Memoranda and Notes of Russian 
Envoys, 1719-1808. Vol. 630; Documents concerning negotiations between Russia and Sweden, 1560- 
1808. Vol. 654-5; Special Peace Mission to Russia. Stedingk and Skj6ldebrand, 1809. Vol. 538; Draft 
of treaty of Fredrikshamn. Vol. 539; Mission documents. Vol. 540. 
SAXONY 
Heland, 1797-1805. Vol. 676-8; Received letters, 1795-1805. Vol. 685-686. 
KABINETTET F45R UTRH-CES BREWAXLING 
A-2 A- Ministerial Protocols. Secret protocols concerning peace negotiations with France, Russia and 
Denmark, 1809. Vol. 1. 
B. Outgoing Documents. Various Missions. Berlin, London, Madrid, Paris, St. Petersburg, Vienna, 
1800-1809. Vol. 174-210. 
C. Diaries. 
Foreign Ministers' outgoing documents, 1742-1809. 
1796-1800 Vol. 8. 
1801-1805 Vol. 9. 
1806-1809 Vol. 10. 
D. Received documents. Kabinettet fdr utrikes brevvaAing. UD. Huvudarkivet. 
Inkomna handlingar. Huvudserie. EIA. 
Letters, memoranda and notes to F. W. von Ehrenheim, 1801-1809. 
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Letters from Gustavus IV and others. Vol. 36. 
Letters from several individuals. Vol. 37. 
Letters from Gustavus IV. Vol. 38. 
Letters from Wetterstedt, 1805-6. Vol. 39. 
Letters from Wetterstedt, Jan. -June 1807. Vol. 40. Letters from Wetterstedt, July-Dec. 1807. Vol. 4 1. 
Letters, memoranda and notes to Wetterstedt, 1805-09. 
Letters from several. Vol. 43. 
Letters from Ehrenheim. Vol. 44. 
Letters from Lagerheim. Vol. 45. 
DESPATCHES FROM GOVERNORS. G6teborg och Bohus LAn. 1758-1809. Vol. 1. 
KONSELJPROTOKOLL I ORIGINAL. 1800-1809. Vol. 67-132. 
KONSEIJPROTOKOLL I RENSKREFT. 1799-1805. Vol. 12-18. 
STATSRADSPROTOKOLL. 1809. Vol. 1-3. 
KANSLISTRYRELSEN. 
Renskrivna Protokoll. A-2. Vol. 1. Nov. 1809-June 1810. 
Koncept till utgaende skrivelser. B. 1. Vol. 1.1809- 10. 
Registratur allman serie C. 1. Vol. 28.1809- 10. 
Diarier. C. 11. Vol. 40a. 1809-11. 
PRIVATE ARCHIVES IN RIKSARKWET 
Boije af Genniis papers. Letters from Gustav IV to Boije. 
Cronstedtska Almanacks samling. Almanacker ur Fuller6 arkiv. 
Ehrenheim. Archive. 1754-1827.2 volumes. 
Essen Papers. 1755-1824. The private papers of the Field-Marshal and General-Governor of Swedish 
Pomerania and Norway. (E. 3590-3605). Vol. 1. Drafts of letters, 1803-07. E. 3590. Pommerska 
handlingar; Vol. 6. To 1800. E. 3585; Vol. 7.1801-05. E. 3596; Vol. 8.1806-07. E. 3597; Vol. 9.1808- 
13. E. 3598. Str6dda handlingar, 1808-20. E. 3603. 
Ghan Papers. 1809-1810. 
Giertta-Puke Papers. 1751-1816.4 volumes. Private papers of Admiral Puke. (E. 3698-3701). 
Grieff Papers. Notes oR the 1809 March Revolution. I volume. (E. 9315). 
Rirta Papers. Private papers of the Secretary of State. I volume. 
Lagerbjelke Collection. Vol. 11. Drafts of letters, notes and copies, 1801-37. E. 4446; Vol. 12. Orders 
and letters, 1779-1837. E. 4447; Vol. 13. Letters from royalty, 1807-27. E. 4448; Correspondence with 
Ehrensvtird, 1802-04; 99 letters. E. 4449; Correspondence with Engestr6m, Essen, Fersen, Lagcrheim. 
1803 -04 E. 4450; Letters to Lagerbielke. E. 445 1; 
Correspondence with Rosenblad, 1803 -05. (3 7); 
Toll, 1801-05; Ugglas and Wachtmeister. Letters from Gustavus IV, 1805. E. 4456. 
Lagerheim Archive. Letters, notes and memoranda of Gustavus IV's Minister of Finance. 
Contains accounts of the currency exchange fund, 1805-09, and war finances, 1805-10.78 volumes. 
(E. 44594536). 
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LaIng PaPers. General consul in G6teborg. Letters from various. I volume. (E. 9983). 
LefTdn Collection. 1784-1862. 
Libecrantz Collection. The collected papers of the President of 'Kommerskollegium'. 1730-1815.9 
volumes. (E. 4655-4663). 
L6wenhielm Collection. Mission to Berlin. 1805; Correspondence with Gustavus IV, Tibell, Armfelt 
and Essen. E. 468 1; Memoirs. Gustavus IV, Charles XIII, Crusenstolpe, Lagerbielke; Wetterstedt and an autobiography of himself-, Comments to Schinkels "Minnen". Replies to questions by Schinkel; Memoranda about General de Suremain; Notes about Bj6mstjema; Review of J. Brown's "Les Cours du Nord"; Copy of "Notice sur la revolution en Suede". E. 4685; Letters to L6wenhielm from several. Mainly from 1806. E. 4687. 
Montgomery Collection. Parts of the Ehrenheim family archives. 23 volumes. (E. 4806-28). Ehrenheim Archive. Short biographical notes. Letters to Ehrenheim. E. 4806. 
The Nauckhoff Collection. Admiral Nauckhoffs collected papers, 1788-1848.3 volumes. (E. 9653- 55). 
Quiding Papers. Letters and documents, 1778-1846.2 volumes. (E. 5117-8). 
Reutersvdrd Papers. Travel diaries. May 1792-July 1818.1 volume. (E. 5148). 
Ruuth Collection. Collected letters. Documents of political and economic interest. 12 volumes. 
(E. 5212-5223). 
Reuterholm Collection. Gustaf Adolf Reuterholm's letters, 1756-1813. 
Reutersward Archive. Diaries. Vol. 2.1792-1803; Vol. 3.1803-1818. 
Silffing Archive. Letters and documents belonging to Gustav IV from the period after the 1809 
revolution and during his e)dle in Europe. 16 volumes. (E. 6887-6902). 
Sj6holm Archive. Letters to Charles M11. I volume: Letters to Charlotte Gyldenstope from C. G. von 
Brinkman- 
Stafsund Archive. The Fersen Family archive. Letters, diaries and memoranda belonging to Hans 
Axel von Fersen. 1755-1810. 
Stedingk Archive. Curt von Stedingk's Archive. The Swedish Archive. Drafts of letters and 
despatches, 1795-1836. Vol. 69-72. E. 6584-87; Despatches, 1800-1807. Vol. 82-87. E. 6597-6602; 
Letters'from family, 1759-1812. Vol. 93-94., E. 6608-09; Letters from Royalty, 1788-1828. Vol. 102. 
E. 6617; Letters from others, 1790-1807. Vol. 107-118. E. 6622-6633; Letters and Notes from 
Russians, 1790-1807. Vol. 119-121. E. 6634-6; Letters and Notes from Swedish authorities, 1790- 
1807. Vol. 122-125. E. 6637-6640; Letters to Stedingk, 1808-1836. Vol. 126-135. E. 6641-50; Other 
documents. Royal letters and orders. Documents concerning delivery of weapons to Russia, 1806-07. 
Border negotiations. Treaties. The events of 1808-09. Vol. 182-188. E. 6697-6703; Ludvig von 
Stedingk's diary. Vol. 211-212. E. 6726-7. 
SAvstaholm Archive. Georg von Rigerhom and Lars Jakob Rook. (E. 9318-9457). Gustaf Trolle- 
Bonde. 24 volumes. (E. 9458-81). 
Toll Archive. Papers and letters of Christoffer Toll. Correspondence with Baron Henning. I vol. 
(E. 5772). 
Tosterup Collection. Documents and letters from the revolution of 1809 belonging to Isak 
Silversparre. Taken at Gripsholm from Gustavus IV. 
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Tronheim Collection. Documents about the events of 1809.2 volumes. 
Sven Tronheim. Private papers, 1809-1837.1 volume. 
Uggla Family Archive. Samuel af Uggla's papers, 1750-1812; Per-Gustaf af Uggla's papers, 1784- 1853.7 volumes. (E. 5927-5633). 
Wetterstedt-Gyldenstolpe Collection. Foreign Nfinister Gustaf af Wetterstedt's private archive, 1776- 1837.12 volumes. (E-6019-30). 
H6mingholm Collection. Charles De Geer's papers, 1747-1805.199 volumes. (E. 2739-2938). 
The Royal Autograph Collection. Essays on Military matters. Reference to a conversation between 
Gustavus IV and Marshal Brune. Speech to the Pomeranian Diet. Letters from the King to: Louis 
XVIR, His mother, Frederick Wilhelm III, and several other persons after the revolution. 
KUNGLIGA BIBLIOTEKET (KB). 
d 1029. G. W. af Tibell. Svenska Arm6ens FAIttAg i Tyskland. 1805-06. 
d. 1030. G. Montgomery. flistoria om Finska Kriget 1808 och 21 bilagor. 
d- 103 1. A-Hanunarskj6ld. NAgra erindringar mot... (G. Lagerbring i Historisk Tidsskrift). 
d, 1032. C. O. M6mer. Anteckningar r6rande Stralsunds belagnng. 1807. 
d- 103 3. Kartor, signalbrev, projekter, fdrslag m. m. Under kriget 1808. Fran Klerckers papper. 
d. 1034. H. G. von Rausswolf. 1762-1840. Journal 6fver Sveaborgs behigring. A. E. S. von Hausswolf, 
1789-1842. Journal i Rysk fangenskap, 1808-09. 
d- 1035. Nils Rosenblad Memoranda till Gustav IV Adolf. 
cL 1037. E. F. K6ning. Kustarmdens krigshistoria. 1808 och 1809. 
d. 1038. Ryska bref tagna af en Courier. Stockholm, 1808. 
d. 1039. C. C. Gj6rwell. Annaler fdr Aren 1801,1804,1806 och 1808-11. 
d. 1040. R. G. Hochschild, 1752-1806. (Expeditionssekreterare). Anledningar till Svenska Historien 
under Konung Gustav IV Adolf, 
d. 104 1. J. C. af Puke, 1801-1878. Anteckningar r6rande Konung Gustaf IV Adolf. 
d. 1042. G. Adlerspaffe. Berattelse om revolutionens uthrott i Wermland 1809. Daterad Mariestad, 16 
Dec. 18 10. 
d. 1043. Betalningar till Admiral Cronstedt. 
d. 1044. Str6dda handlingar och uppsatser r6rande Sveriges historia under Gustaf IV Adolfs 
f6rmyndartid och egen tid. 
d. 1046. Gustav IV Adolfs brev till General-Major Klercker. 1803-09. 
d. 1048. Handlingar r6rande Sveriges Regerings fdrAndring som intraffade 13 Mars 1809. 
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d. 1050. Berättelse om Expeditionen till Westerbotten med Kustarmeen 1809 af generalintendenten 
vid Kustarmeen, G. F. Klingstedt. 
d. 1053. Brev till Carl ME 1. Brev frAn Gustaf IV Adolf, 1798-1808.2. Brev frAn G. M. Armfelt, 
1897-09.3. Brev frAn Klingspor, 1793-1808.4. Brev frin G. W. Tibell, July-Nov. 1808.5. Brev frAn 
J. W. Tomerhielm, 1805-09.6. Brev frAn Toll, Sept. -Oct. 1808. 
d. 1054. Brev till Hertig Carl af Wermanland. FrAn Battram, 1794-1808. Aminoff, Armfelt, 
BergenstrAlhe, Bonde och minga andra, 1793-1808. 
d 1055. Originalbrev frAn Carl )all till Gustaf M6mer, Lagerheim och Wegelin. 
d. 1060. Calender f6r 1804 och 1805. Dagboksanteckningar av Hertig Carl. 
& 106 1. Handlingar ur von Brinkmanska Arkivet pa Trolle-Ljungby. Utgiven af Gustaf Andersson och 
C. Cavallin. 
d. 1062. Originalbrev frAn Hertig Carl till Baltazar von Platen, 1808. 
d. 1064. Handlingar och anteckningar r6rande h6gmAlet mot Guvem6ren Falkberg pd St. Barthdldmy 
f6r att uppge kolonin till f. d. Konungen Gustaf IV Adolf. 
d- 1065. Historiska handlingar frin aOren 1809-14. Del. 3. StatsrAdsprotokoll angiende 
kTigsfdrklaringen mot England 18 10. 
d. 1070. Str6dda handlingar och uppsatser r6rande Sveriges historia under Kung Carl X[II och huset 
Bernadotte efter 1809. Avskrifter. 
d- 1072. Precis historique des campagnes du 1. er Corps de la Grande Arm6e ans 1806 et 1807, par 
Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte. 79 skrifna, blad. I volym. 
ENSKILDA BREVSAMLINGEN (EP) 
Ep. 4: 1-4. C. C. Gj6rwell. Samling av brev. Del. IV. 1797-1811. 'P- 
Ep. A: 1. Brev frAn Georg Adlersparre. Del. 1.1796-1808. 
Ep. A. 2 1. Brev frin S. E. Albom. 1806-20. (175). 
Ep. B. 8. Brev till och frAn E. G. Borg. 
Ep. B. 10. Brev till P. A-Borg- 
Ep. B. 14. Originalbrev-af C. G. von Brinkman. Till Marianne Ehrenstr6m, 1796-1837; Till 
Adlersparre, Arwidsson, Askeld, Geijer, Nordstr6m, Suchtelen. 1816-45. 
Ep. B. 14: 2. Brev frAn Brinkman till Agnes Edholm, 1830-46. 
Ep. B. 15. Brev frAn Brinkman till Gustaf Anton von Brinkman. Justitiekansler i Skine. 
Ep. B. 22. Brev frAn Brinkman till Sophie Brun, dansk fdrfattarinna, 1817-18. 
Ep. D. 5. Brev till och frAn W. F. Dalman. Adlersparre, Bj6mstjema, H. Hamilton, H. Hartmansdorrf, 
Johan Jdrta, m-m- 
Ep. D. 5. Brev till Edelcrantz. Folio 4.420 letters from several people of interest. 
228 
Ep. 10-12. Engestr6mska Samlingen. Vol. 6-10.1801-10. 
Ep. G. 7-19. Gj6rwellska Samlingen. Brev till Gj6rwell. Vol. 1,1800-1811. Vol. 25-34,1801-18 10. Brev frAn Gj6rwell. Vol. 45-61,1800-1811. 
Ep. G. 2 1. Brev till P. A. Granberg. 
Ep-G. 25- BrewWing mellan Gustav, Prins av Vasa, son till Gustav IV, och Kammarherre Magnus Lagerberg. 1870-77. 
Ep. H. 2: 1-7. BrewWing. Vol. 1,1803-1809. 
Epj. 9. Brev till Georg H. Jdgerhom. 
Ep. k. 6. Georg N. Klercker. Vol. 4. Handlingar 1800-08. Fredsbrott med Ryssland Vol. 5. Finska kriget, 
1808-09. 
Ep. M. Brev till Professor Eberhard Munck af Rosensch6ld. Brev frdn Brinkman under Rosensch6lds 
vistelse i England. 
Ep. P. 5: 1-3. Brev frAn Baltazar Bogislav von Platen. Brev frAn Saumarez och andra, bi. a. Telford 
(1808-28), RajalinWirsen (1809-27), Gustav Hope. 
Ep. R-4. Brev till och frAn Rosenblad Vol. 1. Korporationer och myndigheters brev tiff Rosenblad, 
1775-1847. Vol. 2. Enskilda Kungliga brev. Vol. 3. Enskilda brev. Privata, 1798-1846. Vol. 4. Ovriga, 
1785-1815. Vol. 5. Brev frAn Rosenblad, 1793-1845. 
Ep. R-5. Brev till landsh6vdingen Nils von Rosenstein, 1755-1824. 
Ep. S. 10. Brev till von Schwerin, 1763 -1820. 
Ep. S. 13. Brev till och frAn Johan Tobias Sergel. 
Ep. S. 14. Brev till Envoyen Wan Ulric Fredriksson Silfverhielm, 1762-1819. 
Ep. S. 15. Diverse brev till Silfverhielm. 
Ep. S. 16. Diverse och Kungliga brev till Silfverhielm. 
Ep. S. 16a. Brev till Catharina Sophia Silfversparre, 1795-1807. Uppgifter om svenska uppfattning om 
Preussiska krisen 1806. 
Ep. S. 57. a. Brev till General P. von Suchtelen. 
Ep. T. 10. Brev frAn Thim till J. M61ler, 1804. 
Ep. T. 15. Brev fran Toll till Overste Dahnfelt, 1801-1817. 
Ep. V. 4. Brev till P. A-Wallmark. 
Ep. V. 6. Brev till Gen. Majoren Frih. Ernst von Vegesack under Finska fdIttfiget 1808. 
LE-p. V. 17-18. Brev till och 
frAn Gustaf af Wetterstedt, 1776-1837. (286). 
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Aberdeen University Library. 
Fraser. Family and Nfilitary correspondence, 1806-53. 
Charles Arbuthnot. Private and Official Papers, 180249. 
Alnwick Castle. 
Duke of Northumberland Library and Archive. 
John Fiott-Lee. Correspondence with Sir Hugh Percy, the Third Duke of Northumberland. 
Bedford Estate. 
Some papers of Sir Robert Adair. 
Buckinghamshire Record Office. 
Correspondence and papers of John Fiott-Lee. 
Papers of Robert Hobart. Secretary of State for War, 1801-04. (D/MH). 
Cumbria Record Office. 
Sir Charles Bagot's Papers. Letters from George Canning, William Pole and others, 1808-36. 
Nfiscellaneous papers relating to his career, 1805-43. 
Londsdale MSS. Pitt's Letters to Earl of Londsdale, 1783-1805. (DALONS). 
Derbyshire Record Office. 
Alleyne Fitzherbert. Despatches, 1777-1802. Correspondence, 1781-1804. Reports on drafts, 
treaties, notes and other documents, 1777-1817. Family and other correspondence 1785-1839. 
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